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Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions keep occurring from time to time in process 
plants, storage areas and transportation by road or rail, often with severe effects. There is 
no doubt that a better knowledge of their main features will help in decreasing both their 
frequency and their consequences. 
This is the main aim of this thesis: the analysis of the main causes of BLEVEs, the 
improvement in the prediction of their effects and consequences and, finally, the 
definition of simple measures to be applied in the management of emergencies associated 
to these events. 
Historical analyses have been performed to determine the prevalence of BLEVEs among 
all major accidents in fixed plants and in the transportation of hazardous materials, as well 
as their main causes; the action of fire as domino effect escalation has also been studied, 
with special attention to the time to failure of a vessel in such a situation. 
The different existing methodologies for the estimation of the peak overpressure are 
presented and compared, and the diverse uncertainty factors affecting the prediction of 
BLEVE mechanical effects are analyzed. 
A new and relatively simple methodology has been proposed to predict the blast effects 
of these explosions, which allows a quick and accurate estimation. Finally, based on all 
these analyses, simple emergency management measures are proposed which could 








Encara avui, en plantes de procés, àrees d’emmagatzematge o en el transport per carretera 
o ferrocarril, de tant en tant es continuen produint les explosions anomenades BLEVE 
(Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion, en català explosió del vapor en expansió 
d’un líquid bullent), sovint amb efectes molt severs. No hi ha cap mena de dubte que 
conèixer millor les principals característiques d’aquestes explosions permetrà reduir-ne 
tant la seva freqüència com les seves conseqüències. 
Aquesta és precisament la principal finalitat d’aquesta tesi: l’anàlisi de les causes 
principals de les BLEVEs, la millora en la predicció dels seus efectes i conseqüències i, 
finalment, la definició de mesures que siguin senzilles d’aplicar quan es produeixen 
emergències associades a aquest tipus d’esdeveniment. 
S’han dut a terme anàlisis històriques per a determinar la prevalença de les BLEVEs 
d’entre tots els accidents greus que es poden produir en instal·lacions fixes i durant el 
transport de mercaderies perilloses, així com també per a determinar-ne les causes 
principals. També s’ha analitzat l’acció que exerceix el foc com a element desencadenant 
d’efecte dominó, fent especial atenció al temps que trigarà un dipòsit en esclatar quan es 
veu sotmès a la seva acció. 
També es presenten i comparen les diverses metodologies existents per a l’estimació del 
pic de sobrepressió produït en una BLEVE, i s’analitzen els diversos factors d’incertesa 
que afecten la predicció dels efectes mecànics generats en una BLEVE. 
S’ha presentat una metodologia nova i relativament simple per predir els efectes d’aquest 
tipus d’explosions, que permet fer estimacions ràpides i acurades. Finalment, en base a 
totes aquestes anàlisis, s’han proposat mesures senzilles per a la gestió d’aquest tipus 
d’emergències que poden ajudar a reduir significativament les conseqüències de les 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Risk and industrial activities 
There is no doubt that industry –and, more specifically, chemical industry– has implied a 
significant improvement in human life. It has given us fuels, medicals, paintings, 
detergents, insecticides, etc. Thanks to all these products, life expectance in industrialized 
countries has improved continuously in the last decades. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that with the industry and its related activities –including 
process plants, storage areas, transportation of hazardous materials– new risks have also 
appeared. New severe accidents –the so-called major accidents– have occurred, 
associated to them: fires, explosions, toxic releases. The consequences of these accidents 
can reach distances beyond the contour of the industrial plant or far from the 
transportation path. Even though both the industry and the administration realized this 
very soon, and regulations were issued and appropriate measures were taken in most 
industrialized countries, it is a fact that from time to time severe accidents occur. Process 
industry grew significantly after the Second World War and, with it, the storage and 
transportation of dangerous goods continuously increased. Due to these factors, the 
frequency of industrial accidents also increased, especially in developing countries. The 
effort to improve the safety of industrial activities must therefore continue to decrease, as 
far as possible, their risk.  
It is a fact that the risks to which people are subjected have changed significantly with the 
industrialization of society: some of them have practically disappeared and some new 
hazards have appeared. 
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Everybody understands what “risk” means. However, to analyze it, a strict definition 
allowing its quantification is required. Among the diverse definitions proposed, this one 
is nowadays the most widely accepted: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 × 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 
A quantitative assessment of risk implies, according to this definition, the knowledge of 
the frequency with which a given event will occur and the estimation of its consequences 
on people, environment and equipment if it occurs. Both variables can be predicted but, 
even if a significant effort has been devoted to this field, this prediction implies still a 
significant error in some cases. The essential aspects of certain accidents are not 
sufficiently known and the frequency with which they could happen depends on many 
circumstances. As a whole, the analysis of the risk associated to a given installation or 
activity involves nowadays a significant uncertainty. This is why an effort must be done 
to improve our knowledge on major accidents, on their main features, on their physical 
effects and consequences and, even, on their expected frequencies. 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the knowledge of one of the most severe major 
accidents that, unfortunately, occur from time to time: the BLEVE, a mechanical 
explosion that often is coupled with a thermal phenomenon, the fireball. 
 
1.2 Major accidents 
Industrialization has had a tremendous effect in everyday life. Even if its main aim is to 
make human life easier and safer, some problems and undesired events can unfortunately 
happen. These problems sometimes show themselves as steady state polluting situations, 
sometimes as accidents which can have consequences on people, equipment and 
environment. 
Based on the extent of those accidents, they can have different effects on their 
surroundings. Specifically, the occurrence of major accidents is possible in chemical 
plants and also during transferring, transporting and storing of hazardous substances. 
Some of those accidents have had inevitable effects on people and on the surrounding 
environment. Moreover, a few of them, because of their specific characteristics and severe 
consequences, caused fundamental changes in legislation and in safety culture. Major 
accidents such as those of Flixborough (1974), Seveso (1976), San Juanico (1984) and 
Bhopal (1984) had an important impact and, as a consequence, a significant effort was 
done in industrialized countries to improve the safety of certain plants and activities. 
The definition and main features of major accidents is discussed here, with a special 
emphasis on their main effects (thermal radiation, overpressure and dispersion of toxic 
compounds). 
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Major accidents can be defined in different ways. An official one is that contained in the 
Council Directive 2012/18/EU on the control of major-accident hazards involving 
dangerous substances (also known as the Seveso III Directive): 
“An occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or explosion resulting from uncontrolled 
developments in the course of the operation of any establishment (this defined as the 
whole area under the control of an operator where dangerous substances are present in 
one or more installations, including common or related infrastructures or activities), and 
leading to serious danger to human health or the environment, immediate or delayed, 
inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances”  
Furthermore, Meyer and Reniers (2013) proposed the following definition:  
“A major accident (disaster) as an event that is brutal and sudden and of an enormous 
dimension. It has severe consequences that are accompanied by destruction of goods 
and/or deaths” 
Indeed, the release –instantaneously or over a short period of time– of a significant 
amount of energy or hazardous materials is closely associated to the occurrence of major 
accidents. Consequently, thermal (thermal radiation), mechanical (blast and ejection of 
fragments) and chemical (release of toxic material) effects are the dangerous phenomena 
following such accidents. These phenomena can have an effect on people, property and 
environment. 
Besides the direct effects, people can be psychologically harmed. Furthermore, equipment 
and buildings can be badly damaged in the occurrence of a major accident. Additionally, 
the release of hazardous materials into the soil, water or the atmosphere can imply another 
impact on the surrounding environment. Finally, a major accident can have an effect on 
intangible assets (e.g., brand) of the company involved. 
The occurrence of such accidents is associated to the release, often instantaneous or in a 
short time, of a hazardous substance or of energy. If this occurs, the evolution of the risk 
situation will depend on the meteorological conditions, on the amount of substance 
released and on the distance to the vulnerable targets. The diverse possibilities have been 
plotted, in a simplified scheme, in Figure 1-1 (Casal, 2008). 
There are various possible scenarios. When a hazardous substance is released, its physical 
condition (liquid, gas or vapor, particulate solid or two-phase mixture) is an important 
factor to define the evolution of the event. 
The spilled hazardous material can penetrate into the soil if it is in liquid phase; this can 
imply ground water contamination and soil pollution. This scenario happens in the 
absence of any concrete layer, when the spilled liquid can contact directly to the soil. On 
the other hand, contact of the spilled liquid with surface water can cause water pollution. 
In both cases, if a pool is formed (in the case of a spill on water, when both liquids are 
immiscible), the evaporation of the substance may happen. 
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If a released liquid originates a pool, a pool fire can emerge in presence of an ignition 
point if the material is flammable. The smoke of pool fire is sooty and possibly toxic in 
the case of a toxic material. Nearby equipment can be affected by intense thermal 
radiation of the pool fire. When there is no immediate ignition, the formation of a toxic 
or flammable cloud will be possible. If that flammable cloud meets an ignition point later 
on, a flash fire will be possible and an explosion can also occur, depending on the amount 
of material in the cloud and the confinement degree.  
The evolution of a toxic or flammable cloud depends on the wind and on the 
meteorological conditions. A toxic cloud can have potential dangerous effects on people 
in the affected area. A vapor cloud is also likely to be generated from released material in 
liquid-vapor state (two-phase flow, usually from the release of a hot and pressurized 
liquid). Because of the evaporation of liquid droplets, the volume and concentration of 
the vapor cloud can be increased.  
The speed of the material released in gas-vapor state is an important factor for predicting 
the further scenarios. In the case of low-speed exit, the formation of a cloud is probable. 
On the other hand, releasing of the material at high speed (often the sonic one) will only 
cause atmospheric dispersion, due to the strong turbulence of the jet and the associated 
entrainment of air, which dilutes the release. However, if the substance is flammable, a 
jet fire can occur, with a strong thermal flux. 
Dust or dispersed fine particles have a potential to cause an explosion inside its container 
or inside a building. Due to the confinement, such explosion can have very severe effects, 
damaging a significant area. If fine powders are released into the atmosphere, and 
depending on the prevailing atmospheric conditions, a toxic cloud can be originated (for 
example, a released of soybean dust can give rise to allergic effects on population, as 
happened years ago in the Barcelona port). 
Finally, a container or vessel –a tank, a reactor, etc.– can explode if the pressure inside it 
exceeds a certain value (e.g. it exceeds the design pressure of the vessel) or if the container 
fails by an impact (for example, in the case of a road accident), or the vessel is engulfed 
by fire and loses its strength as a result of the wall heating. The blast and ejection of the 
fragments are the possible effects of such explosion (often called a BLEVE). Moreover, 
if the contained liquid is flammable, the explosion is usually followed by a fireball. 
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Figure 1-1.Major accidents: simplified schema (modified from Casal (2008)). 
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1.3 What is a BLEVE? 
Even though a BLEVE is a very severe accident, it is still insufficiently known. In this 
section, the definition of this phenomenon is presented. 
BLEVE is the acronym of “Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion”, proposed by 
Walls, Marsh and Smith in 1957 to define a certain type of vessel explosion. These 
authors coined this acronym during their investigation about the explosion of a vessel 
containing formalin and phenol. They defined this type of explosion as (Abbasi and 
Abbasi, 2007b): 
“The failure of a container occurring at a moment when the contained liquid is at a 
temperature well above its boiling point at atmospheric pressure”. 
A BLEVE is therefore a physical explosion, and not at all a chemical one (Abbasi, 
Pasman, Abbasi, 2010). The effects of BLEVE accidents could be categorized in three 
groups: 
1. blast overpressure 
2. fragments ejected 
3. fireball (if a flammable substance is involved) and thermal flux. 
However, even though this first definition was quite adequate, other definitions were 
proposed later on by different authors. Some of these definitions have been summarized 
in Table 1-1 and will be analyzed deeply in Chapter 4. 
 
Table 1-1. BLEVE definitions proposed by different authors 
Date Author Definition 
1957 J.B. Smith, W.S. Marsh 
and W.L. Walls 
The acronym BLEVE was coined in 1957 by three Factory Mutual 
Research Corporation workers J.B.Smith, W.S.Marsh and 
W.L.Walls. They had analyzed the likely of failure of a vessel 
containing an overheated mixture of formalin and phenol, and had 
believed that the container had suffered a “boiling liquid expanding 
vapour explosion” (Abbasi et al., 2007b).  
1979 R.C. Reid Reid defined BLEVE as “the sudden loss of containment of a liquid 
that is at its superheated limit temperature” (Reid, 1979).  
1978 W.L. Walls A failure of a major container into two or more pieces, occurring at 
the moment in time when the contained liquid is at a temperature well 
above its boiling point at normal atmospheric pressure (Walls, 1978, 
1979).  
1991 I.R.M. Leslie and A.M. 
Birk 
The BLEVE is usually associated with a large explosive release of a 
LPG. The explosive part of the release is caused by a very rapid phase 
change from liquid to vapor. A BLEVE does not necessarily involve 
a fireball (Leslie and Birk, 1991).  
1993 J.E.S. Venart, G.A. 
Rutledge, K. 
Simple “BLEVE” experiments have revealed the existence of a loss 
of containment event we call a Boiling Liquid Compressed Bubble 
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Date Author Definition 
Sumathipala and K. 
Sollows 
Explosion,”BLCBE”. Such an event is more powerful than the 
BLEVE and is at an extremum of failure types that range from it to 
the BLEVE and ultimately down to those which result only in the 
expulsion of their contents as a flashing two-phase jet. 
All the events and their interrelationships are obviously very complex 
and have many interacting dynamic components. The generic 
features of the BLCBE consist of: 
1. Partial failure of the containment vessel. 
2. Multiple bubble initiation, and growth in a prenucleated 
bulk liquid. 
3. Rapid two-phase swell, repressurization and coherent 
collapse of the bubbles formed. 
4. Bubble collapse shock pressure failure of the previously 
damaged vessel. 
5. Violent distribution of the compressed two-phase contents 
as extremely fine evaporating aerosol with significant blast, 
and 
6. If contents are flammable, the potential for a detonation. 
Obviously, as the contents of such vessels approach the superheat 
limit, even more powerful events are possible (Venart, Rutledge, 
Sumathipala, Sollows, 1993).  
1996 A.M. Birk and M.H. 
Cunningham 
A BLEVE is a physical explosion that follows the sudden loss of 
containment of a LPG. When an LPG experiences a sudden pressure 
drop (due to loss of containment, for example) the bulk of the liquid 
is sent into a state of superheat. If the degree of superheat is large, it 
causes violent flashing of the liquid which can be explosive. 
Generally speaking, a large degree of superheat requires a very rapid 
pressure drop (Birk and Cunningham, 1996).  
2004 E. Planas-Cuchi, J.M. 
Salla and J. Casal 
BLEVEs occur when a tank containing a pressurized liquid is heated, 
for example, due to a fire. As pressure increases, a condition is 
reached at which the walls of the container (whose temperature has 
been increasing, especially in the upper part where the liquid is not 
in contact with them) can no longer withstand the pressure and the 
vessel bursts. At the moment of failure, due to the instantaneous 
depressurization, the temperature of the liquid will be higher than that 
which would correspond to it according to the saturation curve on the 
P–T diagram: the liquid will be superheated. If the liquid temperature 
in the instant of the depressurization is higher than the ‘‘superheat 
temperature limit’’ (which is different for each substance), a violent 
and instantaneous flash of a fraction of the liquid will occur and a 
superheated liquid vapor explosion will take place (Planas Cuchi , 
Salla , Casal 2004b).  
2004 A.C. van den Berg, 
M.M. van der Voort, J. 
Weerheijm, and N.H.A. 
Versloot 
A BLEVE, the acronym for boiling liquid expanding vapor 
explosion, is the consequence of the rupture of a pressure vessel 
containing a liquefied gas. If the liquid pressure suddenly drops, as a 
result of a sudden rupture of the vessel, a fraction of the liquid will 
quickly evaporate. The evaporation process extracts heat from the 
liquid by which the temperature and the vapor pressure of the liquid 
fall. The evaporation continues until the liquid temperature has fallen 
to the boiling temperature at atmospheric pressure and, consequently, 
the vapor pressure has fallen to atmospheric pressure. The quick 
phase change from liquid to vapor goes hand in hand with the 
increase of a large volume. One cubic meter of liquid propane, for 
instance, gives rise to about 260 cubic meters vapor under 
atmospheric conditions. The volume of vapor pushes the surrounding 
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Date Author Definition 
air aside, which produces a blast wave. The blast wave may do 
damage up to a substantial distance in the environment (van den 
Berg, van der Voort, Weerheijm, Versloot, 2004). 
2007 A.M. Birk, C. Davison 
and M.H. Cunningham 
A BLEVE is the explosive release of expanding vapor and boiling 
liquid when a container holding a LPG fails catastrophically (Birk, 
Davison, Cunningham 2007).  
2010 S. M. Tauseef, T. 
Abbasi and S. A. 
Abbasi 
If a container with a LPG suffers structural failure –be it due to creep, 
fatigue, or fire-induced or any other form of failure– it may lead to a 
sudden depressurization of the container. 
As a result, the LPG will suddenly be transformed into a fluid, which 
is superheated with respect to the precipitously lowered pressure. 
Depending on the nature of the chemical, quantity of superheated 
liquid present, and the mechanism of the container failure, such a 
situation can lead to instantaneous and violent vaporization of the 
contents, causing a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion, a 
BLEVE (Tauseef, Abbasi, Abbasi, 2010).  
2010 CCPS BLEVE is defined as a sudden loss of containment of a pressure-
liquefied gas existing above its normal atmospheric boiling point at 
the moment of its failure, which results in rapidly expanding vapor 
and flashing liquid. The release of energy from these processes 
(expanding vapor and flashing liquid) creates a pressure wave. A 
BLEVE requires three key elements: 
 A liquid that exists above its normal atmospheric pressure 
boiling point 
 Containment that causes the pressure on the liquid to be 
sufficiently high to suppress boiling 
 A sudden loss of containment to rapidly drop the pressure 
on the liquid (CCPS, 2010).  
 
Some of these definitions are somewhat restricted, as they impose the condition of 
reaching the superheat limit temperature or they refer specifically to pressure-liquefied 
gases. 
As a summary of aforementioned definitions, we can conclude that nowadays the 
following definition could be a more general and correct one, being in practice widely 
accepted: 
“A BLEVE is the explosion of a vessel containing a liquid (or liquid plus vapor) at a 
temperature significantly above its boiling temperature at atmospheric pressure”. 
(Hemmatian et al., 2016) 
 
1.4 Substances that can originate a BLEVE 
There is some confusion on this point, as some people believe that only flammable 
substances (which can give rise to a fireball) can undergo a BLEVE. But really, practically 
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all liquids, reaching certain storage conditions, can undergo a BLEVE. By looking at the 
preceding definitions, LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) leads to the instantaneous 
generation of a gas phase in the event of a sudden pressure drop (depressurization). It 
should be noted that the pressurized liquefied gases have usually atmospheric boiling 
temperatures lower than ambient temperature. For instance, light hydrocarbons (such as 
propane, ethane and butane), refrigerants and ammonia, belong to this group. However, 
this does not mean that other types of substances which have atmospheric boiling 
temperatures higher than ambient temperature could not undergo a BLEVE. Indeed, their 
boiling temperatures will be going beyond the normal atmospheric boiling temperature if 
they are exposed to thermal heating in a closed vessel. Water and heavy hydrocarbons are 
some examples of this kind of liquid (Abbasi et al., 2007b; CCPS, 2010). In fact, the 
explosion of a steam boiler is usually a very strong BLEVE, due to the high enthalpy 
content of water. 
Concerning LNG, there are various views about the BLEVE probability. Venart (2005), 
an author with a considerable experience in this field, mentioned that an LNG BLEVE is 
possible even if the probability of occurrence is low. For corroboration of this statement, 
he presented one LNG accident in Spain which had been reported by Planas-Cuchi et al. 
(2004a). In contrast, some other researchers like Napier and Roopchand (1986), Bernatik 
et al. (2011) and Pitblado and Woodward (2011) refuse the credibility of BLEVE 
accidents with LNG; they believe that an LNG BLEVE is improbable because of the 
following reasons: 
 LNG outer tank and insulation prevent heat transfer from a fire to main tank 
 LNG tanks are designed to work at relatively low operating pressures. 
However, most of those articles in which were denied the possibility of an LNG BLEVE, 
accepted the road tanker accident occurred in 2002 (Planas Cuchi et al., 2004a) as a 
BLEVE phenomenon. 
 
1.5 The significance and prevalence of BLEVEs 
Studies in the field of BLEVE phenomenon are essentially based on their effects and the 
corresponding consequences, which can be very severe. Diverse authors have performed 
scientific works and published papers in this field. Reid (1979) presented the definition 
for BLEVE and introduced the possible mechanism for it. Walls (1978, 1979) also worked 
on this phenomenon and gave his definition for that phenomenon in order to figure out 
what kind of an accident could be considered as a BLEVE. Later on, Birk et al. (1996; 
1996; 2007; 1993; 2009) investigated about that phenomenon by doing interesting 
experiments and simulations. Their works focused on fired BLEVE and resulting blast. 
Several authors used their experimental data in order to predict the BLEVE consequences. 
Abbasi et al. (2007a , 2007b) published a review article about the BLEVE mechanism 
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and its consequences assessment and management, and they defined a framework for 
superheat limit temperature (Tsl). Casal (2008, 2013) and Casal and Salla (2006) studied 
BLEVE definitions, mechanism, its consequences, and possible approaches for mitigating 
and managing its risk. They introduced a new approach for predicting BLEVE mechanical 
energy and resulting blast by using a definition of liquid superheating energy. 
Additionaly, Salla et al. (2006) proposed a physical explanation for the concept of the 
superheat limit temperature (Tsl). Planas-Cuchi et al. (2004a , 2004b) studied BLEVE 
mechanical energy by assuming real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion. 
They believed that the previous studies in this field were based on thermodynamic 
assumptions which caused a significant overprediction in the assessment of BLEVE 
consequences; they also reported and analyzed two LNG BLEVE accidents. CCPS (2010) 
devoted one chapter to BLEVE phenomenon which contained BLEVE definition and 
mechanism, as well as the assessment of its consequences. Although these studies have 
really helped to a better understanding of this phenomenon, unfortunately severe BLEVE 
accidents still occur, showing that further research is needed. 
Analyzing the BLEVE accidents occurred during previous years can help to have a better 
understanding on the phenomenon and on its main features. In the scientific resources, 
there are rather few historical studies about this phenomenon. Prugh (1991) presented a 
brief historical survey, analyzing 49 BLEVE accidents and their general causes (Table 
1-2). Abbasi et al. (2007b) analyzed 89 BLEVE accidents occurred in the period 1926 – 
2004: fire (36%) and mechanical failure (22%) were the main causes of them; domino 
effect was found in some cases.  
Table 1-2. Results of Prugh historical analysis on the cause of BLEVEs (Prugh, 1991) 
Cause Number of incidents Percentage (%) 
Exposure to fire 17 34.7 
Mechanical damage 11 22.4 
Overfilling 10 20.4 
Runaway reaction 6 12.2 
Overheating 3 6.1 
Vapor-space explosion 1 2.1 
Mechanical failure 1 2.1 
Total 49 100.0 
 
However, these surveys were performed on a relatively reduced number of cases and 
some of the accidents covered occurred long ago, when the conditions both at industry 
and in the transportation where different from those found today. A wider historical 
analysis seemed therefore necessary in order to have a better knowledge of different 
aspects of BLEVE accidents such as their cause, origin, consequences and frequencies. 
This is why, as a first step, a set of 167 BLEVEs occurred between 1960 and 2013 have 
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been collected and analyzed. The result of this historical survey are presented in the next 
sections. 
 
1.6 Occurrence of BLEVEs: a historical survey 
The historical analysis of BLEVE accidents is an interesting way to understand them 
better, as it can give a good overview about this phenomenon and which important factors 
play a role in it. MHIDAS (Major Hazard Incident Data Service) database (MHIDAS, 
2007) was used to obtain the main data in this study. This database covers 14,168 
incidents (November 2007 version) recorded from the beginning of the 20th century until 
2006 in over 95 countries, and each record is classified according to different fields (e.g. 
cause, origin) to facilitate automatic processing; it is managed by the UK Health and 
Safety Executive. Moreover, other databases were also consulted: Analysis, Research and 
Information on Accidents (ARIA, 2012), created by the French Ministry of Regional 
Planning and the Environment; Major Accident Reporting System (MARS, 2012), 
through which EU member states report industrial accidents in a standard format, 
overseen by the Major Accidents hazards Bureau of the EU Joint Research Centre; and 
Failure and ACcidents Technical information System (FACTS, 2010), a database for 
accidents involving hazardous materials created by TNO Industrial and External Safety. 
The lack of information in some accidents was fulfilled by getting assistance of other 
available resources like the U.S. Chemical Safety Board, (CSB, 2012), the U. S. National 
Transport Safety Board (NTSB, 2013) and the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA, 2012).  
When collecting a large volume of information by using different databases, the 
probability of recording repetitious accidents increases. The retrieval of information 
among large databases is also another difficulty when analyzing the accidents. In this 
study, Microsoft Access® was used in order to manage and classify the data. By doing 
so, analyzing and editing of BLEVEs information became easier. 
Analyzing different databases for finding information will be confusing without 
providing relevant keywords or criteria to identify accidents as a BLEVE. The criteria 
used in this selection have been the following: 
 The definition for BLEVE, already mentioned in a preceding section (end of 
Section 1.3), was used. 
 This study has only taken into account accidents occurred after 1st January 1960. 
This is due to the fact that before this date (more than half a century ago) the type 
of industry was essentially different from the present one (control, safety, 
management, etc.) and therefore those accidents would not be much useful 
nowadays to find common trends and reach sound conclusions. 
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 This survey considers accidents occurred in process plants, in storage areas or in 
the transportation of hazardous materials (road, rail and ship). Moreover, it also 
includes accidents that have occurred because of natural events such as 
earthquakes or floods. 
 Accidents occurred in military premises (ammunition, etc.) or with fireworks have 
not been considered. 
Although the number of BLEVE accidents was reduced when applying the 
aforementioned criteria, the accuracy and quality of the accidents’ sample increased. 
Finally, a set of 167 BLEVE accidents –the largest sample of BLEVE accidents surveyed 
until now– were obtained and analyzed. The features of the selected accidents are 
discussed in the next sections.  
1.6.1 Distribution of accidents according to the time and location 
The frequencies of the BLEVE accidents during the decades have been plotted in Figure 
1-2. The highest frequency belongs to the 70’s (29.9%). The occurrence of this type of 
accidents decreased until the end of 20th century and afterwards a clear trend cannot be 
observed. A fact that should be mentioned here, and which could have some influences, 
is the much better access to information on major accidents (BLEVE included) in the last 
decades; this could contribute to increase the frequency of registered cases.  
 
Figure 1-2. Distribution of BLEVEs over the time. 
 
The selected accidents have also been classified by their region. This type of classification 
was done by considering different factors such as political and development-based 
criteria. Countries in the world were classified in three independent groups and the 
accidents were distributed in them: 
1. European Union (20.4%), 
2. Other developed countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
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3. Rest of the world (25.1%). 
According to these categories, the highest percentage (75.8%) is found in the developed 
countries. This high percentage should be attributed to the presence of an important 
number of plants and to the associated transportation and storage infrastructures in these 
countries. Moreover, in developed countries, due to the existing policies and institutions 
in the field of safety and environment, more information about the occurred accidents is 
available. 
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Figure 1-3 shows the frequencies of BLEVEs as a function of time in the three different 
regions. It can be seen that the contribution of developing countries has increased in recent 
years, while it has decreased in developed ones.  
1.6.2 Substances involved 
As already mentioned, a liquid can undergo a BLEVE if its temperature at the moment of 
vessel failure is higher than its atmospheric boiling temperature. By this definition, it can 
be expected that substances with boiling temperature lower than ambient temperature –
such as light hydrocarbons– are prone to BLEVE. 
Table 1-3 shows the substances involved in the 167 BLEVE accidents here analyzed. 247 
substances have been identified, as in some of the accidents more than one substance were 
simultaneously involved. As it can be seen in this table, LPG was by large the most 
frequent material, being found in 66% of BLEVEs, followed by vinyl chloride (6%) and 
oil (6%); LNG took part in 3% of the BLEVE accidents.  
 
Table 1-3. Substances involved in BLEVEs 
Substance Number of accidents Percentage 
LPG 111 66 
Vinyl chloride 10 6 
Oil 10 6 
Gasoline/Petrol/Diesel/Kerosene 8 5 
Ethylene oxide 7 4 
Carbon dioxide 6 4 
Water 5 3 
LNG 5 3 
Propylene 4 2 
Ammonia 3 2 
Chlorine 3 2 
Butadiene 3 2 
Ethylene  3 2 
Toluene diisocyanate 3 2 
Sodium hydroxide 3 2 
Sulfuric acid 3 2 
Other chemical substances 60 36 
Total 247 149 
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It should be noticed that water also appears (3%). Concerning water, the following 
consideration must be done; probably the number of BLEVEs involving it has been much 
larger than those registered in databases, even though, as water is not flammable and 
therefore it does not originate any subsequent fireball, many of such cases had not been 
registered as BLEVEs. 
These substances were also classified according to their hazardousness (Table 1-4). Here 
again the total percentage exceeded 100% because several substances present more than 
one hazard (e.g., ammonia is flammable and toxic; carbon dioxide is cold and 
asphyxiating). Flammable substances were involved in 132% of BLEVEs, followed by 
toxic substances (44%) and corrosive ones (23%). However, these figures should be 
considered with certain caution, as the fact that BLEVEs with flammable substances are 
usually followed by a fireball increases the magnitude of the accident and make them 
more prone to be included in accident databases. 
 
Table 1-4. Hazard of substances involved in BLEVEs 
Hazardousness of substance No. of accidents Percentage 
Flammable 221 132 
Toxic 73 44 
Corrosive 38 23 
Oxidizing 22 13 
Explosive 18 11 
Cold 13 8 
Asphyxiating 8 5 
Total 393 236 
1.6.3 General/specific cause 
Understanding the main causes of accidents can be a good mean to prevent further similar 
accidents. In Table 1-5, MHIDAS database categories for generic causes were used to 
identify the causes of BLEVE accidents. The total number of causes were larger than the 
number of BLEVE accidents because in some accidents there were more than one cause. 
General causes of accidents were not specified in 27 (16.17%) out of 167 cases; the results 
in Table 1-5 correspond thus to 140 accidents. 
Impact failure (47.1%) followed by human factor (30.7%) and external events (29.3%) 
were the main causes. By comparing these data with those in Table 1-2, the latter (external 
events) decreased from 34.7% to 29.3%; but the impact failure increased significantly 
from 22.4% to 47.1%. This could be attributed to an increase in number of transport 
accidents which will be defined as specific cause of BLEVE accidents in Table 1-6.  
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Impact failure 66 47.1 17.2 68.8 19.4 
Human factor 43 30.7 41.4 20.0 48.4 
External events 41 29.3 20.7 33.8 25.8 
Mechanical failure 39 27.9 44.8 25.0 19.4 
Instrument failure 7 5.0 6.9 5.0 3.2 
Violent reaction 6 4.3 - 5.0 6.5 
Service failure 1 0.7 - 1.3 - 
Upset process conditions 1 0.7 3.4 - - 
Total 204 145.7 134.4 158.9 122.7 
 
A detailed analysis was also performed by referring to each region. In European countries, 
mechanical failure (44.8%) was the most probable cause of BLEVEs, while in other 
developed countries it was impact failure (68.8%). However, human factor (48.4%) and 
external events (25.8%) were the main causes of the accidents in the rest of the world. 
This can be explained by a worse safety training of operators and poor safety culture in 
these countries. 
Each general cause was subdivided into specific causes in Table 1-6. Rail accidents (55%) 
and road accidents (22%) were the most frequent specific ones in impact failure. 
Regarding human factor, general maintenance (27%) followed by general operation 
(16%) were the main frequent ones. Finally, fire (72%) was the main specific cause in 
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Table 1-6. Specific causes of BLEVEs 




Impact failure (47.1%) Rail accident 40 55 
 Road accident 16 22 
 Other vehicle 11 15 
 Heavy object 4 6 
 Excavating equipment 1 1 
 Ship to ship collision also barges 1 1 
Human factor (30.7%) General maintenance 8 27 
 General operation 5 16 
 Overfilling 4 13 
 Management 3 10 
 Procedures 3 10 
 Failure to connect or disconnect 2 7 
 Design error 2 7 
 Draining accident 2 7 
 Failure to isolate or drain before uncoupling 1 3 
External events (29.3%) Fire 33 72 
 Explosion 7 15 
 Temperature extremes 4 9 
 Earthquake 2 4 
Mechanical failure (27.9%) Overheating 20 37 
 Overpressure 7 14 
 Hose 4 7 
 Brittle failure 4 7 
 Leaking coupling or flange 4 7 
 Corrosion 3 5 
 Relief valve failure 3 5 
 Weld failure 3 5 
 Leaking or passing valve 3 5 
 Metallurgical failure 2 4 
 Fatigue  2 4 
Instrument failure (5%) Indicator 2 40 
 Trip 2 40 
 Controller 1 20 
Violent reaction (4.3%) Run away reaction 4 80 
 Confined explosion 1 20 
Service failure (0.7%) Electricity 1 100 
Upset process conditions (0.7%)1 - 1 100 
1For this case MHIDAS does not have any categories 
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1.6.4 General/specific origin 
The general origin of accidents (Table 1-7) gives an interesting information concerning 
the activities in which the probability of such accidents is higher; the total percentages of 
accidents are higher than 100 again, because some accidents had different origins. 
Overall, transport (46.7%) and storage area (23.4%) obviously had dominant percentages 
than the other groups. Transfer (including loading/unloading operations) has a significant 
contribution as well. The general origin of accidents was also investigated for the different 
parts of the world; transport was the main origin: EU (29.4%), other developed countries 
(56%), and rest of the world (40.5%). It was followed by process plants (20.6%) in 
European Union and by storage in the other two categories. The origins "Transport" and 
"Transfer" are specially interesting. When analyzing all accidents (Vilchez et al., 1995), 
approximate values of 39% for Transport and 8% for Transfer are found. However, for 
the specific case of BLEVE those percentages increase significantly: up to 47% for 
Transport and 13% for Transfer (17.6% for EU). Clearly, road/rail accidents and 
loading/unloading operations have an important influence. 
 









Rest of the 
world, % 
Transport 78 46.7 29.4 56.0 40.5 
Storage area 39 23.4 17.6 25.3 23.8 
Transfer 22 13.2 17.6 11.0 14.3 
Process plant 19 11.4 20.6 4.4 19.0 
Domestic/commercial 
premises 
10 6.0 11.8 3.3 7.1 
Warehouse 3 1.8 2.9 1.1 2.4 
Disposal area 2 1.2 2.9 1.1 - 
Total 173 103.7 102.8 102.2 107.1 
 
The specific origin of the accidents was also studied. According to the data gathered in 
Table 1-8, rail tanker (29.9%), road tanker (19.2%) and pressurized storage vessel 
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Table 1-8. Specific origin of BLEVEs 
Specific origin No. of accidents Percentage 
Rail tanker 50 29.9 
Road tanker 32 19.2 
Pressurized storage vessel 31 18.6 
Portable transport container 18 10.8 
Fired process equipment 7 4.2 
On-plant pipes and associated valves 6 3.6 
Heat exchanger 6 3.6 
Atmospheric pressure storage tank 5 3.0 
Ship 5 3.0 
Tank container 4 2.4 
Process vessels 3 1.8 
Reactor 3 1.8 
Hose 2 1.2 
Small commercial tank 2 1.2 
Pipeline 2 1.2 
Barge 1 0.6 
Total 177 106.1 
 
1.6.5 Affected population 
The affected population is one of the important aspects in safety and risk analysis, and 
reducing the number of people affected by the BLEVE consequences is the aim of many 
scientific studies in the field of safety and loss prevention. The affected population can 
be classified in three groups: fatalities, injuries and evacuees. The results presented here 
are just for those cases where information was available (in 72% of cases for fatalities, 
for injuries in 75% and for evacuees in 29%). 
In 120 BLEVEs occurred since 1960, about 1280 people were killed; a detailed study was 
performed on them. The 𝑝 − 𝑁 curve is usually used to represent the lethality of accidents 
(Figure 1-4). In this plot, the number of fatalities (𝑁) is shown on the abscissae and the 
probability of a BLEVE accident with fatalities equal or greater than 𝑁 (for 𝑁 = 1, 𝑝 =
1) is illustrated on its ordinate axis. In fact, the accumulated probability of BLEVE 
accidents can be represented by this illustrative curve as a function of its severity. The 
accumulated probability was calculated by the least square method. The resulting function 
was 𝑝 = 𝑁𝑏, with the b value equal to -0.711. This means that the accumulated 
probability of BLEVE accidents that causes 10 or more deaths is 5.13 times greater than 
the accumulated probability of BLEVE accidents with 100 or more fatalities. 




Figure 1-4. Accumulated probability as a function of number of deaths. 
The accumulated probability of fatalities versus the number of deaths was also calculated 
















Number of deaths (N)
Chapter 1. Introduction 
21 
 
Figure 1-5. p-N curve according to the development degree of the countries. 
Despite similar probability of deaths for developed countries, the accumulated probability 
of number of deaths was higher for the “rest of the world”, specifically for 𝑁 > 20, with 
a value of 𝑏 = −0.544. 
The analysis of the number of injuries in the accidents (Table 1-9) showed that only 25.2% 
of accidents had no injured 39% of accidents had between 1 and 10 injured; in 30.9% of 
cases there were between 11 and 100 injured; and only 4.9% had more than 100 injured 
people. 
Table 1-9. BLEVEs Injured 
Injured No. of accidents Percentage 
No injuries 31 25.2 
1-10 48 39.0 
11-100 38 30.9 
101-1000 5 4.1 
>1000 1 0.8 















Number of deaths (N)
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Further analysis (Table 1-10) showed that in 20.8% of BLEVE accidents there were no 
evacuees, in 27.2% there were between 1 – 100, in 20.8% there were between 101 – 1000, 
in 20.8% there were between 1001 – 10,000, and in only 10.4% of accidents there were 
more than 10,000 people evacuated.  
 
Table 1-10. BLEVEs evacuees 
Evacuees No. of accidents Percentage 
No evacuees 10 20.8 
1-10 10 20.8 
11-100 3 6.4 
101-1000 10 20.8 
1001-10,000 10 20.8 
>10,000 5 10.4 
Total 48 100.0 
 
1.7 Objectives of the thesis 
The data presented in this introductory chapter shows that BLEVEs can occur –and, in 
fact, keep occurring from time to time– in process plants, in storage areas and in the 
transportation by road and rail. They are a significant major accident, having caused 
severe consequences on people and on equipment.  
However, even if this is a well-known fact, BLEVE is still not enough known. Diverse 
authors have analyzed it theoretically and a few ones have performed experimental tests; 
all these efforts have improved certainly the knowledge of this phenomenon, but there are 
still significant gaps. 
There is no doubt that a better knowledge of BLEVE main aspects would help in 
decreasing its frequency, in improving the management of emergencies and, finally, in 
reducing its potential effects and consequences. 
The main objective of this thesis is therefore to improve the knowledge of BLEVE main 
features, with a special emphasis in the prediction of its physical effects (blast 
overpressure). The achievement of this main objective has been planned through the 
definition of a set of more specific objectives, listed below: 
 Analysis of the main causes and consequences of BLEVEs through the historical 
analysis tool. 
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 Study of the influence of domino effect (and, specifically, of fire as escalation 
vector) on BLEVE accidents and their main drivers. 
 Comparison of the current existing models to predict BLEVE blast effects. 
 Proposal of an improved methodology to predict BLEVE blast effects that allows 
to be used in a quick but accurate way. 
 Proposal of essential emergency management measures, specially in 




Chapter 2. MAJOR ACCIDENTS AND DOMINO EFFECT. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BLEVES 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent surveys have emphasized the importance of the domino effect in the occurrence 
and severity of the major accidents that take place in the process industry and in some 
closely related activities, such as the transportation of hazardous materials 
(Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2010, 2011; Darbra et al., 2010). Escalation criteria have been 
proposed to assess the near-field effects of fire and explosion (Cozzani et al., 2006). The 
main features of domino accidents have been recently analyzed by diverse authors in the 
book “Domino effects in the process industries. Modelling, prevention and managing” 
(Reniers and Cozzani, 2013). The diverse chapters of this book clearly show the 
complexity of domino effect accident scenarios and the many ways through which the 
escalation and propagation of accidents can take place. 
Although an increasing interest can be inferred from the publications found in the 
literature, this subject has been treated by a relatively reduced number of authors. As a 
result, the main domino effect features and trends are still poorly known. 
Domino effect has a special importance concerning the occurrence of BLEVEs, as often 
these accidents are the secondary step of a domino sequence: for example, a fire which 
impinges on a vessel which after a certain time collapses. Thus, in this chapter the diverse 
aspects of domino effect are analyzed, with a specific reference to BLEVE. 
Diverse definitions and interpretations about the meaning of the domino effect are 
available; Reniers (2010) published a list of them. For the purpose of this chapter, the 
definition proposed by Delvosalle (1998) will be used to select the accidents. According 
to him, a domino accident can be defined as: 
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“a cascade of events in which the consequences of a previous accident are increased both 
spatially and temporally by the following ones, thus leading to a major accident”. 
Domino effect can be analyzed through different approaches. Amongst them, the analysis 
of past accidents seems to be a powerful tool. Past accidents are in fact the only source of 
“experimental data” available in this field, data for which a high price has been paid. The 
analysis of these accidents gives the possibility of knowing diverse aspects of domino 
effect: the usual events that initiate it, the most frequent sequences, the substances that 
are more prone to be associated to these accidents, etc. However, such a survey has certain 
implicit difficulties, the most significant one being the lack of information. 
Accidents involving domino effect can be found from the specialized literature, from 
reports of certain institutions and in appropriate databases. However, often the 
information thus obtained is not complete; this implies a reduction of the sample size 
when a statistical treatment must be performed, with the consequent loss of significance 
of the results. 
Several historical surveys have been published on this subject. Bagster and Pitblado 
(1991) studied the frequency and likelihood of domino accidents in a pioneering work. 
Kourniotis et al. (2000) performed a survey on a total of 207 accidents, of which 80 
involved domino effect; their sequences (ratio of accidents with one or two domino 
effects) and their consequences on the population were analyzed. Ronza et al. (2003) 
studied 108 accidents occurred in port areas which involved as well domino effect. With 
a much more specific approach, Gómez-Mares et al. (2008) published a survey on 
accidents involving jet fires, 50% of which had been the primary event of a domino effect 
sequence. Darbra et al. (2010) performed a historical analysis on 225 accidents involving 
this effect. Shortly after, Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2011) published another survey on 224 
accidents also involving domino sequences. 
In these last two papers the main features of the accidents were analyzed: substances 
involved, origin, primary events, consequences, etc. In Darbra et al. (2010) the accident 
sequences were studied through the relative probability trees. In Abdolhamidzadeh et al. 
(2011) a list of the accidents studied was included. The results of these two surveys 
differed in some aspects, essentially because of the difference in the respective sets of 
data (geographical location of accidents). Thus, aspects such as the severity of accidents 
over the years or their frequency as a function of time were different. 
Therefore, it seemed of interest to devote a chapter to perform a wider analysis including 
both sets of data (avoiding repetitions); the two collections were merged and screened, 
adding also new accidents occurred in the recent years. Accidents occurrence and features 
in developing countries (in which industry is developing quickly) were analyzed and 
compared with the situation in the industrialized ones. In addition, a specific analysis of 
accidents occurred in the period 2000-2013 has been also performed. The whole analysis 
has given as well some information of the relative significance of BLEVEs among all 
major accidents. 
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2.2 Methodology 
The survey was performed by using both datasets and other sources of information. Many 
data were obtained from resources which are mentioned in Chapter 1 such as: MHIDAS 
database (2007), MARS (2012), FACTS (2010), and ARIA (2012). Moreover, other 
resources were also consulted, like in the previous chapter, in order to complete the 
information about some accidents (e.g., CSB (2012), NTSB (2013) and NFPA (2012)). 
Finally, the information on accidents was collected and centralized in Microsoft Access 
in order to manage and retrieve easily and avoid duplication of recorded accidents. 
In order to identify the different domino accidents from the databases, keywords related 
to domino effect were selected. Once the accidents were gathered, clear criteria to define 
if they involved a domino effect were established.  In this way, a proper selection of 
accidents was done. The criteria used in this selection are the following ones: 
Domino effect occurs when a first accident in a unit (e.g. an explosion) triggers a second 
one in another unit (e.g. release and fire in a tank). This is known as a spatial domino 
accident. 
It is also considered a domino effect when a first accident in a unit (e.g. a jet fire from a 
vessel impinging on the vessel wall) originates a second one (e.g. BLEVE of the vessel) 
in the same unit. This is known as a temporal domino accident. 
In the case that “two” accidents are essentially simultaneous, this is not domino effect. 
They should be considered practically as the same accident; for example: the explosion 
in a floating roof tank followed immediately by a fire in the same tank. 
This study has only taken into account accidents occurred after 1st January 1961. As 
commented in Chapter 1, before this date (half a century ago) the type of industry was 
essentially different from the present one (control, safety, management, etc.) and, 
therefore, those accidents would not be much useful nowadays to find common trends 
and reach sound conclusions. 
This survey considers accidents occurred in process plants, in storage areas and in the 
transportation of hazardous materials (road, rail and ship). Moreover, it also includes 
accidents that have occurred because of natural events such as earthquakes or floods. 
Accidents occurred in military premises (ammunition, etc.) or with fireworks have not 
been considered. 
After applying these criteria, the number of selected accidents was reduced considerably; 
however, the accuracy and quality of the domino accidents’ sample was increased. 
Finally, a collection of 330 accidents was obtained. This is the largest sample of domino 
accidents analyzed until now. 
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2.3 Accident analysis 
In this section, the main features of the selected domino accidents are analyzed. 
2.3.1 Distribution of accidents according to time and location 
Figure 2-1 shows the evolution of the accidents frequency as a function of time. As it can 
be seen, the 70’s is the decade with the highest percentage of accidents (23.9%); after an 
exceptional decrease in the 90’s, the frequency increases again in the first decade of the 
21st century to the previous values (this figure is quite similar –although the values are 
different– to Figure 1-2, as part of the accidents analyzed, are coincident). These values 
do not show a clear increasing or decreasing trend, but rather a more or less stationary 
one. 
 
Figure 2-1. Distribution of domino accidents over the time. 
 
The location of the domino accidents was also studied, as the main features of the process 
industry, as well as legislation and risk-planning policies –which have an effect on the 
occurrence and severity of accidents– can change from one country to another. Although 
it is not easy to make such clusters, finally, by applying development-based criteria, the 
accidents were classified in three main groups depending on the country where they had 
occurred: 
1. European Union (21.8%) 
2. Other developed countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
Norway and the United States (54.5%) 
3. Rest of the world (23.7%). 
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As it can be seen in this classification, 76.3% of domino accidents occurred in developed 
countries. The presence of a high number of plants and the associated transportation and 
storage infrastructures in these countries accounts for this high percentage; another factor 
that contributes to this value is the fact that more information on accidents occurred in 
these countries is available. However, the contribution of developing countries has 
increased in comparison with a previous study from Darbra et al. (2010): from 19% to 
23.7%.  
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Figure 2-2 presents a detailed analysis of the occurrence of domino accidents as a function 
of time in the different parts of the world. An overall slightly decreasing trend with time 
can be observed for the EU and other developed countries; this trend can change if shorter 
periods –for example, one decade– are analyzed. This would agree with the data published 
by Niemitz (2010) for accidents registered in the MARS database between 1996 and 
2004. This trend would show the influence of the existing policies and institutions related 
to safety and environment in these countries. Instead, a rather increasing trend is observed 
over the whole analyzed period for the “rest of the world”. This gives a clear indication 
that a special attention should be paid to the situation in the developing countries, some 
of which are undergoing a significant increase in their industrial activity sometimes not 
linked to an increase in the corresponding safety regulations.  
2.3.2 Substances involved 
Often more than one substance was involved in the accidents (domino effect is usually 
characterized by affecting different equipment in an accidental sequence). In total, 537 
substances were identified in 330 accidents. However, the real number of substances 
could be higher, as in some accidents only those involved in the primary accident were 
specifically mentioned, and sentences such as “the fire spread to storage tanks containing 
chemicals” were occasionally used to describe the secondary accident. 
As shown in Table 2-1, LPG was the most common substance, being involved in 22% of 
domino accidents. It was followed, at a significant distance, by gasoline (10%) and oil 
(9%); other liquid hydrocarbons were found such as diesel oil/fuel oil and naphtha; 
hydrocarbons were involved in 55% of accidents. 
Table 2-1. Substances involved in domino accidents 
Substance No. of accidents Percentage 
LPG 72 22 
Gasoline 33 10 
Oil 29 9 
Diesel oil/fuel oil 20 6 
Naphtha 14 4 
Vinyl chloride 13 4 
Chlorine 11 3 
Natural gas 11 3 
Ammonia 10 3 
Ethylene oxide 10 3 
Other chemical substances  314 95 
Total 537 162 
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Toxic substances were also involved: chlorine and ammonia. The percentages in this table 
do not total 100 because of the involvement of more than one substance in many 
accidents. 
Concerning the hazardousness of the materials, flammable substances were the most 
frequent ones, being involved in 142% of the domino accidents. They were followed by 
toxic substances (55%) and, with a smaller contribution, by corrosive substances (19%). 
Again, the percentages do not add up to 100. 
 
2.3.3 General/specific causes 
Understanding the causes of accidents is a helpful aspect to prevent them from occurring 
again. Although the information came from a variety of sources, the MHIDAS database 
categories were used for the generic causes: external events, mechanical failure, human 
error, impact failure, violent reaction (runaway reaction), instrument failure, upset 
process conditions and services failure.  
Table 2-2 shows the generic causes that initiated a domino accident in the cases included 
in this analysis. Again, the percentages do not total 100 because some accidents were 
triggered by more than one generic cause. Mechanical failure (35.2%) and external events 
(29.4%) were the main causes of the accidents. Human error caused 24.6% of the 
accidents. These values have increased with respect to those of Darbra et al. (2010) 
survey: 28.9%, 30.7% and 20.9%, respectively.  













Mechanical-failure 103 35.2 38 38 25 
External events 86 29.4 18 33 33 
Human factor 72 24.6 26 21 33 
Impact failure 49 16.7 1 27 7 
Violent reaction 25 8.5 13 9 2 
Instrument failure 13 4.4 7 4 2 
Upset process conditions 9 3.1 4 4 0 
Services failure 5 1.7 1 2 2 
Total 359 123.6 108 138 104 
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A more detailed investigation about general causes of the accidents in the different parts 
of the world showed that mechanical failure was the main cause in European and other 
developed countries. However, for the particular case of the rest of the world, the main 
generic causes were human factor and external events (see Table 2-2). Accidents 
associated to human factor have increased significantly in developing countries (33%) 
compared with industrialized countries (21% in EU and 26% in other developed 
countries); this could be probably explained by a worse safety training of operators and a 
poorer safety culture, as well as to the existence of less severe regulations.  
Table 2-3. Specific causes of the domino accidents 




Mechanical failure (35.2%) Overpressure 14 16.1 
 Overheating 13 15.0 
 Other metallurgical failure 10 11.5 
 Leaking coupling or flange 9 10.3 
 Leaking or passing valve 8 9.2 
 Hose 6 6.9 
 Corrosion 4 4.6 
 Fatigue 4 4.6 
 Leaking gland or seal 4 4.6 
 Relief valve failure 4 4.6 
 Weld failure 4 4.6 
 Brittle failure 3 3.4 
 Use of incompatible materials 2 2.3 
 Overloading 2 2.3 
External events (29.4%) Fire 49 49.0 
 Explosion 28 28.0 
 Lightning 14 14.0 
 Extreme temperatures  3 3.0 
 Earthquake 2 2.0 
 Sabotage 2 2.0 
 Flooding 2 2.0 
Human factor (24.6%) General maintenance 16 21.1 
 General operation 15 19.7 
 Overfilling 12 15.8 
 Design error 10 13.2 
 Procedures 8 10.5 
 Management 7 9.2 
 Draining accident 3 3.9 
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 Failure to isolate or drain before 
uncoupling 
2 2.6 
 Accidental venting 2 2.6 
 Failure to connect or disconnect 1 1.3 
Impact failure (16.7%) Rail accident 33 70.3 
 Other vehicle 6 12.8 
 Heavy object 5 10.6 
 Road accident 1 2.1 
 Ship to land collision 1 2.1 
 Ship to ship collision 1 2.1 
Violent reaction (8.5%) Runaway reaction 11 57.9 
 Confined explosion 8 42.1 
Instrument failure (4.4%) Controller 6 50.0 
 Indicator 3 25.0 
 Trip 3 25.0 
Upset process conditions (3.1%)1 - - - 
Services failure (1.7%) Electricity 4 80.0 
 Water supply 1 20.0 
1For this cause MHIDAS does not have any categories 
 
Each general cause includes the contribution of different specific causes, which are shown 
in Table 2-3. Within the mechanical failure causes, overpressure (16.1%) and overheating 
(15%) were the most frequent ones, followed by metallurgical failure (11.5%) and leaking 
coupling/flange (10.3%). Regarding to specific causes of external events, accidents 
(essentially fire and explosion) in other plants were the most frequent types. Finally, when 
considering human factor as generic cause, maintenance was the main specific cause 
(21.1%). 
2.3.4 Origin 
The MHIDAS categories are used in Table 2-4 to define the origin of accidents. Again, 
the number of general origins can be higher than the total number of domino accidents 
because some accidents may have two origins at the same time. The main origin of the 
accidents is process plants (38.5 %); this percentage has increased clearly from the 28% 
found by Darbra et al. (2010). Storage areas have been the origin of the accidents in 33% 
of the cases. This could be explained by the high degree of confinement found in some 
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Rest of the 
world, % 
Process 127 38.5 44.4 37.8 34.6 
Storage 109 33.0 31.9 32.8 34.6 
Transport 53 16.1 6.9 20.6 14.1 
Transfer 35 10.6 12.5 10.0 10.3 
Warehouse 15 4.5 0.0 0.0 7.7 
Domestic or 
commercial premises 
11 3.3 4.2 2.8 3.8 
Waste storage or 
disposal areas 
1 0.3 5.6 2.8 1.3 
Total 351 106.3 105.5 106.8 106.4 
 
An interesting contribution is that of “transfer” which, as found already in other surveys 
(for example, the extensive one performed by Vilchez et al. (Vílchez, Sevilla, Montiel, 
Casal, 1995), represents still the origin of an important percentage of the accidents 
(10.6%). Even if it is well known that loading/unloading operations are especially 
dangerous and measures are often applied to prevent these accidents, these operations 
continue being the source of a relatively high number of dangerous events.  
When analyzing the origin in different parts of the world, process plants remain being the 
main one in the more industrialized countries (44.4% in EU, 37.8% in other developed 
countries). However, in the rest of the world, storage areas are at the same level than 
process (both 34.6%). This can be explained due to the fact that in developing countries 
there are more storage areas than process plants.  
The specific origin can also give a good understanding about domino accidents besides 
the general one. In 18 cases the specific origin was not specified. According to Table 2-5, 
atmospheric pressure storage vessels (18.6%), portable transport containers and rail 
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Table 2-5. Specific origin of domino accidents 
Specific origin No. of accidents Percentage 
Atmospheric pressure storage vessels 58 18.6 
Portable transport containers 42 13.5 
Rail tanker (tank cars) 42 13.5 
Process vessels 32 10.3 
On-plant pipes and associated valves 30 9.6 
Pressurised storage vessels 28 9.0 
Reactor 19 6.1 
Tank container 19 6.1 
Ship 13 4.2 
Pump 11 3.5 
Pipeline 10 3.2 
Road tanker 8 2.6 
Heat exchanger 7 2.2 
Barge 4 1.3 
Solid storage 3 1.0 
Hose 3 1.0 
Fired process equipment 3 1.0 
Equipment for moving solid material 1 0.3 
Small commercial tank 1 0.3 
Total 334 107.3 
 
2.3.5 Affected population 
The population affected by major accidents is an important priority in many safety 
studies. According to accident consequences, affected population can be divided in three 
categories: number of fatalities, number of injuries and number of evacuees. The results 
presented here are just for those cases where information was available (in 70.3% of cases 
for fatalities, for injuries in 68% and for evacuees in 32%). 
The lethality of accidents has been represented by means of the 𝑝 − 𝑁 curve (Figure 2-3) 
as in the previous chapter. Its slope indicates how the probability of an accident is reduced 
as a function of its severity. The least square method was used to calculate the probability. 
The b value of the curve 𝑝 = 𝑁𝑏was found to be -0.814; this means that the probability 
of an accident involving a domino effect that causes 10 or more deaths is 6.5 times greater 
than the probability of a domino accident that causes 100 or more deaths. This number is 
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in good agreement with the previous study from Vilchez et al. (1995) for all accidents, in 
which the value 𝑏 = −0.84 was found. There were two exceptional accidents in Mexico 
and Iran, respectively, with a great number of fatalities, which have been plotted in Figure 
2-3 but have been excluded from the least square calculation since they are outside the 
trend (confidence interval). 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Accumulated probability as a function of the number of deaths for domino accidents. 
 
In Figure 2-4, the probability of fatalities in different parts of the world has been plotted 
versus the number of deaths. The probability of death was similar for all the countries for 
the less severe accidents; however, for 𝑁 > 20 this probability was significantly higher 
for the “rest of the world”, with a value of 𝑏 = −0.65. It is clear from this plot that the 
consequences of a severe accident, in terms of lethality, are more important in the 
developing countries; for example, the probability of having an accident with at least 35 
fatalities in a developing country (PR) is 0.4 times larger than in developed countries (PD). 
This should be attributed, at least partly, to the quite different land use planning regulation 
measures, much less restrictive in the developing countries.   
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The number of injured people in domino accidents was also studied. There were no 
injured people in 23.5% of the accidents; 39.4% of accidents had between 1 and 10 
injuries; in 31.9% of cases there were between 11 and 100, and only 5.2% had more than 
100 injured people. 
 
Figure 2-4. p-N curves according to the development degree of the countries for domino accidents. 
 
Further analysis showed that in 16.8% of domino accidents there were no evacuees, in 
26.2% there were between 1–100, in 25.2% there were between 101–1000, in 27.1% there 
were between 1001–10,000, and in only 4.7% of accidents there were more than 10,000 
people evacuated.  
2.3.6 Domino sequences 
A practical way to analyze the domino accident sequences is the relative probability event 
tree (Darbra et al., 2010), in which each sequence is represented as a branch and its 
relative probability of occurrence can be easily calculated by a statistical treatment. 
The primary events considered were only “explosion” and “fire”. “Gas cloud” was not 
included as a primary event because, when it occurred, it was considered to be an 
explosion (if it originated mechanical effects) or a fire (if it was just a flash fire), or a 
PD = 1.37 N
-0.979
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toxic cloud which would not cause any secondary event. Figure 2-5 shows the resulting 
event tree. The number of accidents and the relative probability of occurrence (in square 
brackets) are included in each branch. The relative probability was calculated by dividing 
the number of accidents at each level to the number of accidents at its previous level. The 
overall probability value of each accident’s sequence was presented at the end of each 
branch.  
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The domino accidents that only include primary and secondary events are called “two-
step” domino accidents; if there are at least three events in the sequence, they are called 
“three-step” domino accidents. Of the 330 domino accidents, treated in this study, 53% 
started by an explosion and the rest of them (47%) were initiated by a fire. 
In 155 cases (47%) the domino sequence started with fire as a primary event; the 
secondary events were explosion (61.2%), fire (33.5%) and explosion plus toxic cloud 
(5.3%). The most common three-step sequence was fire→explosion→fire. 
Most first step explosions originated a fire as a secondary event (81.1% of cases). In the 
rest of the cases, another explosion followed the first one (12.6%), or a toxic cloud (5.1%) 
or both phenomena (1.2%). 30 accidents reached a third step: explosion→fire→explosion 
(25 cases), explosion→fire→fire (4 cases) and explosion→fire→toxic cloud (one case).  
Among the 330 domino accidents analyzed, 282 accidents included primary and 
secondary events (“two-step”), and 48 of these included in addition a “third step”. The 
only “four-step” domino sequence found was fire→explosion→fire→explosion.   
The ratio between “two-step” and “three-step” accidents has been found to be 6; this value 
is similar to that found in a previous study (Darbra et al., 2010) with a partly coincident 
set of data. However, it differs from the values obtained in other surveys: Kourniotis et 
al. (2000) found 2.4 in a set of 80 accidents, and Abdolhamidzadeh et al. (2009) obtained 
2.2 in a set of 73 accidents; this difference could be attributed to the fact that these two 
last sets of data were rather reduced and, probably, obtained from more specific sources. 
 
2.4 Accidents occurred in the 21st century 
A special effort has been devoted to the analysis of those accidents occurred recently, i.e., 
in the first years of the 21st century (2000-2013), since they are the most representative 
of the current process industry situation and the hazmat transportation, even if the sample 
is significantly more reduced. As MHIDAS database was not available from 2007, an 
effort was made to gather more accidents from other sources; this could have introduced 
a certain bias in this specific sample of data. 84 accidents were submitted to the same 
treatment described in the previous sections in order to allow the comparison of both 
periods.  
2.4.1 Distribution according to location 
When the geographical distribution is analyzed 14.3% correspond to the EU, 44% to 
“other developed countries” and 41.7% to the rest of the world; this distribution is 
different from the one found in the general study (Table 2-6). Comparing the two sets of 
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results, it can be concluded that in the developed countries (EU and other developed 
countries) the frequency of domino accidents has decreased, whereas in the rest of 
countries there exists an increasing trend. 
Table 2-6. Comparison of domino accidents between general study and 21st century 
 General study, % 21st century, % 
EU  21.8 14.3 
Other developed countries 54.5 44.0 
Rest of the world 23.7 41.7 
This should be considered, once more, as a clear indication that the developing countries 
have an enlarging problem with their chemical industry activities (furthermore, in some 
of these countries, the number and size of process plants is increasing), a stronger control 
being required.  
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The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (current US$)1 and the value added by industry are 
shown for different parts of the world (Figure 2-6). Increasing trend of GDP is observed 
for the rest of the world. Moreover, the results show that the value added by industry in 
the rest of the world has a higher amount. It proves the greater rate of industrialization in 
those countries. 
 
2.4.2 Substances involved and their hazards 
No significant changes have been really detected in this category. LPG (14.3%) and oil 
(11.9%) –together with gasoline– keep being the most common substances involved in 
domino accidents. Hydrocarbons had a slightly higher contribution in the general study 
(61%, Table 2-1) than in this new set of data (53.7%). As for the type of hazard, 
flammable and toxic substances keep being the most frequent ones, followed by explosive 
and corrosive. 
2.4.3 General and specific causes 
Table 2-7 shows the main general causes; as in the general study, there are significant 
contributions also from mechanical failure and human factor, having the latter increased 
with respect to the overall set of data from 24.6% to 35%. 
 
Table 2-7. General causes of domino accidents in 21st century 
General cause No. of accidents Percentage 
Mechanical-failure 19 40 
Human factor 17 35 
External events 10 21 
Impact failure 5 10 
Instrument failure 1 2 
Services failure 1 2 
Total 53 110 
 
                                                 
1 GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets 
or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
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Concerning the specific causes, and even though the sample is now much more reduced, 
overpressure keeps being the most frequent one in the “mechanical failure” category, and 
general maintenance is also the first specific cause inside “human error”.  
2.4.4 General origin 
The general origin of accidents in this century is illustrated in Figure 2-7, being the most 
significant contributions those of process plants, with an increase from 38.5% (in the 
general survey) to 51.2%. If the geographical distribution is analyzed, this increase is 
found in all three geographical categories, whereas in storage areas this frequency 
decreased. It should be noted that no accidents in transfer are found in the EU, while a 
10.8% and 2.9% are found in “other developed countries” and “in the rest of the world”, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 2-7. General origin of domino accidents in 21st century. 
 
2.4.5 Affected population 
The accumulated probability of domino accidents for the number of fatalities in the 21st 
century has also been studied. In the 𝑝 − 𝑁 plot, the new b value is now -0.827. This 
number is slightly lower than the value previously obtained (-0.814) for the whole set of 
data, although the difference is not significant. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Domino effect occurs with a certain frequency due to the fact that many process and 
storage plants are rather compact, with short distances between equipment. This means 
that, in the event of, for example, a fire, the possibility of flame impingement on a 
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reservoir or a pipe is very high, with the subsequent failure, loss of containment and 
occurrence of an additional accident scenario. Thus, the domino effect can be very 
important because of its ability to significantly increase the severity of an accident 
through an escalation phenomenon. This is why the interest in studying it has increased 
in recent years.  
The present study, performed on a set of 330 cases, has allowed the characterization of 
some interesting aspects of domino effect; as the cases studied were limited to relatively 
recent years (from 1961 up to 2013), this characterization must be considered as updated 
and valid for the current industry. 
Most of the accidents (76.3%) occurred in the industrialized countries, what is quite 
logical taking into account that it is in these countries where the higher number of process 
industries are located. However, in the 21st century the contribution of developing 
countries has increased from 23.7% to 41.7%. 
The survey has shown that most accidents occurred in process plants (38.5%) and storage 
areas (33%); the contribution of process plants has increased in the new century up to 
51%. Taking into consideration the whole set of accidents, in the industrialized countries 
the frequency in process plants is higher than in the developing countries, in which storage 
areas have an important contribution; this is probably due to the fact that in these countries 
storage facilities are more common than process plants. A relatively low frequency was 
found in transportation (16.1%); this is a significant –and logical– difference when 
comparing with “all” major accidents (Vílchez et al., 1995). Instead, the occurrence in 
loading/unloading (11%) is quite similar. Explosion and fire keep being the initiating 
accident of the domino sequence, as shown by previous surveys. 
The substances more frequently involved were the flammable ones: LPG, gasoline, oil, 
naphtha, with a rather reduced contribution of toxic materials (chlorine, ammonia); 
flammable materials were present in 142% of cases and toxic ones in 55% (percentages 
do not total 100 because diverse materials were often involved in the same accident). 
Consequently, the main initiating events were explosion (53% of cases) and fire (47%). 
In the industrialized countries an important effort has been devoted to improving the 
safety of plants and operations. This seems to have given good results: the frequency of 
accidents occurrence shows a slight decreasing trend as a function of time for the 
European Union and the group of the here called “other developed countries”. Instead, 
the frequency of accidents in developing countries shows a slightly increasing trend for 
the whole period analyzed.  
The most important causes of the domino accidents were mechanical failure, external 
events and human factor, increasing the latter from 24.6% to 35% when analyzing the 
accidents occurred in the 21st century. In addition, the influence of human factor is higher 
in the developing countries. These two findings suggest that actions need to be taken to 
improve this situation. Concerning mechanical failure, overpressure is the main specific 
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cause. The importance of pressure relief systems should be emphasized, Kreder and 
Berwanger (1995) and Berwanger et al. (2000) found that approximately 40% of process 
equipment has at least one deficiency in its pressure relief systems. This deficiency can 
be originated from absent and/or undersized pressure relief devices or improperly 
installed pressure relief devices.   
The consequences on the population were analyzed through the 𝑝– 𝑁 plot, which has 
shown that the probability of domino accidents with higher number of fatalities is higher 
for the developing countries; again, a better regulation of land use planning could be 
useful to decrease the impact of these accidents. As for the material damages and losses, 
no enough data could be gathered to analyze it quantitatively, although it is evident that 
the domino effect increases significantly the severity of the accident. 
Finally, an interesting aspect is the domino sequences, which were analyzed by applying 
the relative probability event tree. 53% of the accidents started by an explosion and the 
rest of them (47%) were initiated by a fire. The secondary events were fire (194 cases), 
explosion (127 cases; in 10 case, a toxic cloud was also involved) and toxic cloud (only 
9 cases). The ratio between “two-step” and “three-step” accidents has been found to be 6. 
There was only one four-step sequence case (fire→explosion→fire→explosion) 
The domino effect occurs in many major accidents, increasing significantly both their 
complexity and their final effects and consequences. Although in recent years the interest 
on it has increased, less attention has been paid to domino effect as compared to other 
aspects of industrial accidents; this is the reason why its main features are still 
insufficiently known. 
The results obtained from a historical survey may vary significantly according to the 
origin of the data analyzed. Thus, it is important to classify the data into adequate 
categories, such as, for example, industrialized countries and developing countries. A 
good example of this is the variation of the frequency of domino accidents as a function 
of time: for the EU and other developed countries the overall trend is slightly decreasing, 
whereas the developing countries show a certain increasing frequency over the last 
decades. Another aspect in which a significant difference has been detected is the severity 
of the accidents, especially for the most severe ones (more than twenty fatalities), which 
is again worse in these countries; land use planning is probably one of the aspects that 
can be associated to this situation. And, as a third significant difference, accidents 
originated by human factor are significantly more frequent in the developing countries. 
This could be explained by a poor safety culture and training in these countries.  
Concerning the situation in the 21st century, a practically stationary frequency has been 
observed when accidents in the more industrialized countries are analyzed; this would 
confirm the fact –already observed in other surveys– that the traditionally increasing 
frequency of occurrence has changed to another trend (stable or slightly decreasing) in 
the developed countries. However, in the developing countries an increase in the 
frequency is observed. 
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A main conclusion which can be inferred from this survey is that the efforts devoted in 
the industrialized countries to improve the safety of both process plants and transportation 
of hazardous materials are clearly giving good results, both from the point of view of the 
frequency and the severity of the accidents. It is evident that a similar effort should be 
applied urgently in the developing countries, where the situation is unfortunately different 
and, furthermore, in some of them the chemical industry is growing significantly. 
Finally, a set of recommendations can be issued from this survey. 
 Accidents occurred in “transfer” operations continue having a constant and 
important occurrence. Equipment safety devices and methods of 
loading/unloading should be improved, as well as the specific training provided 
to the operators. 
 Overpressure is the main specific cause of accidents originated by mechanical 
pressure. Design, installation and maintenance of safety relief devices should be 
stressed. 
 Human factor keeps having a very important influence in domino accidents, even 
in the new century. This incidence is clearly higher in the developing countries; 
therefore, the training of the operators, both in maintenance and plant operation, 
should be significantly improved. 
 The frequency of severe (more than twenty fatalities) accidents is higher in the 
developing countries; there can be probably an influence of land use planning 
regulations, which should be improved. 
 Taking into account both primary and secondary events, fire is the accident with 
the highest contribution to domino effect. Therefore, the importance of fire 
protection and firefighting systems should be stressed. 
 The frequency of domino effect accidents has lightly decreased in the EU and 
other developed countries, whereas there is an increasing trend in the developing 
countries. This indicates once more the importance of safety culture measures and 
land use planning, which should be more and more important in those countries 
in which chemical industry is experiencing a significant growth. 
 When the BLEVE accidents were searched in the analyzed sample, 58 cases were 
found. 43 of them occurred as a consequence of a fire and 15 as the first event of 
a domino sequence; all of them originated a further accident. This implies the 18% 
of the whole sample. 
 The fact that 74% of these BLEVEs were originated by a fire supported the 
previous belief that fire was the main cause of most BLEVEs. This is a very 
important aspect; if really it can be proved that this is true, then this would be a 
good reason to further strengthen and improve the thermal protection of those 
vessels which are prone to undergo such an accident. Therefore, an additional 
effort was done to improve the collection of data to analyze this subject in detail; 




Chapter 3. FIRE AS A FIRST STEP OF DOMINO EFFECT 
IN BLEVES 
3.1 Introduction 
As seen in Chapter 2, the first event in a domino effect sequence is usually an explosion 
or a fire; these two accidents have approximately the same contribution when large sets 
of cases are analyzed. However, in the specific case of BLEVEs the situation changes 
significantly, fire having a much more significant role. 
If a vessel containing a pressurized liquid is subjected to the effects of a fire, there is a 
certain possibility that, depending on the circumstances, it explodes after a time. This can 
happen even if the vessel is equipped with active or passive protection, and with pressure 
relief valves; and it can occur almost immediately or after more than one hour from the 
starting of the fire.  
In this chapter the incidence of fire as a primary event leading to a BLEVE is analyzed, 
as well as the domino effect sequences found in such accidental scenario. 
3.2 Effects of fire on a vessel 
When a vessel is subjected to a fire, its effects will depend on the type of fire, especially 
on the thermal flux released, and on whether the equipment is exposed only to thermal 
radiation or there is flames impingement. As for the consequences, they will depend on 
the duration of the fire and on the equipment features: design (shape, wall thickness), 
filling degree and existence of protective measures. 
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3.2.1 Pool and tank fires 
Pool and tank fires can last long time; if their thermal radiation reaches another relatively 
close equipment, unless this is adequately protected –both thermal insulation and water 
deluge can be a good protection in this situation– the conditions for failure could be 
reached. 
In this type of fires, the combustion is rather bad due to poor air entrainment as the flow 
velocity in the flames is usually less than 10 m s-1 (Johnson and Cowley, 1992). Flames 
are composed of relatively bright zones, with a high concentration of incandescent soot, 
and other zones covered by black smoke; both zones contribute to thermal radiation, 
bright zones having the highest emissive power (𝐸). For the non-luminous (smoke 
covered) zones, Muñoz et al. (2004), working with gasoline and diesel oil, found a value 
of 𝐸𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑡 = 40 kW m
-2, independent of the pool diameter and of the type of fuel. For the 
luminous, bright zones, they found 𝐸𝑙𝑢𝑚 values ranging between 80 and 120 kW m
-2, 
depending on the pool diameter and the type of fuel. The fraction of the fire surface 
covered by the luminous flame depends on the type of fuel, although an approximate 
value of 0.4 can be assumed; this would imply an approximate value for the whole fire 
surface of 𝐸 =  60 kW m-2. Moorhouse and Pritchard (1982) suggested that with large 
pool fires of hydrocarbons, excluding liquefied gases, 𝐸 is unlikely to exceed this value. 
Other values have also been proposed: API 521 (Standard, 2007) suggests 80 – 100 kW 
m-2; Nizner and Eyre (1983) obtained surface emissive powers of 35 kW m-2 for kerosene, 
48 kW m-2 for LPG and 153 kW m-2 for LNG. 
However, the radiation intensity decreases quickly as the distance from the flame surface 
increases, and the heat load on a given equipment will usually be much lower than these 
values.  
If there is flame engulfment of an equipment, heat transfer will be the sum of two 
contributions, radiation and convection. Different values have been proposed: heat fluxes 
in the range of 95 – 130 kW m-2 have been measured for kerosene (Moodie et al., 1988), 
80 – 150 kW m-2 for JP-4 (Schneider and Kent, 1989), 100 – 180 kW m-2 as a general 
range for liquid hydrocarbons and 150 – 250 kW m-2 for LPG pool fires (Johnson et al., 
1992; Roberts et al., 2004). This can lead to rather high temperature increase rates of the 
vessel wall above the liquid level. 
If there is flame impingement, deluge systems require high flow rates; adequate thermal 
insulation can give a good protection.  
3.2.2 Jet fires 
Jet fires thermal characteristics depend on the fuel and on the outlet velocity. Low 
pressure releases of liquid or two-phase mixtures give low velocity flames and bad 
combustion, a situation relatively close to that of a pool fire. If the velocity is high, air 
entrainment is important and this improves the combustion; however, with two-phase 
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flow, the flame is still sooty and bright and the radiation mechanism dominates. Instead, 
with sonic gas flow –gas jet fires are often sonic and very turbulent– the combustion is 
very good and the flame is almost transparent, convection being much more important 
than radiation. This behavior has an important influence on the value of the flame surface 
emissive power; for propane, Palacios et al. (2012) obtained values of approximately 𝐸 =
80 kW m-2 for gas jets and 𝐸 = 230 kW m-2 for two-phase flow jet fires.  
The thermal radiation intensity decreases significantly with the distance, but if there is 
impingement of the flames on a surface, very high heat fluxes occur. Impinging on a solid 
surface modifies significantly the shape of the flame, increasing the area of contact with 
the equipment. Accurate values cannot be predicted and a wide range of heat fluxes has 
been proposed; the following ones can be assumed (Casal, 2008): 
 natural gas: 50 – 300 kW m-2; average: 200 kW m-2 
 propane gas, sonic: 300 kW m-2   
 propane, two-phase flow: 150 – 220 kW m-2  
 propane, two-phase flow, low velocity: 150 kW m-2. 
If these heat fluxes impinge on a non-wetted wall, the temperature increase is so quick 
that the vessel can fail in a very short time. 
3.2.3 Fireballs 
The thermal radiation intensity from a fireball can be very strong at short distances. 
Flames surface emissive power depends on the fuel and is usually significantly higher 
than that of a pool fire, as practically all the fireball surface is covered by bright flames. 
Moorhouse and Pritchard (1982) suggested a range of 150 – 300 kW m-2, although it can 
be as high as 350 kW m-2 for LPG. As the duration is short, protected equipment subjected 
to it will not fail; unprotected equipment could fail in some cases, but the probability is 
rather low due to the short exposure time. If there is flame impingement, heat fluxes can 
be in the range 200 – 350 kW m-2 (Lees, 1996; Mannan, 2014). In this case, water deluge 
systems are not efficient due to the turbulence of flames, but fireproofing layers are 
efficient; again, the contact time will be generally very short as the fireball will rise from 
the ground level, and the probability of failure must be considered rather low. 
3.2.4 Flash fires 
The contact time with the equipment is so short that the probability of originating a 
domino effect is usually negligible and should only be considered for the case of floating-
roof tanks (Cozzani et al., 2006). 
A summary of the approximate ranges of heat fluxes and surface emissive power for the 
diverse types of fire can be seen in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1. Approximate ranges of heat fluxes and surface emissive power 
Type of fire 𝑬, kW m-2 
Flame engulfment/impingement 
heat flux, kW m-2 
Pool, tank Hydrocarbons: 40 – 100 
LNG: 150 – 200 
LPG:50 – 120 
80 – 180 
180 – 260 





150 – 220 
200 – 350 
Fireball 150 – 350 -- 
Flash fire LNG, LPG: 125 – 280 -- 
 
3.3 Heating rate of vessel wall 
When a vessel undergoes the effects of a fire, the situation can change dramatically 
depending on two circumstances: i) the vessel wall has or not a thermal insulation layer; 
ii) the vessel wall is in contact with a liquid or with a vapor or a gas. 
The existence of a passive protection –a thermal insulation layer– should in principle 
imply that the vessel wall temperature will not increase up to dangerous values. However, 
if this protection does not exist or –as often happens– it has been destroyed by a 
mechanical action (erosion by a turbulent jet, the impact by a fragment from an explosion, 
a traffic accident in the case of a road or rail tanker), the wall is directly exposed to the 
fire effects. 
In such circumstances, the situation can again significantly change depending on whether 
the wall is wetted by the liquid contained in the vessel or it is in contact with the vapor 
above the liquid level. 
If the wall is wetted by liquid, its temperature will be close to that of the liquid and thus 
it will be protected and will not lose strength. However, if the wall is above the liquid 
level, i.e. it is in contact with the vapor, cooling by convection will be very poor and its 
temperature will increase rather quickly. The wall heat-up will be especially important if 
the vessel is engulfed by the flames. 
Figure 3-1 shows the evolution of wall temperature for an empty vessel located on a pool 
fire (Planas Cuchi et al., 1996). With the initial development of the fire, the wall 
temperature increases quickly (3.5 ºC s-1 for the hexane pool, 5.8 ºC s-1 for the kerosene 
pool); in a second stage, with a fully developed fire, fire-induced wind reduced somewhat 
the wall heating rate: 1.3 ºC s-1 for the hexane pool, 3.6 ºC s-1 for the kerosene pool. In all 
cases the rate at which the temperature rises is very high, implying that in very short time 
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the wall can be heated in such a way that, due to the weakening of the material, it will not 
stand the inside pressure. 
The pressure inside the vessel will increase due to the fire heating of the wall surface 
wetted by the liquid, the heating rate depending on the liquid level and the vessel 
geometry, and these factors affect the pressure rise (Landucci et al., 2013). For example, 
a rail tank car filled to 94%, engulfed in a hydrocarbon pool fire, was pressurized up to 
the safety relief valve set pressure in approximately 2 minutes (Townsend et al.,1974). 
However, even if the pressure relief valve opens, it could not prevent the vessel explosion 
if the vapor space wall has been heated up to too high temperatures; of course, if the valve 
action delays the explosion, the mass involved in it will be smaller and the effects will be 
less severe. 
 a)      b) 
  
Figure 3-1. Temperature evolution as a function of time in a non-wetted wall of a vessel engulfed in a pool 
fire: a) pool fire of hexane, 4 m2, lower lateral wall; b) pool fire of kerosene, 12 m2, lower lateral wall 
(Planas Cuchi et al., 1996). 
 
The aforementioned heating rates can be significantly higher if there is impingement of 
the flames from a highly turbulent jet fire, as in this case the heat flux will be much more 
important. 
 
3.4 BLEVEs and domino effect sequences 
In Chapter 1, a historical analysis was performed on 167 accidents involving a BLEVE 
event. The same set of data used in Chapter 1 was used here and the analysis of these 
cases allowed the identification of those accidents in which a domino effect sequence 
occurred. In 40 accidents, a BLEVE occurred as a single accident whereas in 127 cases a 
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Table 3-2. General origin of BLEVE accidents with domino effect 
General origin No. of accidents Overall percentage 
Transport 60 47 
Storage area 39 31 
Transfer 22 17 
Process plant 12 9 
Domestic/commercial premises 6 5 
Other 4 3 
Total 143 112 
 
Table 3-2 shows the type of plant or activity in which these 127 accidents occurred; the 
overall number of accidents (143) is larger than that of real accidents because some of 
them can be included in two different origins (for example, “transfer” and “storage area”). 
Practically half of the accidents occurred during transportation, followed by storage, 
transfer and process plants. It is interesting to note again the high contribution of transfer 
operations (22 accidents), as noted in Chapter 2.  
 
Table 3-3. Specific origin of BLEVE accidents with domino effect 
Specific origin No. of accidents Percentage 
Rail tanker 40 31 
Pressurized storage vessel 24 19 
Road tanker 22 17 
Portable transport containers 17 13 
On plant pipes and associated valves 6 5 
Atmospheric pressure storage vessels 5 4 
Heat exchangers 4 3 
Reactor 3 2 
Ship 3 2 
Hose 3 2 
Other 8 7 
Total 135 105 
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As for the specific origin (Table 3-3), rail tankers were the most common, followed by 
pressurized storage vessel and road tanker. Here again there are some misleading data; 
for example, in Table 3-2, 60 accidents correspond to “transport”, while in Table 3-3 rail 
and road tanker plus ship accidents sum 65. This is due to the coincidence of both 
“transfer” and “transport” in several accidents in the MHIDAS database, which criterion 
has been kept here. 
The substances involved in the accidents have been summarized in Table 3-4. The 
resulting overall number of accidents (199) is again much larger than that of real accidents 
because in many of them diverse substances were involved (e.g., in a train accident 
occurred in 2000 in Louisiana, dichloropropane, toluene diisocyanate, sodium hydroxide, 
ethylene oxide, acrylic acid and methyl chloride were involved). LPG was clearly the 
most frequent substance, followed by oil and other hydrocarbons; only four cases were 
found in which LNG was involved. 
 
Table 3-4. Substances involved in BLEVE accidents with domino effect 
Substance No. of accidents Percentage 
LPG 90 71 
Oil/Gasoline/Petrol/Diesel/Kerosene 14 12 
Vinyl chloride 10 8 
Ethylene oxide 7 6 
LNG 4 3 
Propylene 4 3 
Other chemical substances 70 56 
Total 199 159 
 
As for the general cause of the accidents (Table 3-5), in practically two over five of them 
it was due to an impact; this cause was found mainly in transportation (typical accidents 
occurred in road and rail transportation). This was followed by other external events, 
mechanical failure and human factor, respectively. 
Figure 3-2 shows the significance of fire in the BLEVE sequences. In 88 cases (69%) a 
fire was the first step, while in 33 cases the first event was directly a BLEVE. A typical 
scenario was a road or rail accident with a release of a flammable substance, quickly 
ignited; the flames travelled back to the release source, leading to a jet fire which, after a 
certain time, provoked the explosion of the vessel. In such cases, the existence of a jet fire 
impinging on the vessel wall is highly probable. If all domino effect steps in the analyzed 
sequences are considered, then 97 fires and 57 explosions leading to another event are 
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found. Here again the larger contribution of fire as compared to that of explosion is 
evident. 
Table 3-5. General causes of BLEVE accidents with domino effect 
General cause No. of accidents Percentage 
Impact failure 52 47 
External events 39 35 
Human factor 31 28 
Mechanical failure 30 28 
Instrument failure 5 5 
Violent reaction 5 5 
Services failure 1 1 
Total 163 148 
 
The explosion following the fire was in most cases the closing event of the sequence, 
although in a few ones it led to another explosion or to another fire. In those accidents in 
which the accidental sequence started with a BLEVE, this could lead to a fire (in most 
cases) or to another explosion. Of course, the complexity of the possible sequences 
depends on the plant arrangement or on the number of rail tankers involved in the 
accident. 
As a whole, the sequence fire→explosion was found in 97 cases in the event tree, while 
explosion→another event, occurred only in 57 cases. It should also be noted that in a few, 
very unusual cases, the vessel can fail without exploding but releasing a large jet fire 
(Demichela et al., 2004). 
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Figure 3-2. Domino effect sequences in BLEVE accidents. 
 
3.5 Time to failure 
When an equipment is subjected to the effects of a fire, the time to failure (TTF) is a very 
important aspect from the point of view of emergency management. Thirty years ago it 
was generally believed that when a pressurized vessel was subjected to direct contact with 
flames –a situation that could originate an explosion– about 25 – 30 minutes were 
available to try to solve the situation; after that time, the explosion could occur at any 
moment and therefore firefighters should move away. This false belief took the life of 
many people. It is now well known that in the aforementioned situation, depending on the 
circumstances, the explosion can occur after a few minutes from the start of the fire action, 
or even after a shorter time. In the San Juanico accident (Mexico, 1984), the first BLEVEs 
occurred 70 seconds after the first jet fires appeared; in the accident occurred in Nijmegen 
Contribution to the study of BLEVEs and their mechanical effects 
56 
(The Netherlands) in 1978, a tanker of LPG exploded at a filling station just 3 minutes 
after fire started underneath during unloading. However, the time to failure can be 
significantly higher: in the accident occurred in Zarzalico (Spain, 2011), an LNG road 
tanker was exposed to a very strong fire during approximately seventy minutes before the 
explosion occurred (Planas et al., 2015). Table 3-6 gives the time to failure for a series of 
accidents involving fire→BLEVE domino sequences (MHIDAS, 2007). 
Diverse circumstances can have a significant influence on the value of the time to failure: 
1. Whether the flames impinge on the vessel wall below the liquid level (tank wall 
being therefore refrigerated by the liquid) or above it; in this later case, if there is 
no passive protection, wall temperature will increase significantly and its tensile 
strength will decrease, what can eventually lead to the vessel burst in a relatively 
short time.  
2. The existence of a protection system. Active or passive protection can be very 
useful to avoid or, at least, delay the failure of equipment undergoing thermal 
radiation or flames impingement. 
 
Water deluge can be efficient to protect equipment subjected to pool fires effects, both 
for radiation exposure or flames impingement, as they are able to maintain a water film 
on the equipment surface (Table 3-7). With high momentum jet fires, however, a water 
deluge system should not be considered a good protection if there is flame impingement, 
as the high velocity of the jet will probably penetrate the water film and the dry surface 
will be in contact with the flames (Badri et al., 2013). Fixed water monitors could be 
effective delivering a high flow rate of water just to the flames impingement zone 
(Bradley, 2012). 
 
Table 3-6. Time to failure for different cases (fixed plants and transportation) 














1984 Mexico VCE→Jet fire→BLEVE→Fire LPG sphere 70 s 
1978 Netherlands Fire→BLEVE LPG 3 min 
1961 USA Fire→BLEVE→Fire LPG cylinder 10 min 
1974 USA Fire→BLEVE LPG 13 min 
1982 USA Fire→BLEVEs LPG 15 min 
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2011 Japan Fire→BLEVE LPG sphere 1 h 













1980 USA Fire→BLEVE Petrol road 
tanker 
3 min 
1970 USA Fire→BLEVEs LPG rail cars First car in 5 
min, 6 rail cars 
in 40 min 
1970 USA Fire→BLEVEs LPG 15 min 
1987 Australia Fire→BLEVE LPG rail tanker 15 min 
1974 Spain Fire→BLEVE Ethylene 
cryogenic trailer 
20 min 
1989 USA Fire→BLEVE→Fire Peroxide, 
polyethylene 
rail cars 
Peroxide car in 
20 min; 
polyethylene car 
in 6 h 
2002 Spain Fire→BLEVE LNG road 
tanker 
20 min 
1972 USA FIRE→BLEVE Propylene road 
tanker 
25 min 
1973 USA Fire→BLEVE LPG rail car 30 min 
1970 France Fire→BLEVE Propane tank 
car 
40 min 




1968 USA Fire→BLEVE→Toxic release Ethylene oxide 45 min 
2011 Spain Fire→BLEVE LNG road 
tanker 
70 min 




of propane tank;  




However, water deluge systems and water monitors have some practical disadvantages, 
amongst which the large overall water requirement and corrosion/maintenance problems 
can be cited as the most important ones. Furthermore, they are restricted to fixed plants. 
 
Table 3-7. Water application rates from API 2510A (Bradley, 2012) 
Exposure to radiant heat (no flame impingement) 5 L min-1 m-2 
Flame impingement (pool fire) 5 – 12.5 L min-1 m-2  
Flame impingement (jet fire)  1000 – 2000 L min-1 
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Therefore, passive fire protection is often used, both for vessels and for structural 
supports, when the danger of jet fires is considered. A fireproofing layer can delay or even 
avoid the equipment failure. Townsend et al. (1974) performed tests with full-scale rail 
tank cars containing propane, engulfed in a pool fire. In the case of an unprotected tank 
car equipped with a pressure relief valve (PRV), initially filled in a 94%, the tank 
underwent a powerful BLEVE after 24 min (content at the moment of failure: 40%); 
another tank car, also with a PRV, filled in an 85% and protected with a 3 mm layer of 
intumescent paint, experienced a BLEVE (content at the moment of failure: 3%) after 93 
min. Therefore, fireproofing can increase the TTF, thus allowing the application of 
emergency measures such as evacuation, and PRV will decrease the amount of material 
involved in the explosion and in the subsequent (if the material is flammable) fireball. 
However, if the insulating protection is damaged (by erosion, or by a mechanical impact 
as often happens in the case of traffic accidents), the temperature of the unprotected 
element can increase quickly to dangerous values. 
As a general approach, correlations have been proposed to estimate the time to failure for 
pressurized vessels (Landucci et al., 2009), even though they should be used only as 
indicative approaches and their predictions can be modified by specific circumstances. 
 
3.6 Discussion 
The historical analysis has shown that when the first event triggering the domino effect 
sequence is analyzed for a large set of accidents, fires and explosions have approximately 
the same contribution; even if fires are more frequent than explosions, the higher reach 
of explosion effects increases their contribution to domino effect. The same proportion is 
found when all domino effect steps in the diverse sequences are considered. 
However, in the case of BLEVE accidents, fire is the prevailing first event, being found 
in approximately 70% of cases; when all domino effect steps in the diverse sequences are 
considered, the fire/explosion proportion is 1.7/1. Approximately half of the accidents 
associated to the fire→BLEVE sequence occurred in transportation. 
If there is flame engulfment or impingement, a BLEVE can occur at any moment from 
the start of the fire, the time to failure ranging between one minute and more than one 
hour, depending on the circumstances. 
From the point of view of emergency management, such a situation should therefore be 
considered as very dangerous; people should be evacuated immediately and firefighters 
should withdraw to a safe distance. 
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The existence of fireproofing and safety relief valves can contribute –but do not 
guarantee, especially in the case of mechanical impact– to increase the time to failure; 
furthermore, safety valves reduce the amount of material involved in the explosion and 
in an eventual fireball in the case of flammable materials. These passive protection 




Chapter 4. PREDICTION OF BLEVE BLAST: 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIVERSE 
METHODOLOGIES 
4.1 Introduction  
The effects of a BLEVE are blast and ejection of fragments. However, flammable 
substances are often involved in BLEVE accidents; in such cases, the explosion is usually 
followed by a fireball, which consequences can be very severe. Instead, if the involved 
material is not flammable (as, for example, water in the case of a steam boiler explosion), 
there will be no thermal effects.  
The common method to predict the most important effects produced by a BLEVE, i.e. the 
peak overpressure and positive impulse of the blast wave, consist in determining the total 
mechanical energy released by the explosion. Then, by assuming that a certain percentage 
of this energy is converted into pressure wave, the peak overpressure can be estimated by 
the method of the TNT equivalent mass, Sachs scaled distance curve or other similar 
characteristic curves. 
There is not a unique way to calculate the mechanical energy released in a BLEVE, and, 
several models can be found in the literature. The differences among them rely, basically, 
on the thermodynamic assumptions on which they are based. Very few attempts have 
been made to compare results given by the diverse models with experimental data 
available (Abbasi et al., 2007b; Bubbico and Marchini, 2008; Crowl, 1991; Laboureur et 
al., 2014; Ogle et al., 2012) and, mostly, the comparison has been made in terms of the 
peak overpressure generated. 
Different authors studied thermodynamic approaches in order to calculate and compare 
the expansion energy and its resulting overpressures for different fluids in BLEVE 
accidents. According to those studies, methodologies based on real gas behavior and 
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adiabatic irreversible expansion assumption (Planas Cuchi et al., 2004b; Casal et al., 
2006) seem to give a better approximation for the resulting overpressure. However, 
methodologies based on the assumption of ideal gas behavior and isentropic expansion 
(Prugh, 1991) have been often applied in a conservative approach. Some questions still 
remain about the contribution of the different phases (gas and liquid) existing in the vessel 
to the generation of overpressure. 
Therefore, a detailed and comprehensive analysis is required to compare all the 
methodologies, with their different thermodynamic assumptions, in order to have a better 
understanding about these different approaches and to try to clarify which are the “best” 
models. As it will be shown later on, most of the analyses published by the different 
authors considered only some of the proposed approaches and none of them considered 
all the published methodologies for their treatment. In this chapter, a comparative analysis 
of the diverse models used for the calculation of the mechanical energy and, from this 
value, the peak overpressure, is performed. Data available in the literature and 
corresponding to diverse experimental tests of BLEVEs with propane and butane vessels 
have been used.  
4.1.1 The superheating limit temperature (Reid’s theory) 
As a previous step, it is necessary to clarify some aspects concerning a theory that has 
been very popular among specialist working in this field, and which could create some 
confusion. 
Reid (1979) defined BLEVE as "the sudden loss of containment of a liquid that is at or 
above its superheating temperature limit". He considered that the temperature of the 
liquid contained in the vessel had to reach the so-called superheat limit temperature (𝑇𝑠𝑙) 
for the occurrence of a BLEVE explosion. If this limit temperature was not reached just 
before the depressurization, there would be an explosion, certainly, but it would not be a 
BLEVE, being much less severe than a BLEVE. According to Reid’s definition, there is 
a mechanical unstable condition whenever (𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑉⁄ )𝑇 ≥ 0. At this condition (𝑇 > 𝑇𝑠𝑙), a 
liquid vaporizes spontaneously and explosively in the event of a sudden depressurization, 
with a very strong homogeneous nucleation in the whole mass of superheated liquid 
which gives rise to a practically instantaneous flashing of liquid. According to this theory, 
it would be this extraordinary nucleation and flash vaporization what would make 
BLEVEs so severe. Instead, if the temperature of the liquid at the moment of vessel failure 
is below 𝑇𝑠𝑙, the explosion –much less severe– will not be a BLEVE and the overpressure 
wave will be much less stronger. 
Figure 4-1 shows the vapor saturation curve and superheat limit loci, according to Reid’s 
theory. Let us suppose a liquid, with a given Tsl value of the superheat limit temperature, 
in a closed vessel which is being heated. Its pressure and temperature will increase 
following the P-T equilibrium line. If at a certain moment, at situation A, the vessel fails 
(𝑇 being below 𝑇𝑠𝑙), the depressurization will follow the AB line and the explosion will 
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not be a BLEVE. However, if during the depressurization the “superheat limit curve” 
(sometimes called spinodal line) is reached, as, for example, following the CD line, the 
explosion will be a BLEVE.  
 
 
Figure 4-1. Vapor saturation curve and superheat limit line according to Reid theory. 
 
Based on (𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝑉⁄ )𝑇 = 0, Salla et al. (2006) calculated 𝑇𝑠𝑙 for various substances. In this 
case, they used the Redlich-Kwong (RK) and Van der Waals (VdW) equations of state 
(EOS). There is a difference of about 30 K between the results obtained from these two 
EOS. Other authors (Reid, 1983; Sigales, 1990; CCPS, 1994) have proposed several 
simplified equations to calculate 𝑇𝑠𝑙, that are summarized and presented here: 
𝑇𝑠𝑙−𝑇𝑐 = 0.895 ∙ 𝑇𝑐 (4.1) 
𝑇𝑠𝑙−𝑇0 = 0.822 ∙ 𝑇𝑐 + 0.105 ∙ 𝑇0 (4.2) 
𝑇𝑠𝑙−𝑃0 = 𝑇𝑐 (0.11 ∙ (
𝑃0
𝑃𝑐
) + 0.89) (4.3) 
 
Salla et al. (2006) also calculated 𝑇𝑠𝑙 by using the aforementioned equations. They used 
RK and VdW equations of state together with equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3). The results 
obtained were closer to the 𝑇𝑠𝑙 values obtained with RK EOS than those from VdW EOS. 
They concluded that there was a significant uncertainty into the final 𝑇𝑠𝑙 values if the 
methods were based on the thermodynamic stability approach, depending on which 
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concept. According to their definition, the superheat limit temperature corresponds to a 
situation in which the energy transferred between the cooling liquid and the vaporizing 
liquid fractions is at its maximum (leading therefore to a minimum amount of energy in 
the remaining liquid). The main advantage of this approach is that it only depends on the 
properties of the substance involved and it does not require using an equation of state . 
Table 4-1 summarizes the values obtained for 𝑇𝑠𝑙 according to the diverse methods 
proposed for some of the substances typically involved in BLEVE accidents. 
 
Table 4-1. Superheat limit temperature obtained from the various methods (Salla et al., 2006) 
 𝑻𝒔𝒍−𝑹𝑲(K) 𝑻𝒔𝒍−𝑽𝒅𝑾(K) 𝑻𝒔𝒍−𝑻𝒄(K) 𝑻𝒔𝒍−𝑻𝟎(K) 𝑻𝒔𝒍−𝑷𝟎(K) 𝑻𝒔𝒍−𝑬(K) 
Propane 332.0 313.5 331.0 328.3 330.1 315.3 
n-Butane 381.5 360.0 380.6 378.3 379.8 348.8 
Methane 170.9 161.5 170.6 168.4 170.1 174.7 
Ethylene 253.3 239.0 252.7 250.0 252.0 257.2 
Ammonia 363.1 343.0 362.9 358.6 361.3 375.2 
CO2 272.5 257.0 272.2 270.5 271.1 280.2 
Chlorine 372.2 353.0 373.1 367.9 371.6 375.2 
Water 573.0 547.0 579.3 571.4 576.4 606.4 
 
However, nowadays the Reid theory on the superheat limit temperature is not taken into 
account when analyzing real vessel explosions. Reid’s theory could probably be applied 
at laboratory scale, with small vessels, clean and smooth vessel surface, homogeneous 
heating, homogeneous liquid temperature (liquid mixing), etc. Instead, at large, real scale, 
with strong local heating effects and significant temperature differences, the explosion 
does not follow it. In fact, none of the methods proposed in the literature to calculate the 
overpressure from a BLEVE takes it into account. This can be checked very easily: if 
Reid’s theory would apply, when calculating ∆𝑃 as a function of vessel temperature, a 
clear discontinuity should appear at 𝑇𝑠𝑙, with an abrupt increment of the released energy 
(overpressure generation energy) and of the peak overpressure. 
To illustrate this point, a specific case was defined as an example: a 45 m3 vessel which 
is heated up from ambient temperature (300 K) and initially filled up to 50% with 
liquefied propane. The mechanical energy of the contained fluid was calculated by 
applying different mathematical models based on different thermodynamic assumptions 
(analyzed later in this chapter). The results are shown in Figure 4-2. Based on Reid theory, 
there should be an abrupt change at 𝑇𝑠𝑙. However, the data plotted in this figure show that 
there is not any sudden change in the mechanical energy predicted by anyone of the 
different models applied. 
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This is one of the reasons why nowadays Reid’s theory is not taken into account in risk 
analysis, even though it can be useful for a better understanding of BLEVE mechanism. 
Birk et al. (2007, 1993) and Leslie and Birk (1991) performed vast experimental 
investigations about the BLEVE phenomenon. In contrast with Reid's definition, these 
authors stated that a BLEVE can be expected not only at or above the superheat limit 
temperature, but also below this temperature. According to their definition, the 
catastrophic failure of an LPG container leads to violent flashing if the liquid is at 
superheated condition (i.e. at a temperature higher than its boiling temperature at 
atmospheric pressure); however, the severity of BLEVEs that happen at their superheat 
limit temperature is higher than those which occur at lower temperatures. 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Mechanical energy as a function of temperature (including 𝑇𝑠𝑙) for propane, according to 
different mathematical models. 
 
The degree of superheating, which depends on the temperature and pressure inside the 
vessel just before the rupture, plays an important role in the flashing of liquid and in the 
generation of the subsequent pressure wave. Figure 4-3 illustrates the degrees of superheat 
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Figure 4-3. Superheating degrees and superheat limit loci for ammonia and butane at P-T graph (Abbasi et 
al., 2007b). 
In fact, the severity increases with the liquid temperature, as the amount of energy 
contained in it (liquid enthalpy) increases. Indeed, Birk and coauthors have shown that 
the so-called homogeneous nucleation is not a prerequisite for BLEVE accidents. In some 
circumstances, a BLEVE can happen both at a temperature near the ambient one or –more 
often– at a temperature well above it. These explosions are called by some authors 
cold/weak and hot/strong BLEVEs if they are close or far above the ambient temperature, 
respectively. 
 
4.2 Review of methods 
4.2.1 Methods for evaluating the energy released in the explosion 
In the catastrophic failure of a vessel containing a superheated liquid, the expansion of 
the preexisting vapor at the rupture moment plus the partial flashing of the liquid to vapor 
give the available mechanical energy. Some part of that energy is the source of 
overpressure wave. In order to calculate the mechanical energy, different thermodynamic 
assumptions have been considered. These assumptions have been summarized here: 
 Constant volume energy addition (Brode, 1959) 
 Real gas behavior and isentropic expansion (CCPS, 2010) 
 Isothermal expansion (Smith et al., 1996) 
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 Thermodynamic availability (Crowl, 1991, 1992) 
 Real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion (Planas Cuchi et al., 
2004b) 
 Liquid superheating energy (Casal and Salla, 2006). 
 
By reducing the pressure of the contained superheated liquid to the atmospheric one, a 
fraction of liquid flashes to vapor. The volumetric amount of flashed liquid can be 
obtained by knowing the flashing fraction, which can be calculated as: 
 
𝑓 = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−2.63 ∙
𝐶𝑃𝐿,𝑇𝑏
∆ℎ𝑣,𝑇𝑏





) ∙ (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑏)] (4.4) 
 
And the volume of flashed superheated liquid is: 





So, the total volume of vapor contributing to generate the explosion energy while 
reducing the pressure to the atmospheric one is the summation of the preexisting volume 
of vapor inside the vessel before the explosion and the volumetric fraction of flashed 
liquid: 
𝑉∗ = 𝑉 + 𝑉𝑓 (4.6) 
 
Constant volume energy addition 
The energy which is needed to increase the pressure of gas/vapor from ambient condition 
to the one just before the explosion state provides the energy of explosion (Brode, 1959). 
According to this assumption, the pressurization process happens at constant volume. 
Thus: 
𝐸∗ =
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Real gas behavior and isentropic expansion 
Real gas behavior and isentropic assumption are considered for the vapor expansion 
during the explosion. The difference between internal energies just before the explosion 
and atmospheric (just after the explosion) states provides the energy of explosion: 
 
𝐸 = ∆𝑈 = 𝑚𝐿0 ∙ 𝑢𝐿0 + 𝑚𝑉0 ∙ 𝑢𝑉0 − 𝑚𝐿 ∙ 𝑢𝐿 − 𝑚𝑉 ∙ 𝑢𝑉 (4.8) 
 
The liquid and vapor masses at the final state are: 
𝑚𝑉0 = 𝑥𝐿 ∙ 𝑚𝐿 + 𝑥𝑉 ∙ 𝑚𝑉 (4.9) 
𝑚𝐿0 = (1 − 𝑥𝐿) ∙ 𝑚𝐿 + (1 − 𝑥𝑉) ∙ 𝑚𝑉 (4.10) 
 











Depressurization happens abruptly at the explosion moment; so, it can be assumed that 
the temperature of the contained fluid does not have the chance to decrease; thus, 
considering that an isothermal process takes place, the energy of explosion will then be: 
 





By substituting the number of vapor moles and adding 𝑉∗, from Eq. (4.13) the following 
expression of the energy released can be obtained: 
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Ideal gas behavior and isentropic expansion 
This approach considers that the expansion of the vapor is adiabatic and reversible 
(isentropic); the ideal gas law is thus followed. Then, the energy released by explosion 













The concept of thermodynamic availability (exergy) was used by Crowl (1991, 1992) to 
calculate the energy of explosion. In this method, the actual potential of a system to do 
work is estimated as the energy of explosion by considering ideal gas behavior. The batch 
availability for this case is: 
∆𝐵 = −𝑅 ∙ 𝑇0 [𝑙𝑛 (
𝑝
𝑃0





However, in BLEVE explosions, the temperature of the superheated fluid inside the 
vessel is usually higher than the ambient temperature because, in many cases, the vessel 
has been heated by external fire. So, the batch availability formula can be converted to:  
∆𝐵 = 𝐶𝑝𝑣 ∙ (𝑇𝑝0 − 𝑇) − 𝐶𝑝𝑣 ∙ 𝑇0 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝑝0
𝑇
) − 𝑅 ∙ 𝑇0 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝑃0
) − 𝑅 ∙ 𝑇 ∙ (
𝑃0
𝑃
− 1) (4.17) 
 
Equations (4.16) and (4.17) give the useful energy per mole of gas contained in the vessel. 
To calculate the total amount of gas or vapor involved in the explosion process from these 




) ∙ ∆𝐵 (4.18) 
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Real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion 
Planas-Cuchi et al. (2004b) assumed that the expansion associated to the explosion is an 
adiabatic irreversible process; they also considered real gas behavior. These assumptions 
seem to be closer to the real situation than those corresponding to an isentropic process 
(an explosion is supposed to create a high amount of entropy). At adiabatic conditions, it 
can be assumed that the work is equal to the change in the internal energy of the vessel 
content:  
−𝑃 ∙ ∆𝑉 = ∆𝑈 (4.19) 
 
This equation can be solved analytically in order to find the vapor fraction at the final 
state (equation (4.22)): 
𝑃 ∙ ∆𝑉 = 𝑃 ∙ [(𝑣𝑉0 − 𝑣𝐿0) ∙ 𝑚𝑇 ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑚𝑇 ∙ 𝑣𝐿0 − 𝑉𝑇] (4.20) 
−∆𝑈 = (𝑢𝐿0 − 𝑢𝑉0) ∙ 𝑚𝑇 ∙ 𝑥 − 𝑚𝑇 ∙ 𝑢𝐿0 + 𝑈 (4.21) 
𝑥 =
𝑚𝑇 ∙ 𝑃 ∙ 𝑣𝐿0 − 𝑉𝑇 ∙ 𝑃 + 𝑚𝑇 ∙ 𝑢𝐿0 − 𝑈
[(𝑢𝐿0 − 𝑢𝑉0) − (𝑣𝑉0 − 𝑣𝐿0) ∙ 𝑃] ∙ 𝑚𝑇
 (4.22) 
 
Liquid superheating energy 
Casal and Salla (2006) assumed that the expansion work of the superheat flashing liquid 
is the essential contribution in BLEVE overpressure. Even if the constant values (𝑘 in Eq. 
(4.24)) finally used in this method were obtained from all the energy released in the 
explosion, Eq. (4.24) uses only the mass of liquid in the vessel at the moment of 
explosion. They assumed an adiabatic process; therefore, the excess stored heat inside the 
superheated liquid would cover the expansion work which leads to blast wave. The 
authors defined the "Superheating Energy" as:  
𝑆𝐸 = ℎ𝐿 − ℎ𝐿0 (4.23) 
They demonstrated that, for an isentropic process (assuming that 50% of the energy 
released was devoted to braking the vessel and ejecting the fragments; see last paragraph 
of this section), 14% of 𝑆𝐸 would be invested in creating blast if a reversible process was 
assumed (what they did not consider acceptable). If, instead, an irreversible (much more 
realistic) process is assumed, only 5% of 𝑆𝐸 originates blast; these percentages were 
introduced through a constant 𝑘: 
𝐸𝑤 = 𝑘 ∙ 𝑚𝐿 ∙ 𝑆𝐸 (4.24) 
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However, in this thesis, in order to make possible the comparative analysis, 𝑘 values will 
be lightly changed, assuming that only 40% (instead of 50%) of the energy participates 
in resulting BLEVE blast. So, we have: 
𝑘 =  0.11 for isentropic process 
𝑘 =  0.04 for irreversible process 
 
In this study, the irreversible process is considered for the comparative analysis. 
Most of the aforementioned methods are able to calculate the maximum amount of energy 
available that can be released in a BLEVE. However, not all this energy is converted to 
blast overpressure. Actually, some fraction of the energy is used to break the vessel and 
eject the fragments (this has been already included in the method proposed by Casal and 
Salla (2006)). The mechanical properties of materials that constitute the vessel, play here 
an important role. Approximately 80% and 40% of the energy is considered to generate 
overpressure in fragile and ductile failures, respectively. The rest of the energy is used for 
breaking the vessel and ejecting the fragments. This consideration introduces a certain 
additional (and practically unavoidable) uncertainty when calculating the blast. 
4.2.2 From energy released to overpressure wave 
Once the energy invested in creating the blast wave is known, it is necessary to estimate 
the value of the peak overpressure generated. 
There are several methods to do this. One which is simple, even though it should be 
essentially applied to unconfined explosions, is that based on the equivalent TNT mass. 
The blast energy of TNT is usually considered as ∆𝐻𝑇𝑁𝑇 = 4680  kJ·kg
-1. Once the 
equivalent mass of TNT has been calculated (equation (4.25)), the TNT scaled distance 











Here, 𝛽 (the fraction of the total mechanical energy converted into pressure wave) will 
be considered to be 0.4 (i.e., 40%) for all calculations as a ductile failure is assumed. 
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Another possibility is to use the Sachs scaled distance (based, as well as the TNT scaled 
distance, on the Hopkinson law), calculated from the following expression: 
𝑅𝑠 = 𝑟0 ∙ (
𝑃0





Figure 4-4 shows the curves to be used for both aforementioned methods. In the case of 
superheating energy method, Ew should be substituted directly instead of β
.E* in equations 
(4.25) and (4.27). 
 
Figure 4-4. Pressure vs. Scaled distance curve:  TNT equivalent mass method (left)  (CCPS, 1994); Sachs 
method (right) (Laboureur et al., 2014). 
 
4.3 Review of comparative analyses 
A few authors have performed a comparative analysis of some of the aforementioned 
methodologies (Table 4-2). In the following paragraphs, their analyses and conclusions 
are commented. 
Crowl (1992) conducted a research by using thermodynamic availability, in order to 
calculate the maximum explosion energy of expansion gas contained in a vessel. Crowl 
(2010) compared the results obtained in this way with those from three other methods, 
those based on isothermal, isentropic expansion and constant volume energy addition 
assumptions. According to their analysis, the isothermal method is more conservative 
than the other three methods, and that assuming isentropic expansion is the one which 
predicts the lowest value because it considers the final temperature much lower than the 
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surroundings one. The following conclusion was deduced by them for the value of the 
energy of expansion obtained from the diverse approaches: 
Isothermal approach > constant volume energy addition approach > thermodynamic 
availability approach > isentropic approach. 
 
Table 4-2. Thermodynamic assumption considered in different studies 
 Thermodynamic assumptions* 
Study CV RIE IE IIE TA RAIE 
Abbasi, 2007       
Bubbico and Marchini, 2008       
Crowl,2010       
Ogle, 2012       
Laboureur, 2014       
*CV = Constant volume energy addition; RIE = Real gas behavior and isentropic expansion; IE = 
Isothermal expansion; IIE = Ideal gas behavior isentropic expansion; TA = Thermodynamic availability; 
RAIE = Real gas behavior adiabatic irreversible expansion 
 
Ogle et al. (2012) followed the work of Crowl (1992), calculating the maximum energy 
which could be released by a BLEVE. They applied this method to different fluids and 
compared the results with those obtained from other methodologies (ideal gas behavior 
and isentropic expansion (Prugh, 1991), real gas behavior and isentropic expansion 
(CCPS, 2010) and real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion (Planas Cuchi  
et al., 2004b). The energy of expansion calculated by thermodynamic availability method 
was much larger than predicted by the other methods, and the real gas behavior and 
adiabatic irreversible expansion ones gave the lowest energy; the other two methods gave 
similar values, except when approaching the critical temperature. However, the relative 
magnitude changed for each fluid.  
Abbasi et al. (2007b) performed also a review study of several of these methodologies. 
According to their results, if the burst energy of a vessel filled with propane was equal to 
1 kJ as per the method based on ideal gas and isentropic expansion assumption (e.g. Prugh 
(1991)), then it would be about 1.1 kJ and as per the method based on real gas behavior 
and isentropic expansion (e.g. CCPS (2010)) and 0.4 kJ as per the method based on real 
gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion (Planas Cuchi  et al., 2004b); their  
comparative study shows that this last method (Planas Cuchi  et al., 2004b) is less 
conservative than the other ones and probably much closer to the real value. 
Bubbico and Marchini (2008) studied an accident involving the explosion of a vessel 
filled with propane. They applied different methods to calculate the explosion energy and 
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compared the corresponding calculated overpressures with the value obtained from the 
analysis of the real case at two different distances. Comparing the estimated results with 
the real case, they observed that the methodologies based on real gas behavior and 
adiabatic irreversible expansion assumption gave the closest values; they noted that the 
constant volume energy addition or isentropic expansion assumptions, even if far from 
the real phenomenon, may be convenient for conservative calculations.  
Finally, Laboureur et al. (2014) performed also a comparative study. They classified the 
experimental data into three different groups in terms of TNT equivalent mass: large scale 
(mTNT >1 kgTNT); mid-scale (mTNT = 1 kgTNT); small-scale (mTNT < 1 kgTNT). The 
methodologies based on real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion 
assumption (Casal and Salla, 2006; Planas Cuchi et al., 2004b) gave the best fit in all 
cases. These authors commented as well that the methodologies based on ideal gas 
behavior and isentropic expansion assumption (e.g. Prugh (1991)) could be used in a 
rather conservative approach, even though what their results give really should be 
considered in fact the theoretical upper limit of the energy released. 
 
4.4 BLEVE mechanical energy: a comparative study of the prediction 
from the different methodologies 
To study the effects predicted by the diverse models previously commented, a scenario 
was defined for a 45 m3 vessel filled up to a 20%, 50%, and 80% of its total volume with 
different substances (the ones most commonly found in BLEVE accidents according to 
the data from the previous chapters). It was assumed that the vessel was heated up by an 
external thermal source and that it could break at any temperature up to the critical one; 
therefore, the released energy was calculated for all these temperatures. NIST Reference 
Fluid Properties (Version 9.1; Lemmon et al., 2007) was used for the thermodynamic 
calculations. Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6, and Figure 4-7 summarize the results obtained. The 
liquid superheating energy method (Casal and Salla, 2006) was not shown in this set of 
calculations because this method does not give overall energy released, but just the energy 
invested in creating the overpressure wave; however, it will be considered and included 
in the subsequent comparative study.  
Based on Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6, and Figure 4-7, the results show that the methods based 
on real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion give the lowest values for all 
the substances, with a good agreement with the results of some of the previously 
mentioned studies (Bubbico and Marchini, 2008; Labourier et al., 2014).  
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Figure 4-5. Mechanical energy released by the explosion at different temperatures and 20% initial filling 
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Figure 4-6.Mechanical energy released by the explosion at different temperatures and 50% initial filling 
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Figure 4-7.Mechanical energy released by the explosion at different temperatures and 80% initial filling 
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As for the method based on constant volume energy addition, it gives the largest values 
in the cases of propane, butane, vinyl chloride, propylene, and ethylene oxide, which have 
higher molecular weight than the rest of substances in this study. Finally, the method 
based on isothermal expansion gives the largest amount for the rest of substances 
(methane, water, chlorine, ethylene, and ammonia). The only exception is chlorine, even 
if it has a high molecular weight. This behavior can be related to its low and constant 
specific heat capacity at constant volume (𝐶𝑣) as a function of temperature. Figure 4-8 
shows this difference. The method based on thermodynamic availability gives similar 
results than the one based on isothermal expansion. However, the former method has 
lower energy value at the same condition than the latter one, because it considers the 
second law of thermodynamic for the energy lost. 
 
 
Figure 4-8. Specific heat constants at constant volume for different substances. 
 
Finally, the methods based on real gas behaviour and adiabatic irreversible expansion 
show a much smaller change as a function of temperature than the other ones.  
All aforementioned methods have the same behavior as a function of different filling 
levels for various substances. During the heating of a vessel, two simultaneous 
phenomena occur: expansion and evaporation of the contained liquid. If in a vessel there 
is initially a high level of liquid, this level will increase because of heating and subsequent 
expansion. In some specific situations, the vessel could become fully filled with the 
liquid; in such a case, further heating would imply the failure of the vessel due to the 
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occurred in Els Alfacs accident (Casal, 2008). Concerning the variation of the energy 
released as a function of vessel temperature just before the explosion, the methods based 
on real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion show an essentially linear 
behavior for all the substances. This linearity is also observed at temperatures close to the 
critical point and is found at different filling levels.  
The calculated energy at different initial filling levels for a constant temperature are  
shown in Figure 4-9. 
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Figure 4-9. Mechanical energy released by the explosion at different initial filling levels and constant 
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At high temperatures, the constant volume energy addition gives larger values for the 
substances with a bigger molecular weight. The chlorine is again an exception due to its 
specific heat at constant volume.  
On the other hand, methods based on isothermal expansion, thermodynamic availability, 
and ideal gas behavior and isentropic expansion give smaller values at lower 
temperatures. The difference between isothermal expansion and thermodynamic 
availability is that the second law of thermodynamics is considered in thermodynamic 
availability; because of that, the methods based on thermodynamic availability 
assumption give lower amount than the methods based on isothermal expansion. As for 
the method based on the isothermal expansion, its prediction varies with temperature, 
giving higher values at higher temperatures. Finally, the method assuming ideal gas 
behavior and isentropic assumption gives smaller values.  
 
4.5 BLEVE experimental data 
Two sets of BLEVE experiments from literature were used in order to check the 
performance of the different models previously commented. Johnson et al. (1990) and 
Birk et al. ( 2006, 2007) conducted some interesting and complex experimental tests.  
Birk et al. used 2 m3 vessels which contained liquid propane. The vessels were engulfed 
by a set of jet-fires and the overpressures at various distances were measured (𝑃𝑠), both 
in the axial and transversal directions; another reported parameter was the vessel failure 
pressure (𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑝). A summary of these experimental results are shown in Table 4-3. 
Johnson et al. performed a series of tests with butane and propane (Table 4-4). They used 
electric immersion heaters for heating up the vessels; a polymeric heat insulator covered 
the vessels to reduce heat losses. Detonation of a short length of linear shaped high 
explosive charge provoked the failure of the tanks. Only in one of the tests (J6), the 
experimental fluid was changed from butane to propane without changing the vessel 
capacity. These authors also performed one experiment by increasing the volume of the 
container (10.796 m3) and keeping the same amount of butane (2000 kg) such as in 
another test (J5). In another experiment (J3), they reduced the amount of butane to 1000 
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𝒓𝟎 (m)  𝑷𝒔 (kPa) 
B1 17 1863 10/20/30(E)/30(S)/40(E)/40(S) 6.65/3.5/3.11/4.19/2.11/2.73 
B2 35 1846 10/20/30/40(E)/40(S) 3.97/3.78/2.29/1.48/2.13 
B3 13 1699 10/20/40(E)/40(S) 5.29/2.75/1.72/1.83 
B4 21 1894 10/40 5.02/1.675 
B5 12 1573 10/20/30/40 4.13/2.58/1.58/1.31 
B6 51 1803 10/20/30(E)/30(S)/40(E)/40(S) 13.11/8.95/6.03/2.99/3.37/4.06 
B7 52 1563 10/20/30/40 4.563/3.4/1.93/1.58 
B8 53 1813 10/20/30(E)/30(S)/40(E)/40(S) 4.15/2.99/2.99/2.29/2.6/0.64 
B9 61 1858 10/20/30/40 5.44/5.05/3.59/2.7 
S: Transversal direction 
E: Axial direction 
 




Fluid mL(kg) V(m3) 
𝑷𝒓𝒖𝒑 
(kPa) 
𝒓𝟎 (m) 𝑷𝒔 (kPa) 
J1 75 Butane 2000 5.7 1460 25/100/150 6.2/1.3/1.1 
J2 76 Butane 2000 5.7 1510 25/50/100/150 6.3/3.9/0.9/0.6 
J3 38 Butane 1000 5.7 1520 25/50/100/150 5/2.8/1.2/0.8 
J4 68 Butane 2000 5.7 770 25/50/100/150 1/0.5/0.17/0.15 
J5 40 Butane 2000 10.8 1510 25/50/100/150 8.2/3.4/1.4/0.7 
J6 77 Propane 2000 5.7 1520 25/50/100/150 2.3/1.2/0.3/0.3 
J7 76 Butane 2000 5.7 1520 25/50/100 7/3.4/1.3 
 
4.6 Comparative analysis 
Here we consider again a constant 𝛽 factor –fraction of energy released converted into a 
pressure wave– equal to 40% (𝛽 = 0.4) (Planas-Cuchi et al. 2004b), even if different 
values had been proposed in the diverse methods (in fact, most authors have considered 
100% (𝛽 = 1) in a quite conservative and non-real approach). A constant value was used 
to obtain a better comparison of the various thermodynamic assumptions corresponding 
to the diverse methods. The two methods shown in Figure 4-4 (TNT equivalent mass and 
Sachs method) have been used to estimate the overpressure at the different distances 
needed. Figure 4-10 depicts the procedure. 




Figure 4-10. Scheme of the methodology used to calculate overpressure at a certain distance, from the total 
mechanical energy . 
 
The values of the released mechanical energy of the explosion corresponding to the tests 
performed by Johnson et al. have been summarized in Figure 4-11. As it can be observed, 
the methods based on real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion give the 
lowest mechanical energy. The method based on constant volume energy addition has the 
largest value as observed in the previous section.  
 
 
Figure 4-11. Calculated mechanical energy according to the different assumptions for the experiments of 
Johnson et al. (1990) 
 
Next, the mTNT was estimated from the calculated mechanical energy, assuming β=0.4. 
Figure 4-12 shows the calculated mTNT values. In this figure and in the following ones the 
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Figure 4-12. Calculated mTNT for Johnson's experiments conditions, according to the different methods. 
 
There is not a big change between the different methods when comparing these results 
with those in the Figure 4-11; a special case is that of the liquid superheating energy 
methodology, in which a quite different coefficient must be applied. Therefore, the 
methods based on the real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion (including 
that of superheating energy) give the smallest values, while the one based on constant 
volume energy addition gives the largest ones. 
The diverse predictions for the overpressure at a distance of 25 m have been depicted in 
Figure 4-13, together with Johnson experimental values. The same behavior as for mTNT 
is observed here. In most of the tests, the experimental value obtained by Johnson et al. 
is closer to the predictions from the methods proposed by Casal and Salla (2006), Planas-
Cuchi et al. (2004b) and Crowl (1992), which give relatively similar values, and far from 
the values predicted by the other four methods. 
An atypical result is observed in the case of experiments number J4 and J6, which clearly 
has an experimental value much lower than those predicted by all methods. Laboureur et 
al. (2014) found similar large deviations in their calculations. This seems to indicate that 
something strange could have occurred with these two tests. 
By using Sachs scaled distance curve, the trend of calculated overpressure is logically 
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the value for overpressure obtained by Sachs scaled distance is about 50% lower than the 





Figure 4-13. Calculated overpressure at a distance of 25 m for Johnson's experiments conditions a) TNT 
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Concerning the nine tests performed by Birk et al. (2007), the mechanical energy 
predicted by the diverse methods has been summarized in Figure 4-14 for each test. The 
results show again that the methods based on real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible 
expansion (Planas et al, 2004) and thermodynamic availability (Crowl,1991,1992) have 
the smallest values, while the method based on constant volume energy addition (Brode, 
1959) has the largest one.  
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Figure 4-15. Calculated mTNT according to the diverse methods, for Birk's experiments. 
The calculated TNT equivalent mass values are shown in Figure 4-15, again including 
those from the superheating energy method.  The methods based on real gas behavior and 
adiabatic irreversible expansion and on superheating energy still have the smallest values 
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Figure 4-16. Calculated overpressure at a distance of 20 m for Birk's experiments: a) TNT equivalent mass 
method; b) Sachs method. 
 
Figure 4-16 shows the overpressures at a distance of 20 m predicted by the different 
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curve, respectively, Figure 4-4), together with the experimental value obtained by Birk et 
al. The results are similar to those previously obtained. Here again, using Sachs scaled 
distance gives lower values of overpressure than utilizing the TNT equivalent mass 
method. The methods based on superheating energy and real gas behavior and adiabatic 
irreversible expansion give the best approximation for the measured overpressures. It 
should be noticed that there is not any value for experiment B5 at 20 meters. At 
experiment B6, it was reported that it was a two-step BLEVE; the authors told that the 
blast would be more severe in this type of explosion.  
 
4.7 Model performance analysis 
The models’ performances were analyzed by applying the Root-Mean-Square Deviation 
(RMSD) and Theil theory (Piñeiro et al., 2008). Theil’s partial inequality coefficients are 
used to partition the squared sum of the predictive error. It means that those coefficients 
partition the variance of observed values which is not explained by the predicted ones. 
Theil coefficients give a handy toolkit to measure a model’s consistency and its bias. 
RMSD has been calculated with respect to all the aforementioned experimental results 
(Table 4-5). 
The results confirm the values obtained in the previous section. The methods based on 
real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion (Planas Cuchi et al., 2004b; Casal 
and Salla, 2006) still have the lowest RMSD, together with that using thermodynamical 
availability (Crowl, 1992). 
Table 4-5. Overall RMSD considering all thermodynamic assumptions 
 Thermodynamic assumption* 
RMSD CV RIE IE IIE TA RAIE SE 
Johnson, TNT curve 9.2 4.6 4.5 3.6 2.7 2.3 2.2 
Johnson, Sachs curve 4.5 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Birk, TNT curve 14.3 8.7 9.6 7.4 6.3 4.9 4.1 
Birk, Sachs curve 8.0 4.7 4.9 3.6 3.0 2.4 2.2 
*CV = Constant volume energy addition; RIE = Real gas behavior and isentropic expansion; IE = 
Isothermal expansion; IIE = Ideal gas behavior isentropic expansion; TA = Thermodynamic availability; 
RAIE = Real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion; SE = Liquid superheating energy 
 
Even if the RAIE and SE methods are based on real gas behavior and adiabatic 
irreversible expansion assumption, their RMSE values show some deviations. The reason 
can be explained by the fact that the SE method considers only the mass of liquid for 
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calculating the overpressure. So, it will be affected by liquid filling levels. Figure 4-17 
shows the fact for the experiments with different filling levels.  
According to Figure 4-17, the experiments with lower filling levels (i.e., experiments B1, 
B2, B3, B4, and B5) gave larger ∆P values by using RAIE method, due to the higher 
contribution of the pre-existing vapor. Therefore, those experiments were studied in detail 
by comparing with experimental values (Figure 4-18).  The predicted values for closer 
distance (10 m) had larger deviation (overprediction) by using RAIE method. On the other 
hand, SE method gave closer results for the same points. Two contrary issues , 
underprediction of SE method for consideration of liquid mass and overprediction of 
Sachs curve in close distance, affect in the predicted results by SE method and cause 
smaller deviations at that points in comparing with the results obtained by RAIE methods 
for the same points. 
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Figure 4-18. Comparison with experimental values for lower filling levels in Birk experiments. 
 
As it was mentioned before, Sachs scaled distance curve gives less conservative values. 
Based on the results in Table 4-5, the RMSD values are lower when Sachs curve was used 
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In fact, the predicted overpressure could be alleviated about 50% by using Sachs scaled 
distance curve. This issue is shown in Figure 4-20.  
 
 
Figure 4-20. Calculated overpresures for Johnson et al. and Birk et al. experiments by using TNT equivalent 
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Figure 4-21. Calculated RMSD & U Theil for the prediction of Johnson's experimental values by the diverse 
models: a) TNT equivalent mass method; b) Sachs method. 
 
In Johnson experiments (Figure 4-21), the models’ bias is the main reason of the variance 
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Figure 4-22. Calculated RMSD & U Theil for the prediction of Birk's experimental values by the diverse 
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4.8 Discussion 
The estimation of blast from BLEVEs is subjected to diverse uncertainties, some of which 
are inevitable. For example, an aspect which can be important is the heterogeneity of the 
blast wave, i.e. its directionality (Birk et al., 2007): for cylindrical tanks, the value of 
overpressure is not the same on the direction of the tank main axis than on the direction 
perpendicular to it, especially at short distances. However, nowadays this aspect has not 
been sufficiently studied and it cannot be included in any estimation of overpressure. 
Another one is the fraction of the overall energy released in the explosion that is invested 
in creating the overpressure; it should be taken into account that some of this energy is 
devoted to breaking the vessel and ejecting the fragments to a certain distance. Thus, 
some authors assume that it is 50%, some others assume 40% and, finally, those more 
conservative assume 100%. Furthermore, there is actually some discussion about the 
respective contributions of the previously existing vapor (just before the explosion) and 
that of the vapor generated in the liquid flash (Birk et al., 2007; Laboureur et al., 2015) 
Another factor which will add incertitude in any analysis is the amount of material 
involved in the explosion. Will the tank be filled in an 80%? Or, even if it was filled at 
the beginning of the emergency –for example, a fire heating it– at the moment of the 
explosion the degree of filling will have decreased significantly, for example to 40%, due 
to the release through a safety valve? 
Therefore, it should be realized that only approximate estimations of overpressure wave 
can really be performed. However, even if this must be accepted, it is also true that some 
of the methods proposed in the literature give better predictions than others. 
It can be emphasized again that Reid’s theory, establishing the superheat limit 
temperature as a condition to be fulfilled for an explosion to be a BLEVE, should be 
restricted to laboratory small scale. The results obtained in this chapter have not shown 
any discontinuity or significant increase in overpressure when this temperature is reached.  
The comparative study here developed of the diverse methods –based on different 
thermodynamic assumptions– proposed by different authors has shown that, as could be 
expected, there is an important scattering in the values obtained from them. Looking at 
these results a rough classification in two categories could be done: a) methods giving a 
quite conservative value, which in some cases is clearly the upper theoretical value 
thermodynamically possible, and b) methods giving a lower value, much less 
conservative but much closer to the real/experimental one. 
The methods based on constant volume energy addition, isentropic expansion and 
isothermal expansion would be in the first category, while those assuming adiabatic 
irreversible expansion would be in the second one. These latter methods, even though 
much less conservative, are nevertheless much closer to real values, as certain analyses 
of full scale BLEVEs have shown (see, for example, Bubbico and Marchini, 2008). 
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The analysis performed has proven that the methods based on real gas assumption and 
adiabatic irreversible expansion are the less conservative ones, showing a linear behavior 
as a function of temperature at different filling levels, thus denying the validity of the 
superheat limit temperature concept. This linearity can be used to predict the mechanical 
energy as a function of temperature and filling level. 
Finally, it has been observed that the TNT equivalent mass curve gives more conservative 
values than the Sachs scaled distance curve; in fact, it has been shown that the predicted 
overpressure could be decreased up to about 50% by using this latter method. 
Further experimental work is still needed to improve the knowledge of overpressure from 
BLEVEs. However, due to the diverse uncertainty factors aforementioned, one may think 






Chapter 5. A NEW PROCEDURE TO ESTIMATE BLEVE 
BLAST 
5.1 Introduction 
When a vessel undergoes a BLEVE, part of the released energy is converted into blast. In 
Chapter 4, different ways to calculate this mechanical energy, based on diverse 
thermodynamic assumptions, were investigated. The results showed that, in general, all 
methodologies tend to provide conservative results except those based on real gas 
behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion, which give values that are more realistic. 
These methods, however, are somewhat cumbersome to implement and require many 
thermodynamic data of the substance involved, which make difficult for them to provide 
quick results. As for the one based on the superheating energy, although it is easier to 
apply, it does not take into account the contribution of the previously existing vapor, what 
in some cases –a vessel with low filling degree– can imply a non-negligible error. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to provide a new methodology to calculate the 
mechanical energy released during a BLEVE phenomenon, easy and fast to implement 
but, at least, as reliable and precise as the currently existing ones.  
 
5.2 BLEVE mechanical energy and its linear behavior 
When in Chapter 4 the influence of the diverse thermodynamic assumptions on the 
calculation of the mechanical energy was analyzed, something quite interesting was 
observed. This is the fact that the model based on real gas behavior and adiabatic 
irreversible expansion –which, as mentioned before, was the one which provided the most 
realistic results– showed an almost linear variation of the energy released as a function of 
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the temperature inside the vessel just before the explosion; this linearity was observed at 
any vessel filling level. Instead, the behavior of all other models was clearly non-linear. 
This happened with all the substances investigated (see Figures 4-6 to 4-8), that were –
according to the historical analysis– the ones more frequently involved in BLEVE 
accidents. In the following sections, a deeper analysis of this linear behavior is performed 
for the substances listed in Table 5-1. This analysis has allowed developing a new quick 
and easy method to obtain the total mechanical energy released from a BLEVE. 
 
Table 5-1 Boiling and critical temperatures of the analysed substances. 
Substance Boiling temperature (K) Critical temperature (K) 
Propane 231.0 369.9 
Butane 272.7 425.1 
Methane 111.7 190.6 
Water 373.1 647.1 
Vinyl chloride 259.4 425.0 
Ethylene oxide 283.7 468.9 
Propylene 225.5 364.2 
Ammonia 239.8 405.4 
Chlorine 239.1 417.0 
Ethylene 169.4 282.4 
 
5.3 A new methodology to predict the BLEVE mechanical energy: 
polynomial approach 
Initially, a set of 2713 scenarios for a 1 m3 vessel (used as a basis for all calculations), 
covering both different initial filling levels (from 1% to 99%) and temperatures at the 
moment of explosion (from storage temperature to the critical temperature), have been 
defined for all the substances included in Table 5-1. For all the scenarios, the mechanical 
energy per cubic meter of vessel was determined by assuming real gas behavior and 
adiabatic irreversible expansion, according to the methodology proposed by Planas et al 
(2004b). The required thermodynamic data were obtained from NIST Reference Fluid 
Properties (Version 9.1) (Lemmon et al., 2007). A dataset for each substance was 
therefore prepared with the values of the mechanical energy recorded, together with the 
final temperature and related filling level, for each scenario. 
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However, it should be noticed that some scenarios could not be considered, because the 
required physical condition was not fulfilled. For example, a container initially filled up 
to 90% with liquefied propane at 300 K could reach its maximum filling level (100%) at 
a temperature of 326.3 K, before the temperature increased to the propane critical one 
(369.89 K). This phenomenon is due to the variation of liquid and gas densities as a 
function of temperature, according to which, at a certain moment, the decreasing gas 
volume collapses (Casal, 2008). 
 
Table 5-2 Scenarios used to calculate the mechanical energy for the ten substances used. 


















































This can be explained in a simple way (Figure 5-1). Consider a vessel containing a mass 
mT of a given material; the following relationships apply: 
𝑚𝑇 = 𝑚𝐿 + 𝑚𝑉 (5.1) 
𝑉𝑇 = 𝑉 + 𝐿 (5.2) 
 
With the densities of both phases being: 











Therefore, the volume of the vapor/gas phase can be expressed as: 
𝑉 =
𝑉𝑇 ∙ 𝜌𝐿 − 𝑚𝑇
𝜌𝐿 − 𝜌𝑉
 (5.5) 
While the vessel temperature increases, ρL and ρV decreases. However, as ρL >> ρV, (𝑉𝑇 ∙
𝜌𝐿 − 𝑚𝑇) decreases as well and can reach the value zero, this implying that 𝑉 = 0. It is 
possible therefore to reach a temperature at which the vessel will be completely filled by 
liquid. The liquid is essentially a non-compressible fluid, a further increase in temperature 
will lead to the failure of the vessel. 
 
 
Figure 5-1. Liquid and gas volumes inside the vessel (see Table 5-2). 
 
Therefore, taking this to account, the number of scenarios was finally reduced to 2034. 
In order to fit an appropriate surface to data in a plot of energy as a function of temperature 
and filling degree, we used MATLAB Curve Fitting Toolbox 3.4.1. Indeed, an 
appropriate surface was found by using the polynomial regression model. A reasonable 
flexibility for linear data, which is not complicated –the fitting process is simple– is the 
main advantage for polynomial fits. However, the probability of becoming unstable in the 
high-degree fits is the main disadvantage of these fits. Moreover, it is necessary to be 
careful while extrapolating with polynomials, because polynomials of any degree cannot 
provide a good fit outside the data range (Curve Fitting Toolbox User's Guide-
MathWorks, 2015). 
While the “best” equations (i.e., the fitted equations keeping a relatively simple 
expression) were found by using polynomial fits, it was necessary to check how much the 
proposed equations achieved a good fit. The visual examination or a graphical method 
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was the basic applied approach to see how the surfaces were close to the calculated data 
(see Figure 5-2 for the case of butane). In this study, a numerical method was also used 
as another approach to evaluate the goodness-of-fit for the proposed equations.  
The four goodness-of-fit statistics used are: 
 The sum of squares due to error (SSE) 
 R-square 
 Adjusted R-square 
 Root-mean-square error (RMSE). 
Eq. (5.6) provides the sum of squares of residuals (SSE), a value closer to zero meaning 
that the model has a small random error:  





R-square is another statistical approach that can be used for evaluating the goodness-of-
fit. It is the ratio of the sum of squares of the regression (SSR) and the sum of the squares 
(SST). The value closer to one indicates that the model accounts for a greater proportion 
of variance. The R-square can be calculated as: 










𝑆𝑆𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝐸 (5.9) 








The best indicator to compare two models that are nested is the adjusted R-square, a value 
closer to 1 indicating a very good fit. If both the number of responses (𝑛) and the number 
of fitted coefficients (𝑚) estimated from the response values are known, the residual 
degrees of freedom will be: 
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Then the adjusted R-square is: 





The last statistical approach used in this study is the root-mean-square error (RMSE). It 
shows the differences between the predicted values and the observed ones; a fit closer to 
zero is more useful for prediction. It is defined as: 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 𝑠 = √𝑀𝑆𝐸 (5.13) 
 






In this study, the filling level and the temperature were considered as input variables, and 
the related mechanical energy was considered as an output variable. Polynomial models 
were used for surface fitting. The general polynomial term for the fitted models can be 
summarized as: 






where the number of coefficients to be fitted (n+1) is the order of the polynomial and n is 
the degree of the polynomial, which is the highest power of the predictor variable.  
In polynomial surface fits, the polynomial terms can be controlled by defining the degrees 
for the x and y inputs (e.g. in (5.16) 𝑥 is the filling level and 𝑦 is the temperature as inputs, 
and 𝑍 is the energy as an output), the total degree of the polynomial being the maximum 
degree of x and y. For example, poly13 can be defined as: 
𝑍 = 𝑝00 + 𝑝10 ∗ 𝑥 + 𝑝01 ∗ 𝑦 + 𝑝11 ∗ 𝑥 ∗ 𝑦 + 𝑝02 ∗ 𝑦2 + 𝑝12 ∗ 𝑥 ∗ 𝑦2 + 𝑝03 ∗ 𝑦3 (5.16) 
 
In this case, the Curve Fitting Toolbox provided different polynomials with various 
degrees of the input variables (filling level and temperature). Visual examination or a 
graphical method were used to see how close the surface was to the calculated data. Figure 
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5-2 shows the fitted surfaces for butane. In this example, the surface for Poly13 covers 
more calculated points (black dots) than the other surfaces presented by the other 
polynomials (e.g., Poly11, Poly12, etc.). However, as explained before, numerical 
methods were also used to have better examinations and decisions.  
Multiple fits tested were compared by goodness-of-fit statistics. Table 5-3 summarizes 
the goodness-of-fit results for different substances. According to these results, the 
suggested surface model based on Poly13 has a better performance, as it gives smaller 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and Sum of Square Error (SSE). 
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Table 5-3 Goodness-of-fit statistics for different polynomial degrees 
Substance Poly (FL,T) SSE R2 Adjusted R2 RMSE 
Propane Poly11 6.5 0.9921 0.9919 0.23980 
 Poly12 6.1 0.9925 0.9923 0.23450 
 Poly13 0.5 0.9994 0.9993 0.06833 
 Poly21 6.3 0.9923` 0.9920 0.23800 
 Poly31 6.3 0.9923 0.9919 0.23960 
 Poly22 6.1 0.9926 0.9922 0.23500 
Butane Poly11 176.6 0.9127 0.9118 0.94440 
 Poly12 8.5 0.9958 0.9957 0.20820 
 Poly13 0.5 0.9998 0.9998 0.04957 
 Poly21 8.5 0.9958 0.9957 0.20840 
 Poly31 8.5 0.9958 0.9957 0.20870 
 Poly22 8.5 0.9958 0.9957 0.20860 
Methane Poly11 19.1 0.9568 0.9560 0.42090 
 Poly12 2.9 0.9935 0.9933 0.16430 
 Poly13 0.1 0.9998 0.9997 0.03197 
 Poly21 2.9 0.9934 0.9931 0.16650 
 Poly31 2.9 0.9934 0.9930 0.16800 
 Poly22 2.8 0.9936 0.9933 0.16460 
Water Poly11 2123.5 0.9051 0.9035 4.24210 
 Poly12 277.4 0.9876 0.9872 1.54600 
 Poly13 33.3 0.9985 0.9984 0.54050 
 Poly21 281.3 0.9874 0.9870 1.55700 
 Poly31 280.3 0.9875 0.9868 1.56810 
 Poly22 272.1 0.9878 0.9873 1.53800 
Vinyl 
chloride 
Poly11 195.4 0.9367 0.9362 0.89310 
 Poly12 35.5 0.9885 0.9883 0.38220 
 Poly13 3.8 0.9988 0.9987 0.12640 
 Poly21 35.5 0.9885 0.9883 0.38220 
 Poly31 35.4 0.9885 0.9882 0.38350 
 Poly22 35.5 0.9885 0.9883 0.38280 
Ethylene 
oxide 
Poly11 480.7 0.9253 0.9248 1.30600 
 Poly12 81.0 0.9874 0.9872 0.53800 
 Poly13 7.8 0.9988 0.9988 0.16720 
 Poly21 81.0 0.9874 0.9872 0.53800 
 Poly31 80.5 0.9875 0.9872 0.53800 
 Poly22 81.0 0.9874 0.9872 0.53890 
Propylene Poly11 946.6 0.8967 0.8959 1.86200 
 Poly12 38.0 0.9959 0.9958 0.37420 
 Poly13 17.5 0.9981 0.9980 0.25500 
 Poly21 38.2 0.9958 0.9958 0.37550 
 Poly31 37.1 0.9960 0.9959 0.37110 
 Poly22 37.5 0.9959 0.9958 0.37250 
Ammonia Poly11 740.0 0.9275 0.9269 1.72740 
 Poly12 179.5 0.9828 0.9825 0.84570 
 Poly13 17.2 0.9983 0.9983 0.26520 
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 Poly21 176.8 0.9827 0.9824 0.84780 
 Poly31 173.2 0.9830 0.9826 0.84240 
 Poly22 175.8 0.9828 0.9824 0.84710 
Chlorine Poly11 249.1 0.9394 0.9389 0.96600 
 Poly12 52.5 0.9872 0.9870 0.44520 
 Poly13 3.2 0.9992 0.9992 0.10960 
 Poly21 53.4 0.9870 0.9868 0.44870 
 Poly31 52.7 0.9872 0.9869 0.44760 
 Poly22 52.5 0.9872 0.9870 0.44600 
Ethylene Poly11 53.4 0.9489 0.9483 0.56880 
 Poly12 18.3 0.9825 0.9820 0.33540 
 Poly13 2.1 0.9980 0.9979 0.11420 
 Poly21 18.7 0.9821 0.9817 0.33860 
 Poly31 18.2 0.9826 0.9819 0.33610 
 Poly22 18.3 0.9825 0.9820 0.33600 
 
Even if there is a linear relationship between the temperature and the predicted 
mechanical energy, there exists a non-linearity between filling level and temperature. This 
may cause some difficulties in predicting the appropriate polynomial function at lower 
degrees of input parameters. Figure 5-3 shows a non-linear behavior for propane by using 
the methods based on real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion: 
 
 
Figure 5-3. Non linear behavior for propane (real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion). 
 
The appropriate equations for predicting the mechanical energy per cubic meter (𝑒) of 
superheated liquids as a function of the filling level (𝐹𝐿) and the temperature (𝑇) obtained 
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common substances that have been involved in BLEVE accidents, according to the 
historical analysis presented in Chapter 1.  
A slightly better fitting could probably have been reached by using more complex 
polynomial expressions; however, the objective was to find a methodology that, while 
being accurate, was also simple and practical to be applied; these expressions fulfill both 
conditions.  
To go from energy to overpressure, the total vessel volume has to be multiplied by "𝑒" in 
order to find the total amount of mechanical energy (𝐸) in a given system. Then, the total 
energy will be converted to the equivalent TNT mass (𝑚𝑇𝑁𝑇). Next, the scaled distance 
will be calculated considering that 𝛽 = 0.4 for the ductile failure.  
 
Table 5-4 Mechanical energy per cubic meter as a function of  temperature and filling level for different 
substances 
Substance Equation; e (MJ/m3); T (K); FL (%) 
Propane 
𝑒 = 43.97 − 213.9 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 − 0.152 ∙ 𝑇 + 1.349 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 − 0.0004361 ∙ 𝑇2 − 0.002045 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇2  
+ 1.55 ∙ 10−6 ∙ 𝑇3 
Butane 
𝑒 = 21.32 − 87.2 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 − 0.136 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.4765 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.0001885 ∙ 𝑇2 − 0.0005805 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇2
+ 9.693 ∙ 10−6 𝑇3 
Methane 
𝑒 = 6.13 − 42.71 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 − 0.06558 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.5629 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 − 0.0001499 ∙ 𝑇2 − 0.001647 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙  𝑇2
+ 2.327 ∙ 10−6 ∙ 𝑇3 
Water 
𝑒 = 56.36 − 275.6 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 −  0.2341 ∙ 𝑇 + 1.076 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.0001696 ∙ 𝑇2 − 0.0009183 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 2
+ 1.626 ∙ 10−6 𝑇3 
Vinyl chloride 
𝑒 = 20.71 − 92.48 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 − 0.1206 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.5346 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 + 9.836 ∙ 10−5 ∙  𝑇2 − 0.0006987 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇2
+  2.503 ∙ 10−7 𝑇3 
Ethylene oxide 
𝑒 = 23.61 − 119.4 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 − 0.1182 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.6295 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 + 4.505 ∙ 10−5 ∙ 𝑇2 − 0.0007463 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇2
+ 2.946 ∙ 10−7 ∙ 𝑇3 
Propylene 
𝑒 = 104.9 − 86.15 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 − 1.035 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.5013 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.00329 ∙ 𝑇2 − 0.0005726 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇2
− 3.321 ∙ 10−6 ∙ 𝑇3 
Ammonia 
𝑒 = 28.34 − 168.4 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 − 0.1447 ∙ 𝑇 + 1.048 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 − 6.71 ∙ 10−5 ∙ 𝑇2 − 0.001471 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇2  
+ 7.984 ∙ 10−7 ∙ 𝑇3 
Chlorine 
𝑒 = −2.469 − 81.17 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 + 0.08234 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.4975 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 − 0.0005088 ∙ 𝑇2 − 0.0006739 ∙ 𝐹𝐿
∙ 𝑇2  + 8.889 ∙ 10−7 ∙ 𝑇3 
Ethylene 
𝑒 = 9.356 − 69.53 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 − 0.04289 ∙ 𝑇 + 0.6194 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 − 0.0003058 ∙ 𝑇2 − 0.001262 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇2
+ 1.454 ∙ 10−6 ∙ 𝑇3 
 
5.3.1 Comparative study 
We checked the equations obtained and summarized in Table 5-4 by comparing them 
with two sets of experimental data from Johnson et al. (1990), Laboureur et al. (2014) and 
Birk et al. (2007); those experiments have been already commented in Chapter 4. The 
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resulting overpressures at different distances were obtained from the TNT equivalent 
mass and the well-known plot of the scaled distance vs. peak overpressure for TNT. 
The root-mean-square deviation (RMSD) was again used as a statistical toolkit for doing 
a comparative analysis between the different methods (Piñeiro et al., 2008). As it is shown 
in Table 5-5, the new method here proposed gave a good accuracy as compared to the 
other methodologies assuming ideal gas behavior and irreversible expansion.  
The new approach gives results similar to those from RAIE methods and sometimes even 
better. For example, the RMSE value for the Birk experiments is lower for the new 
approach than the RAIE value (Table 5-5). However, this new approach has been 
developed from the RAIE method. Actually, Table 5-3 shows that the approach based on 
polynomial method has some degree of deviation from the data set from which the 
equations were derived, because the fitting method passes a surface from the minimum 
distance to a data point. This deviation could be larger in some points based on the fitted 
surface and its distance to the data points and the degree of polynomial Therefore, the 
small deviation may make difference in the result when calculating the mechanical energy 
of a BLEVE and its overpressure (see Figure 5-11). 
 




RAIE SE New approach 
(polynomial) 
Johnson-TNT curve 2.3 2.2 2.2 
Birk-TNT curve 4.9 4.1 4.2 
*RAIE = Real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion ; SE = Liquid superheating energy 
 
It should be noted that the equations proposed in the new approach give quick and 
accurate results in an easy and convenient way. In fact, they only require the filling level 
and the temperature at the moment of explosion as input variables in order to calculate 
the mechanical energy released by a BLEVE. Contrarily, the other methodologies require 
many thermodynamic data and calculations to obtain this energy,or do not take into 
account (S.E. method) the contribution of pre-existing vapor. 
The nonlinear relation between temperature and filling level (shown in Figure 5-3 ) is 
probably the reason for the observed deviation in the polynomial equations that, as seen 
in the comparative analysis, remains in the range of the expected accuracy of this type of 
calculation and, therefore, should be considered acceptable. 
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5.3.2 Example of application 
A cylindrical vessel with a volume of 80 m3, initially filled to 58% with liquid propane at 
room temperature (20 oC), undergoes a BLEVE due to fire engulfment, when the content 
temperature is 50 oC. The filling degree is 34% at the burst moment. Estimate 




𝑇 = 50℃ + 273.15 = 323.15 𝐾
𝑉 = 80 𝑚3
 
Then, using the propane equation to find the mechanical energy per cubic meter (𝑒): 
𝑒 (𝑀𝐽 𝑚3⁄ ) = 43.97 − 213.9 ∙  𝐹𝐿 − 0.152 ∙  𝑇 + 1.349 ∙ 𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇 − 0.0004361
∙  𝑇2 –  0.002045 ∙  𝐹𝐿 ∙ 𝑇2 + 1.55𝑒 − 06 ∙ 𝑇3 
𝑒 (𝑀𝐽 𝑚3⁄ ) = 43.97 − 213.9 ∙  0.34 − 0.152 ∙  323.15 + 1.349 ∙ 0.34 ∙ 323.15 − 0.0004361
∙  (323.15)2 –  0.002045 ∙  0.34 ∙ (323.15)2 + 1.55𝑒 − 06 ∙ (323.15)3
= 4.5 (𝑀𝐽 𝑚3⁄ ) 
Therefore, the total energy (𝐸) is: 
𝐸(𝑀𝐽) = 𝑒(𝑀𝐽 𝑚3⁄ ) ∙ 𝑉(𝑚3) = 4.5 ∙ 80 = 360 (𝑀𝐽) 
 







= 76.9 𝑘𝑔 𝑇𝑁𝑇 
 













By using the TNT curve, ∆𝑃 at 100 m is 3.6 kPa (0.036 bar) 
∆𝑃 = 3.6 𝑘𝑃𝑎 = 0.036 𝑏𝑎𝑟 
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It should be taken into account that possibly, during an emergency, it is not possible to 
know exactly the conditions at the burst moment. In this case, conservative hypothesis 
can be considered. For instance, a temperature near the equilibrium with the set pressure 
of the PRV and the initial filling level (if no information about the possible loss of part of 
the vessel content through the PRV is available). 
 
5.4 Analysis of BLEVE mechanical energy by using the Artificial 
Neural Network methodology 
The Artificial Neural Network (ANN) approach has been used as a handy toolkit for 
simulation, prediction and modeling in diverse engineering and scientific areas. It can be 
a useful tool when there is some nonlinearity in the system, requiring a relatively reduced 
computing time. 
Thus, ANN was implemented in order to obtain a function allowing the calculation of the 
BLEVE mechanical energy. Again, this function should only require and be depending 
on vessel failure temperature and filling level. 
 
5.4.1 Artificial Neural Network 
Neurons are the basic elements of biological neural network in human brain. The structure 
of a neuron is shown in Figure 5-4. Neuron receives data from neighboring neural cells 
through dendrites and makes some process in soma (body), transferring a signal to the 
next neuron through the axon; data transfer is performed by synapses through 
electrochemical signals.  
 
Figure 5-4. Neuron (Yadav et al., 2014). 
 
The Artificial Neural Network is a method that can be applied to analyze and calculate 
data for different problems and solve them with the same pattern as that of a biological 
neural network. The first attempts in this field were due to Hebb in the 1940s. After that, 
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some researchers such as Hopfield, Rumellhart, Grossberg and Widrow developed this 
method in the 1980s.  
With ANN, huge problems could be solved through parallel and distributed processing. 
It solves problems without requiring too complicated formulation; because of this, it could 
save time significantly in comparison with closed-form solving methods. Moreover, this 
methodology enables to approximate any non-linear function to a compact set of data 
with a specified accuracy (Siddique and Adeli, 2013). 
Every neuron model consists of a segment that signals import through it and acts like a 
synapse. At first, each one of the inputs (xi) is multiplied by its corresponding weight 
value "w". After summation of these values, a bias value "𝑏" can be added to the result. 
A summary of this process for 𝑛 inputs is shown in equation (5.17): 
𝑛𝑒𝑡 = (∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) + 𝑏 (5.17) 
 
At the end of this process, the result enters in a transfer function (Eq. (5.18)): 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑛𝑒𝑡) (5.18) 
 
The usual forms of the transfer function are linear, step, ramp or sigmoid. Figure 5-5 
shows the structure of an ANN. 
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Some neurons connect together, forming a layer of neurons. A network includes one or 
more of these layers. According to the configuration and the way of connection between 
neurons, there can be different types of neural networks. Generally, they can be separated 
into two categories: 1) feedforward neural networks, and 2) feedback neural networks.  
 
Figure 5-6. Feedforward Neural Network. 
 
In a feedforward neural network, the signals travel in a forward way, they cannot come 
back and there is no feedback. This type of neural network (e.g. Figure 5-6) can be 
represented in vector form by equation (5.19): 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝑊 ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏) (5.19) 
 
Here, 𝑌 is the output vector, 𝑊 is the weight matrix, 𝑏 is a bias vector and 𝑓 is a transfer 
function.  
The main task of the neural network is to define the weights and biases in a way that 
adapts the output to the inputs with a minimum error. A training process does the 
modification of weights and biases. The training method used for solving the network in 
this work has been the Bayesian Regulation method, which can be applied to feedforward 
neural networks training. It is based on a statistical approach and assumes that the values 
of weights and biases are related to a distribution function with an unknown variance. The 
main task is to estimate the parameters by means of statistical techniques (Foresee and 
Hagan, 1997; Nguyen, 1998; Siddique et al., 2013). 
 
5.4.2 Dataset preparation 
Two datasets for propane and butane were prepared for the ANN by using the 
aforementioned method based on real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion 
(Planas et al., 2004b). The required thermodynamic data were obtained from NIST 
Reference Fluid Thermodynamic and Transport Properties Database (REFPROP) version 
9.1. Temperature (K), filling level and mechanical energy (MJ/m3) were registered in the 
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datasets. The database interval was designed for filling level ranging between 1% and 
90% in the case of propane, and between 1% and 99% for butane. The initial temperatures 
were 300 K and 283 K for both propane and butane. Actually, the ANN was trained in 
those aforementioned intervals. Propane and butane datasets had 121 and 201 data points, 
respectively. Those datasets were used in the ANN for generating the related functions. 
Finally, the resulting functions were applied to the two sets of experiments from Birk et 
al. and Johnson et al. already presented in Chapter 4 to analyze the goodness of the 
method.  
 
5.4.3 Results of the backpropagation training algorithm 
Three different backpropagation (BP) algorithms were studied in order to find the best 
one for the ANN. Five neurons were considered for the comparative study, and finally 
the algorithm with the lowest MSE was chosen as BP algorithm.. As it is shown in Table 
5-6 and Table 5-7, the Bayesian Regularization algorithm has the lowest MSE for propane 
and butane, therefore was the one selected in this study. The MSE values for these two 
substances were 2.29·10-4 and 4.63·10-5, respectively.  
 
Table 5-6 Back propagation algorithms for propane 
Backpropagation 
algorithm 









trainlm 0.000364 232 0.99996 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 1 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 0.0049 
Bayesian 
Regularization 
trainbr 0.000229 385 0.99998 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 1 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 0.00098 
Scaled Conjugate 
Gradient 






Chapter 5. A new procedure to estimate BLEVE blast 
115 












trainlm 5.85·10-5 116 1 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 1 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 0.0019 
Bayesian 
Regularization 
trainbr 4.63·10-5 1000 0.99999 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 1 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 0.0012 
Scaled Conjugate 
Gradient 
trainscg 8.39·10-6 17 0.94398 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 0.93 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 0.33 
 
Optimizing neurons number 
The determination of neurons' number is very important. Considering few neurons causes 
underfitting and, contrarily overfitting can occur if the number of neurons is higher than 
a specific value. In this study, an ANN was trained based on Bayesian Regulization BP 
algorithm for propane and butane. The number of neurons was changed from 1 to 20 and 
an optimum number of neurons was chosen based on the minimum value of MSE of the 
training. According to Figure 5-7, the optimum number of neurons for propane and butane 
were five and four neurons, respectively. 
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ANN setup and results 
For solving the problem, a multilayer feed forward neural network was used. A general 
picture of this method has been depicted in Figure 5-8. The multilayer feed forward 
network consists of three layers. The first one is the input layer through which the data 
are imported to the network, and the last layer is the output one, which gives the target 
data. Between these two mentioned layers, there is another hidden layer. The number of 
hidden layers depends on the accuracy that is required for a particular problem. In this 
analysis, the number of hidden layers was set to one, which provided a good accuracy. 
Based on the neurons optimization process, the number of neurons at the hidden layer 
was five in the case of propane and four in the case of butane. The transfer function 
applied in this layer was a sigmoid because it had an easy and simple differentiation for 
using in the backpropagation algorithm. For output layer, the number of neurons had to 





Figure 5-8. Artificial Neural Network structure for propane and butane: a) propane ; b) butane. 
 
The process was performed with the MATLAB Neural Network toolbox version R20015a 
(8.5.0.197613 – License Number: 107001). The number of input data for the training 
process was 121 and 201 for propane and butane, respectively. It reached a convergence 
level after 348 iterations in the case of propane and 191 iterations with butane. The 
validation process was done with 15% of data to check the network generalization. The 
resulting network was tested with 15% of data in order to provide an independent measure 
of the network performance during and after training. 
For propane, the designed network regression R-values were close to one, showing that 
there was a close correlation between output and targets. Figure 5-9 shows how much 
accurate the ANN model is.  
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Figure 5-9. Regression plots for propane, left: during training, middle: during the testing, right: all the data 
including validation. 
 
In addition, the optimized weights for propane produced by the artificial neural network 
model are summarized in the Table 5-8. 
 
Table 5-8 Propane's weights matrix 
Neuron 
W1 W2 
Input variables Output 
Temperature Filling level Energy 
1 -1.2335 -0.2862 -0.8641 
2 1.7512 0.3928 0.5474 
3 -0.8560 0.2377 3.16 
4 1.2560 -0.3420 1.1380 
5 1.1617 0.2995 1.1103 
W1: Weights between input and hidden layers 
W2: Weights between hidden and output layers 
 
In the case of butane, the regression results (Figure 5-10) show that the network was 
trained properly and a linear relation exists between output and target data. R values were 
close to unity which indicated linearity between target and output data. 
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Figure 5-10. Regression plot for butane, left: during training, middle: during the testing, right: all the data 
including validation.. 
 
The optimal weights for butane from the artificial neural network between input and 
hidden layers (W1) and between hidden and output layers (W2) are shown in the Table 
5-9. 
 
Table 5-9 Butane's weights matrix 
Neuron 
W1 W2 
Input variables Output 
Temperature Filling level Energy 
1 -1.3757 -0.4138 -0.2668 
2 0.7913 -0.1637 -1.8164 
3 -0.8212 -0.1932 -2.4487 
4 -1.5521 0.4522 -0.3672 
W1: Weights between input and hidden layers 
W2: Weights between hidden and output layers 
 
5.4.4 Comparative study 
Root-Mean-Square Deviation (RMSD) (Piñeiro et al., 2008) as a statistical toolkit was 
also used in the comparison of the results obtained with the ANN method and the 
aforementioned experimental data from Birk et al. and Johnson et al. The results are 
shown in the Table 5-10, together with those obtained from polynomial expressions. As 
can be seen, the functions derived from ANN show a good performance. It can be stated 
that both methods proposed are accurate and practical to be applied. Again, the same 
reason explained in section 5.3.1 could be the reason for deviation between the new 
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approach and RAIE method. Figure 5-11 shows these differences between the various 
approaches and the experimental values. 
 
Table 5-10 RMSD values for different methodologies 
 Thermodynamic assumption*  





Johnson-TNT Curve 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Birk-TNT curve 4.9 4.1 4.2 4.3 
*RAIE = Real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion; SE = Liquid superheating energy 
 
Figure 5-11. Results by different methodologies against their experimental values. 
 
5.4.5 Example of application 
The application of Neural Network method is explained for the same example already 
presented in section 5.3.2: 

























Pressure (kPa) - TNT equivalent  mass
Real gas behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion Liquid superheating energy
New Approach (Polynomial) New approach ( Neural Net Fitting)







T=input('Temperature(K)\n');%Temperature just before the explosion 
fl=input('Filling Level\n');%Filling level just before the explosion 
d=input('Distance(m)\n'); 
v=input('Volume(m3)\n');%Volume of vessel 
a=[T;fl]; 
Energy_predicted_per_m3=propanepredictor3(a);% The NNT function is 












Here is the procedure for calculating the example and the result in kPa when running the 











Overpressure is equal to 3.6435 kPa. 
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5.5 Discussion 
There are several thermodynamic methods to predict the mechanical energy of a BLEVE. 
These methods were compared in previous chapters, and it was concluded that they could 
be classified in two different categories: a) methods giving a quite conservative value, 
and b) methods giving a lower value. The methods based on real gas behavior and 
adiabatic irreversible expansion belong to the second category, being much less 
conservative but much closer to the real/experimental values than the other ones. 
With the adiabatic irreversible expansion method there is almost a linear behavior 
between the mechanical energy and the temperature and filling level at the moment of 
explosion. This characteristic was used in this chapter in order to find a quick method 
(according to time and effect of calculation) to calculate the mechanical energy of a 
BLEVE. Therefore, the aim of this chapter was to present an easy, fast, and precise 
method than the existing ones in order to calculate the mechanical energy of a BLEVE. 
Thus, the linear relation between the temperature and the released mechanical energy was 
employed in order to find an appropriate equation. The data sets were created for several 
substances (selected according to the historical analysis in Chapter 1) by defining a 
scenario for a 1 m3 vessel which was heated up; real gas behavior and adiabatic 
irreversible expansion process was considered. Mechanical energy values were registered 
for related temperatures and filling levels.  
MATLAB Curve Fitting Toolbox was utilized to produce the appropriate polynomials.  
Therefore, several polynomials with various degrees were derived for the most common 
fluids found in BLEVE accidents. The derived equations got filling level and temperature 
as input variables and gave the mechanical energy of BLEVE as an output.  
Visual examination and goodness-of-fit statistics were used to see which polynomial 
provided the best solution. The best fit for proposed equations was the third degree 
polynomial. Actually, it gave the lower deviation with the data set. 
Furthermore, the comparative study on the new approach showed that it had a better level 
of performance than the other methodologies. In some experiments (e.g. Birk 
experiments), the results of the new approach may have some deviation from the results 
of the methods based on real gas behavior and adiabatic and irreversible expansion (Table 
5-5). Indeed, the new approach sometimes had closer approximation than the other 
methods. These differences could be originated from the deviations that happened during 
the calculation of the polynomials (Table 5-3). 
Moreover, Artificial Neural Network (ANN) was used as a handy toolkit for the nonlinear 
system. The aim was to find an appropriate function between temperature and filling level 
as input data and mechanical energy as output datum. Two functions were produced for 
propane and butane by using ANN. For both substances, the designed networks regression 
R values were close to one, which show that there was a close correlations between 
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outputs and targets. The ANN networks showed good level of performance against the 
other methods, which combined with its simplicity, allows obtaining quick and accurate 
results easily.  
The presented methodology for calculating mechanical energy is independent from 
substance's thermodynamic properties information (Enthalpy, Entropy, Internal energy, 
etc.) and it only requires rupture temperature and filling level to calculate the BLEVE 
mechanical energy and the resulting effects. ANN is like a black box and what is 
happening inside the function is not clear. This could be a disadvantage for ANN. 
However, the aim of using ANN in this study has been to show the application of ANN 
in the prediction of the energy of explosion. Its capabilities can be developed for further 
researches in the field of BLEVE such as range of fragmentations and its types. 
Finally, the new approach only depends on temperature and filling level of a vessel for 
estimating the BLEVE released mechanical energy. Comparing the new approach with 
other thermodynamic methodologies based on several thermodynamic variables, the new 





Chapter 6. CONSIDERATIONS ON EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS 
WHICH CAN LEAD TO A BLEVE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Among accidents involving a BLEVE, those occurred in road or rail transportation have 
an important contribution. From the historical analysis previously performed (Chapter 1), 
49.1% of all cases analyzed, i.e. practically half of them, occurred in transportation by 
road or rail; and in most of these cases, the explosion was followed by a fireball. 
When a road or rail tanker transporting a flammable liquid (as, for example, LNG or LPG) 
undergoes a traffic accident or a derailment, the following accidental sequence can occur: 
damage of thermal insulation  loss of containment  ignition  flames impingement 
on the vessel  pressure increase  SRV opening  more flames impingement  
BLEVE of the vessel. 
This sequence can take a variable time. As mentioned in a previous chapter (see Table 
3-6), and especially when the flames impinge on the non-protected vessel wall, the 
explosion can occur after one minute, after one hour or, even, can never occur. 
If there is a certain delay, two things will happen: a) the firefighters will come and will 
try to control the emergency, and b) as the fire is something relatively “attractive” for 
many people, probably a certain number of spectators will come to look at the accident. 
These spectators will adopt a “safety distance” according to their experience and 
knowledge (in most cases, quite limited) of what an explosion or a large fire is, i.e., of the 
order of 100 m. However, even though this distance could be enough for a relatively large 
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pool fire, it is completely insufficient if a BLEVE followed by a fireball takes place. And 
this is the reason why in such accidents often spectators are wounded or even killed. 
Furthermore, many firefighters have also died, due to the uncertainty concerning the time 
to failure; even though in industrialized countries firefighters are more and more aware 
of the convenience of evacuating in the situations which can lead to a BLEVE, still 
accidents occur in which the explosion occurs when they are trying to extinguish the fire, 
with the associated severe consequences. 
In such situations, the measures taken by those managing the emergency are essential to 
reduce the consequences of the event. 
As an example, two cases can be commented:  
1. Tivissa accident. A road tanker transporting LNG underwent a traffic accident and 
turned over on the road near Tivissa, Catalonia (Spain), on June 22, 2002. The 
tank was made of stainless steel, designed for an operating pressure of 7 bar and 
had thermal insulation. It also had 5 safety valves connected to a discharge pipe. 
At that day, the 56 m3 tanker was filled with LNG up to 85% at -160 ℃ and the 
pressure of 1 bar. The start to discharge pressure was set at 7 bar. Approximately 
2 minutes from the accident, fire appeared and the flames engulfed the tank. The 
fire probably originated from tanker fuel, the vessel containment (LNG) or both. 
About 20 minutes later, a BLEVE followed by a fireball occurred. Large 
fragments were ejected and dispersed up to 257 m around the location of 
explosion; the two main tank sections were ejected up to 125 m. The driver was 
killed and two persons located at approximately 200 m were wounded from first 
and second-degree burns because they had not taken the necessary safety distance. 
(Planas et al., 2004a). 
 
2. Zarzalico accident. A 56.5 m3 insulated road tanker transporting LNG underwent 
a traffic accident by colliding against a parked truck on November 20, 2011. The 
driver was killed in the accident. The tank was loaded with 12000 kg of LNG 
stored at -160 ℃ and 1 bar. It was also equipped with 3 safety valves. The start to 
discharge pressure was set at 7 bar. Fire appeared immediately after the accident, 
the flames affecting the tank. About 20 minutes later, the firefighters reached the 
location of the accident. They evacuated the people up to a distance of 600 m. The 
explosion occurred 70 minutes after the beginning of fire. Firefighter had 
withdrawn to 200 m from the place of the tanker at the moment of explosion. The 
large windows of the service station located at 125 m from the explosion point fell 
down. However, the smaller windows were intact. The leaves of trees at 90 m 
from the explosion were dried as a consequence of the thermal radiation. The 
ejected fragments were distributed over a range of 200 m from the accident place. 
Even though there were a large number of spectators, none of them was wounded 
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when the explosion-fireball occurred, as the firefighters had obliged them to 
withdraw to a safe distance (Planas et al., 2015). 
These two cases are a good example of the importance of the safety measures taken by 
the emergency managers concerning both the firefighters and the people in the zone. 
Unfortunately, in many cases these measures –which can be very simple– are ignored, 
with lethal consequences. In this chapter, the results obtained from the historical analysis 
and from the application of BLEVE and fireball mathematical models are used to define 
the main measures which should be taken in these accidents, with an especial emphasis 
in the transportation of LNG and LPG. 
 
6.2 Amount of hazardous materials involved 
For safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail and road, several regulations and 
treaties exist in different parts of the world (e.g., ADR (2015), RID (2015), etc.). The UN 
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods developed by the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council's Committee of Experts on the Transport of 
Dangerous Goods (2011) is the basis for many national and international regulations. 
However, the regulations could be different in diverse parts of the world. 
In road and rail tankers carrying flammable liquefied gasses is mandatory to be equipped 
with pressure relief valves and also with thermal protection in North America, but not in 
Europe (Birk, 2014; Paltrinieri et al., 2009). Based on US Department of Transportation 
(DOT), the diverse classes of tankers, especially tank cars, must follow a specific marking 
system which shows the information about the tank. For example, the class of DOT 
111A60ALW1 for a tank car has the following meaning (Figure 6-1): 
 
 
Figure 6-1.US marking system for tank cars. 
 
According to the US Department of Transportation (DOT), several classes of tank cars 
and cargo tanks are available for the transportation of pressurized gases. There are about 
five classes within the regulations: DOT-105,-109,-112,-114 and -120 for LPG rail 
111 A 60 AL W 1DOT
Authorizing agency Class designation Separator character Tank test pressure 
(PSI)
Type of material 
used in tank 
construction 
Type of weld used Other car features 
(e.g., fittings, 
Linings)
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transportations; and DOT-113 for LNG rail transportations. Moreover, MC-330 and -331 
are used as LPG cargo tanks and MC-338 is in the case of LNG transportations based on 
the regulations.  
 In this chapter, the common classes of tank cars and cargo tanks used for transportation 
of LPG and LNG have been taken from the US Department of Transportation. The main 
regulations for calculating the required information are based on the US DOT 
(Department of Transportation) for Tank Cars and Cargo Tanks: Code of Federal 
Regulations (2016), Title 49 - sections 173.314, 179.101, 179.301, 179.15, and 179.401-
1 for LPG/LNG tank cars and 173.315 and 173.318 for LPG/LNG cargo tanks. Moreover, 
the experiments from Johnson et al. (1990) and Birk et al (2007) and the report from 
Molag and Kruithof (2006) are also considered for defining the various scenarios. 
Here the analysis will be centered on the appropriate tankers for the transportation of LPG 
and LNG (the materials most frequently involved in BLEVE accidents) by road and rail. 
The classes of tankers and their specific parameters considered in this chapter are 
summarized in Table 6-1:  
 
Table 6-1.Scenarios for different tankers in rail and road 
Substance 
Tank (rail) cars Cargo (road) tanks 
Volume (m3) 











110; 94.1; 63 
90%  1137 kPa 
86%  1500 kPa 
81%  2000 kPa 
64; 45.4; 34.1; 
24.6; 13.2; 
10.6; 2.8 
86%  1500 kPa 
81%  2000 kPa 
Butane 
127.1; 121.1; 
110; 94.1; 63 
90%  1137 kPa 
86%  1500 kPa 
81%  2000 kPa 
64; 45.4; 34.1; 
24.6; 13.2; 
10.6; 2.8 
85%  700 kPa 
76%  1500 kPa 
Methane 111 
91%  206.8 kPa 
87%  482.6 kPa 
85% 689.5 kPa 
56 
94%  103.4 kPa 
93%  137.9 kPa 
91%  206.8 kPa 
90%  275.8 kPa 
89%  344.7 kPa 
87%  482.6 kPa 
85%  689.5 kPa 
*The loading temperature is considered as 288.75 K for Propane and Butane and 113.15 for Methane. 
Different capacities of tank cars and cargo tanks are used in the transportation of LPG. 
The tank car capacities range between 63 m3 and 127.2 m3, and the cargo tank capacities 
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range from 2.8 m3 to 64 m3 (Leffler; 2014). In the case of LNG, the capacities of 111 m3 
and 56 m3 were considered for tank cars and cargo tanks, respectively.    
Evidently, the vessels are not completely filled. The maximum filling degree is in fact 
determined by the existing regulations (which are not the same for all countries) and by 
the properties of the transported material. 
In the European Union this is regulated by the European Agreement concerning the 
International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR); the maximum allowed 
filling degree in the worst conditions (i.e., at the conditions at which the safety relief valve 
will open) is 95%. However, these values correspond to the highest pressure and 
temperature and, therefore, in these conditions the density of LNG will have a 
significantly lower value than the one at loading conditions. Thus, the filling degree when 
loading the tank will have to be lower and will depend on these conditions; furthermore, 
it will depend on the density of the LNG, which will be a function of its composition 
(methane is considered here). If the loading temperature is -160 oC (about 1 barg), the 
density of LNG is 420.18 kg m-3. If the set point for the PRV is about 7 barg (a common 
value, for which the density will be 374.3 kg m-3), then the maximum filling degree when 
loading will be: 





Thus, that assumption (95% filling degree at the safety relief valve condition) will be 
assumed for the diverse calculations here. 
 
6.3 Physical effects from a BLEVE: reach and threshold values 
As it was mentioned in previous chapters, the overpressure wave and ejected fragments 
are the mechanical effects of a BLEVE. Moreover, if the substance is flammable, thermal 
effects will follow the explosion ones.  
6.3.1 Overpressure 
To find the corresponding consequences on people, the Probit expressions (Y) can be 
used. 
Thus, for direct overpressure effects the lethality due to pulmonary hemorrhage can be 
estimated using the following equation (Casal, 2008): 
𝑌 = −77.1 + 6.91 ∙ 𝑙𝑛∆𝑃 (6.1) 
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where ∆𝑃 is the overpressure in N·m-2. As practically usually, transportation accidents 






Figure 6-2. Threshold distances of overpressure for 1% lethality (direct effect). a) Rail tankers; b) Road 
tankers. 
For the 1% of lethality, a threshold value of 103.17 kPa is obtained. The corresponding 
distances for propane, butane and methane (assimilated to natural gas) have been 
calculated for different vessel start-to discharge pressures and volumes (Figure 6-2). In 
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of methane decreases by increasing the start-to-discharge pressure in the road 
transportation according to the defined scenarios in Table 6-1. As it can be seen in this 
figure, the reach for lethality due to overpressure direct effects is quite reduced (up to 
approximately 14 m), as could have been expected: the value required for lethality is 
rather high and the peak overpressure  decreases relatively quickly with the distance. 
 
6.3.2 Ejected fragments 
As for the ejected fragments, the most common vessel breaking patterns are those shown 
in Figure 6-3 (Gubinelli and Cozzani, 2009). Among them, the one dividing the vessel in 
one bottom and the rest is the most frequent one (approximately 60% of cases).  
 
 
Figure 6-3. Most frequent fragmentation patterns of cylindrical vessels. 
 
The prediction of the range of ejected fragments is rather difficult, and an accurate 
prediction is in fact impossible. However, a few authors have proposed expressions to 
calculate in an approximate way the maximum distance which can be reached by the 
fragment originated from cylindrical vessels (those used in transportation). Baum (1988) 
proposed the following expressions: 
For tanks < 5 m3 in capacity:      𝑙 = 90 ∙ 𝑚𝑇
0.33 (6.2) 
 
For tanks > 5 m3 in capacity:      𝑙 = 465 ∙ 𝑚𝑇
0.1 (6.3) 
 
Where 𝑀 is the mass of substance contained in the vessel (kg) and 𝑙 is the range (m). 
The resulting distances for different values of vessel volume and filling degree have been 
calculated (Figure 6-4). Very large distances can be covered by the fragments (much 
larger than those found with overpressure). This is due to the special way usually found 
in cylindrical tanks fragmentation, which gives rise to relatively aerodynamical fragments 
which travel in a way similar to that of a rocket or a missile; thus, ranges larger than one 
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kilometer can be reached. Instead, for the case of spherical vessels, shorter distances are 





Figure 6-4. Distances reached by the ejected fragments.a) Rail tankers; b) Road tankers. 
 
Another aspect which should be considered is the direction followed by the fragments. 
Whereas for a spherical vessel this cannot be predicted due to the irregular shape of 
fragments, for cylindrical vessels (those found in road and rail transportation) often the 
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is completely true in some cases (see, for ex., Tivissa accident case), often there is a 
certain scattering; Holden and Reeves (1985) suggested that in 62.5% of cases the 
fragments were ejected in the main axis direction, with a scattering covering an angle of 
45º. 
 
Figure 6-5. Most frequent direction of cylindrical vessel fragments. 
 
6.3.3 Thermal radiation from a fireball 
BLEVE will be probably followed by a fireball if the contained substance is flammable. 
In this situation, predicting the effects of fire and its thermal radiation is crucial from the 
point of view of emergency management and preventive measures. The solid flame model 
(Casal, 2008) can be used as a well-known model to calculate thermal radiation from a 
fireball located at a certain height and distance (Figure 6-6) (see Appendix 2).  
 
 
Figure 6-6. Fireball geometry in relation to a given target. 
 
Even though the size and position of the fireball –and of its wake- change with time, 
usually models assuming non-variable values are used, as the error between both 
approaches has been proved to be negligible. Thus, the threshold values for thermal 
radiation were calculated for 1% lethality (with and without protection; protection is 
considered when, as in the case of firefighters, special resistant dresses are used), 1% 
second degree burns (with and without protection) and 1% first degree burns (with and 














Figure 6-7.Variation of the thermal radiation intensity as a function of distance (each point corresponds 
to one of the scenarios specified in Table 6-1; as an example, one of the cases has been indicated). a) Rail 










































Propane 1% lethality (unprotected) Propane 1% lethality (protected)
Propane 1% second degree burns (unprotected) Propane 1% first degree burns (unprotected)
Butane 1% lethality (unprotected) Butane 1% lethality (protected)
Butane 1% second degree burns (unprotected) Butane 1% first degree burns (unprotected)
Methane 1% lethality (unprotected) Methane 1% lethality (protected)












































Propane 1% lethality (unprotected) Propane 1% lethality (protected)
Propane 1% second degree burns (unprotected) Propane 1% first degree burns (unprotected)
Butane 1% lethality (unprotected) Butane 1% lethality (protected)
Butane 1% second degree burns (unprotected) Butane 1% first degree burns (unprotected)
Methane 1% lethality (unprotected) Methane 1% lethality (protected)
Methane 1% second degree burns (unprotected) Methane 1% first degree burns (unprotected)
V = 10,6 m3
Filling degree = 81%
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The variation of the thermal intensity radiation corresponding to each threshold value as 
a function of the distance (Figure 6-6) has been plotted in Figure 6-7 for the different 
scenarios specified in Table 6-1. Due to geometrical reasons, the variation of the intensity 
with the distance is more important at short distances. In all cases, large distances are 
required to avoid consequences on people, much higher than those corresponding to 
overpressure wave. 
 
6.4 Discussion  
The values obtained from the data exposed in the previous section have allowed the 
calculation of the distances corresponding to the lethality threshold (1% lethality) for both 
blast and thermal radiation. It is obvious that blast damage reach is much shorter in all 
cases than thermal effects, therefore only thermal effects and fragments distances will be 
taken into account here to consider the order of magnitude that evacuation distances 
should cover. The values obtained for the maximum distances corresponding to thermal 
radiation lethality have been summarized in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6-2. Maximum distances for the thermal radiation consequences 
Consequences 
Maximum distance for the consequence (m) 
Propane Butane Methane 
Rail Road Rail Road Rail Road 
1% lethality (protected) 370 270 370 265 280 205 
1% lethality (unprotected) 430 310 425 305 325 240 
1% second degree burns (unprotected) 440 320 440 315 335 245 
1% first degree burns (unprotected) 670 490 665 480 515 380 
 
Approximate distances of 500 m (LPG) and 400 m (LNG) have been obtained for the 
typical tanks used in road transport, while approximate distances of  700 m (LPG) and 
550 m (LNG) have been obtained in the case of rail transportation, due to the larger size 
of the tanks and the higher amounts of dangerous material usually transported. These 
values, together with those obtained for the ejection of fragments (Table 6-3), give 
therefore an idea of the order of magnitude of the evacuation distances that should be 
considered in these type of accidents. 
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Table 6-3. Maximum distance for the fragments reach 
Consequence 
Maximum distance for the fragments reach  (m) 
Propane Butane Methane 
Rail Road Rail Road Rail Road 
Ejected fragments 1390 1295 1410 1310 1350 1265 
 
Once the police or the firefighters reach the location of the accidents, probably there will 
be a certain number of people in the area covered by the aforementioned effects. The time 
required by firefighters can vary significantly, but some values have been suggested; see, 
as an example, those in Table 6-4. Depending on this time and on the accident 
circumstances, the explosion could happen before firefighters’ arrival (the time to failure 
can be estimated for a vessel subjected to a fire, but in the case of a road or rail accident 
the correlations proposed are not at all liable), or a short time after, or even more than one 
hour later. 
 
Table 6-4.Approximate fire brigade response time for effective prevention of a BLEVE, including the time 
to get a supporting water supply over 2.5 km (Molag and Kruithof, 2006) 
Accident location 
Fire brigade response time (minutes) 
Tank vehicle Tank wagon 
City center, urban area, industrial area 45 105 
Rural area 75 105 
Highway with multiple accident and 
blocked access for fire brigade 
75 - 
 
Therefore, it is evident that, in a situation that can lead to a BLEVE-fireball certain 
emergency measures must be taken as soon as possible. 
 
6.5 Recommendations 
In road or rail transportation of dangerous materials, especially flammable liquids or 
liquefied flammable gasses, if there is a situation (fire affecting a tank) which can 
potentially lead to a BLEVE followed by a fireball the following points should be taken 
into account and applied in order to avoid or reduce the consequences on people: 
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 The BLEVE –probably followed by a fireball– can occur at any moment from the 
beginning of the accident. 
 People should be evacuated to a distance of at least 700 m and preferably –if possible– 
to 1200 or 1400 m. 
 Unless there is the need of rescuing someone from the trucks or wagons that suffered 




Chapter 7. CONCLUSIONS 
The work done in this thesis has allowed the following summarized conclusions: 
1. A series of definitions for a BLEVE exist in the literature, many of them not 
completely correct (some of them assuming that it is a fireball). The following 
definition has been proposed. “A BLEVE is the explosion of a vessel containing a 
liquid (or liquid plus vapor) at a temperature significantly above its boiling point 
at atmospheric pressure”. 
2. The historical survey performed on 330 accidents has confirmed the importance 
of domino effect in enlarging the scale and consequences of major accidents, 
especially with flammable substances such as LPG, gasoline and other 
hydrocarbons. It has also confirmed the influence of human factor, still very 
important, primarily in developing countries. The analysis has clearly shown the 
positive results of the regulating measures applied in the developed countries, as 
correspond to the developing ones. 
3. 127 BLEVE accidents were also analyzed. Half of them occurred in 
transportation, essentially by rail and road, and almost 20% in transfer 
(loading/unloading) operations. 
4. The specific analysis of those sequences leading to a BLEVE has shown that fire 
is the most important escalation vector, triggering almost 70% of cases. The 
existence of fireproofing and safety relief valves can reduce the chance of BLEVE 
or mitigate its effects, but they can not guarantee preventing it. 
5. The analysis of the time to failure when fire affects a vessel has given values 
ranging from 69 s up to several hours. This time depends on the specific 
circumstances of each case (damage of fireproofing, jet fire impingement) and its 
accurate prediction is practically impossible. 
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6. The comparative of the diverse methods available in the literature to calculate the 
mechanical effects of these explosions has shown that those based on real gas 
behavior and adiabatic irreversible expansion and the ones based on the liquid 
superheating energy give the values closest to the experimental ones, even though 
some authors prefer to use other which are more conservative. 
7. The analysis of these methods has shown as well that none of them takes into 
consideration the “superheat limit temperature”. This is a concept which should 
be considered of theoretical interest for the phenomenological interpretation of 
BLEVE, but without any practical application when calculating it effects in real 
situations.  
8. A linear relationship has been detected between the vessel temperature and filling 
level and the mechanical energy of a BLEVE. Based on this fact, a new method 
has been developed to calculate the energy released in the explosion, which is 
simple and easy to apply. 
9. The analysis of both a large number of accidents and of the mechanical effects 
(overpressure, ejection of fragments) of BLEVEs has proved that in a situation in 
which fire is affecting a closed vessel which contains a liquid or liquid plus vapor, 
the explosion can occur at any moment from the beginning of the emergency. 
Therefore, evacuation should be immediately applied. An evacuation distance of 
at least 700 m is proposed, although 1,200 m or 1,400 m would be much better 








Δ𝐵 Batch availability, J·mol-1 
𝑐𝑝𝑉 Specific heat of the vapour, J·mol
-1·K-1 
𝑐𝑝𝐿,𝑇𝑏 Specific heat of the liquid at atmospheric-pressure boiling point, J·kg
-1·K-1 
𝑐𝑣 Specific heat capacity of vapor for constant volume, kJ·kg
-1·K-1 
𝑒 Explosion energy considering the expansion of the pre-existing vapour plus the 
vapour generated in the flashing of the liquid per cubic meter, MJ.m-3 
𝐸 Explosion energy considering only the expansion of the pre-existing vapour, J 
𝐸∗ Explosion energy considering the expansion of the pre-existing vapour plus the 
vapour generated in the flashing of the liquid, J 
𝐸𝑤 Part of the explosion energy used to generate the pressure wave, J 
𝑓 Mass fraction of liquid vaporized in the depressurization, -- 
ℎ𝐿0 Enthalpy of the liquid in the vessel at atmospheric-pressure boiling point, J·kg
-1 
ℎ𝐿 Enthalpy of the liquid in the vessel at conditions just before the explosion, J·kg
-1 
∆ℎ𝑣,𝑇𝑏 Latent heat of vaporization at atmospheric-pressure boiling point, J·kg
-1 
Δ𝐻𝑐 Heat of combustion of the fuel, J·kg
-1 
Δ𝐻𝑇𝑁𝑇 TNT heat of explosion, J·kg
-1 
𝐿 Volume of liquid in the vessel just before the explosion, m3 
𝑚𝐿0 Mass of liquid at the final state of the isentropic process, kg 
𝑚𝐿 Mass of liquid in the vessel at conditions just before explosion, kg 
𝑚𝑇 Total mass of the vessel content, kg 
𝑚𝑇𝑁𝑇 Equivalent mass of TNT, kg 
𝑚𝑉 Mass of vapour in the vessel at conditions just before explosion, kg 
𝑚𝑉0 Mass of vapour at the final state of the isentropic process, kg 
𝑃 Pressure in the vessel just before explosion, Pa 
𝑃𝑐 Critical pressure, Pa 
𝑃0 Atmospheric pressure, Pa 
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𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑝 Failure pressure, Pa 
𝑃𝑠 Overpressure at a given distance, Pa 
𝑟0 Distance between the centre of the explosion or the centre of the fireball and the 
point at which the overpressure or the radiation has to be estimated, m 
𝑅 Ideal gas constant, 8.3145 J·mol-1·K-1 
?̅? Scaled distance, m·kg-3 
𝑅𝑠 Sachs Scaled distance, -- 
𝑆𝐿 Specific entropy of the liquid at conditions just before explosion, J·kg
-1·K-1 
𝑆𝐿0 Specific entropy of the liquid at the final state of the adiabatic process, J·kg
-1·K-1 
𝑆𝑉 Specific entropy of the vapour at conditions just before explosion, J·kg
-1·K-1 
𝑆𝑉0 Specific entropy of the vapour at the final state of the adiabatic process, J·kg
-1·K-1 
𝑆𝐸 Superheating energy of liquid, kJ·kg-1 or MJ·m-3 
𝑇 Temperature of the vapour in the vessel just before the explosion, K 
𝑇𝑏 Atmospheric-pressure boiling point, K 
𝑇𝑐 Critical temperature, K 
𝑇0 Ambient temperature, K 
𝑇𝑝0 Temperature at atmospheric pressure, K 
𝑇𝑠𝑙 Superheat limit temperature, K 
𝑇𝑠𝑙−𝐸 Superheat limit temperature from energy balance, K 
𝑢𝐿 Specific internal energy of the liquid at conditions just before explosion, J·kg
-1 
𝑢𝐿0 Specific internal energy of the liquid at the final state of the adiabatic process, 
J·kg-1 
𝑢𝑉 Specific internal energy of the vapour at conditions just before explosion, J·kg
-1 
𝑢𝑉0 Specific internal energy of the vapour at the final state of the adiabatic process, 
J·kg-1 
𝑈 Overall internal energy of the vessel at conditions just before the explosion, J 
∆𝑈 Overall variation of the internal energy of the vessel content, J 
𝑣𝑉0 Specific volume of vapour at the final state of the adiabatic process, m
3·kg-1 
Chapter 6. Considerations on emergency management in transport accidents which can lead to BLEVE 
141 
𝑣𝐿0 Specific volume of liquid at the final state of the adiabatic process, m
3·kg-1 
𝑉 Volume of vapour in the vessel just before the explosion, m3 
𝑉𝑓 Volume of vapour generated in the flashing of the liquid, m
3 
𝑉𝑇 Total vessel volume, m
3 
𝑉∗ Total volume of vapour contributing to the explosion at conditions just before the 
explosion, m3 
∆𝑉 Volume variation of the total content of the vessel when going from the explosion 
state to atmospheric pressure conditions, m3 
𝑊 Expansion work, J·mol-1 
𝑥 Vapour fraction (with respect to the total mass) at the final state of the adiabatic 
irreversible process 
𝑥𝑉 Fraction of the vapour mass at explosion state that does not condense when going 
to the final state of the isentropic process 
𝑥𝐿 Fraction of the liquid mass at explosion state that flashes to vapour when going to 
the final state of the isentropic process 
𝑦𝑖 i
th value of the variable to be predicted  
?̂?𝑖 the predicted value of yi 
?̅?𝑖 the mean value of the response variable  
 
Greek Letters 
𝛽 Fraction of the explosion energy converted into blast wave, -- 
𝛾 Ratio of constant pressure to constant volume specific heats of the gas in the 
vessel, -- 
𝜌𝑉 Density of the saturated vapour at conditions just before explosion, kg·m
-3 
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Appendix 1. MATLAB Artificial Neural Network functions for 
propane and butane 
The ANN function for propane is: 
function [Y,Xf,Af] = propanepredictor3(X,~,~) 
%MYNEURALNETWORKFUNCTION neural network simulation function. 
% 
% Generated by Neural Network Toolbox function genFunction, 20-Jul-
2015 10:17:45. 
%  
% [Y] = myNeuralNetworkFunction(X,~,~) takes these arguments: 
%  
%   X = 1xTS cell, 1 inputs over TS timsteps 
%   Each X{1,ts} = 2xQ matrix, input #1 at timestep ts. 
%  
% and returns: 
%   Y = 1xTS cell of 1 outputs over TS timesteps. 
%   Each Y{1,ts} = 1xQ matrix, output #1 at timestep ts. 
%  





  % ===== NEURAL NETWORK CONSTANTS ===== 
   
  % Input 1 
  x1_step1_xoffset = [300;0.007]; 
  x1_step1_gain = [0.0307692307692308;2.03458799593082]; 
  x1_step1_ymin = -1; 
   
  % Layer 1 
  b1 = [-1.4006238480645015;-1.3795979575436832;-
0.14059650543583493;0.2631971132089671;0.038261783010536697]; 
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  % Layer 2 
  b2 = -0.1202331016783611; 
  LW2_1 = [-0.86414413858158401 0.54741455066742639 3.1600126032151543 
1.1380493679600932 1.1103236663066267]; 
   
  % Output 1 
  y1_step1_ymin = -1; 
  y1_step1_gain = 0.186586503576241; 
  y1_step1_xoffset = 0.95; 
   
  % ===== SIMULATION ======== 
   
  % Format Input Arguments 
  isCellX = iscell(X); 
  if ~isCellX, X = {X}; end; 
   
  % Dimensions 
  TS = size(X,2); % timesteps 
  if ~isempty(X) 
    Q = size(X{1},2); % samples/series 
  else 
    Q = 0; 
  end 
   
  % Allocate Outputs 
  Y = cell(1,TS); 
   
  % Time loop 
  for ts=1:TS 
   
    % Input 1 
    Xp1 = 
mapminmax_apply(X{1,ts},x1_step1_gain,x1_step1_xoffset,x1_step1_ymin); 
     
    % Layer 1 
    a1 = tansig_apply(repmat(b1,1,Q) + IW1_1*Xp1); 
     
    % Layer 2 
    a2 = repmat(b2,1,Q) + LW2_1*a1; 
     
    % Output 1 
    Y{1,ts} = 
mapminmax_reverse(a2,y1_step1_gain,y1_step1_xoffset,y1_step1_ymin); 
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  end 
   
  % Final Delay States 
  Xf = cell(1,0); 
  Af = cell(2,0); 
   
  % Format Output Arguments 
  if ~isCellX, Y = cell2mat(Y); end 
end 
  
% ===== MODULE FUNCTIONS ======== 
  
% Map Minimum and Maximum Input Processing Function 
function y = 
mapminmax_apply(x,settings_gain,settings_xoffset,settings_ymin) 
  y = bsxfun(@minus,x,settings_xoffset); 
  y = bsxfun(@times,y,settings_gain); 
  y = bsxfun(@plus,y,settings_ymin); 
end 
  
% Sigmoid Symmetric Transfer Function 
function a = tansig_apply(n) 
  a = 2 ./ (1 + exp(-2*n)) - 1; 
end 
  
% Map Minimum and Maximum Output Reverse-Processing Function 
function x = 
mapminmax_reverse(y,settings_gain,settings_xoffset,settings_ymin) 
  x = bsxfun(@minus,y,settings_ymin); 
  x = bsxfun(@rdivide,x,settings_gain); 
  x = bsxfun(@plus,x,settings_xoffset); 
end 
 
The ANN function for butane is: 
function [Y,Xf,Af] = butanepredictor2(X,~,~) 
%MYNEURALNETWORKFUNCTION neural network simulation function. 
% 
% Generated by Neural Network Toolbox function genFunction, 20-Jul-
2015 10:53:18. 
%  
% [Y] = myNeuralNetworkFunction(X,~,~) takes these arguments: 
%  
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%   X = 1xTS cell, 1 inputs over TS timsteps 
%   Each X{1,ts} = 2xQ matrix, input #1 at timestep ts. 
%  
% and returns: 
%   Y = 1xTS cell of 1 outputs over TS timesteps. 
%   Each Y{1,ts} = 1xQ matrix, output #1 at timestep ts. 
%  





  % ===== NEURAL NETWORK CONSTANTS ===== 
   
  % Input 1 
  x1_step1_xoffset = [283;0.000615966428987831]; 
  x1_step1_gain = [0.0166666666666667;2.00295823639263]; 
  x1_step1_ymin = -1; 
   
  % Layer 1 
  b1 = [-0.53771579361104227;-
0.59598487453006654;0.66879204443674933;-2.2071537928682843]; 




   
  % Layer 2 
  b2 = -0.31980020721414332; 
  LW2_1 = [-0.26677419106558381 -1.8163939923560939 -
2.4486523332602506 -0.36715175364696184]; 
   
  % Output 1 
  y1_step1_ymin = -1; 
  y1_step1_gain = 0.151254042096522; 
  y1_step1_xoffset = 0.0571057339899198; 
   
  % ===== SIMULATION ======== 
   
  % Format Input Arguments 
  isCellX = iscell(X); 
  if ~isCellX, X = {X}; end; 
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  % Dimensions 
  TS = size(X,2); % timesteps 
  if ~isempty(X) 
    Q = size(X{1},2); % samples/series 
  else 
    Q = 0; 
  end 
   
  % Allocate Outputs 
  Y = cell(1,TS); 
   
  % Time loop 
  for ts=1:TS 
   
    % Input 1 
    Xp1 = 
mapminmax_apply(X{1,ts},x1_step1_gain,x1_step1_xoffset,x1_step1_ymin); 
     
    % Layer 1 
    a1 = tansig_apply(repmat(b1,1,Q) + IW1_1*Xp1); 
     
    % Layer 2 
    a2 = repmat(b2,1,Q) + LW2_1*a1; 
     
    % Output 1 
    Y{1,ts} = 
mapminmax_reverse(a2,y1_step1_gain,y1_step1_xoffset,y1_step1_ymin); 
  end 
   
  % Final Delay States 
  Xf = cell(1,0); 
  Af = cell(2,0); 
   
  % Format Output Arguments 
  if ~isCellX, Y = cell2mat(Y); end 
end 
  
% ===== MODULE FUNCTIONS ======== 
  
% Map Minimum and Maximum Input Processing Function 
function y = 
mapminmax_apply(x,settings_gain,settings_xoffset,settings_ymin) 
  y = bsxfun(@minus,x,settings_xoffset); 
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  y = bsxfun(@times,y,settings_gain); 
  y = bsxfun(@plus,y,settings_ymin); 
end 
  
% Sigmoid Symmetric Transfer Function 
function a = tansig_apply(n) 
  a = 2 ./ (1 + exp(-2*n)) - 1; 
end 
  
% Map Minimum and Maximum Output Reverse-Processing Function 
function x = 
mapminmax_reverse(y,settings_gain,settings_xoffset,settings_ymin) 
  x = bsxfun(@minus,y,settings_ymin); 
  x = bsxfun(@rdivide,x,settings_gain); 




Appendix 2. Solid flame model 
The procedure for calculating thermal radiation (𝐼, 𝑘𝑊 𝑚−2) reaching a given target is as 
follows: 
𝐼 = 𝜏 ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝐸𝑝 (A.1) 
 
Where, 
𝜏 is the atmospheric transmissivity (-)  
𝐹 is the view factor (-) 
𝐸𝑝 is the average emissive power of the flames (kWm
-2). 
 
The atmospheric transmissivity can be calculated as: 
𝜏 = 1.53 ∙ (𝑃𝑤 ∙ 𝑑)
−0.06      for   𝑃𝑤 ∙ 𝑑 < 10
4 N.m-1 (A.2) 
𝜏 = 2.02 ∙ (𝑃𝑤 ∙ 𝑑)
−0.09      for   104 ≤ 𝑃𝑤 ∙ 𝑑 ≤ 10
5 N.m-1 (A.3) 
𝜏 = 2.85 ∙ (𝑃𝑤 ∙ 𝑑)
−0.12      for   𝑃𝑤 ∙ 𝑑 > 10
5 N.m-1 (A.4) 
 
Where, 
 𝑃𝑤 is the partial pressure of water in the atmosphere (N·m
-2) 
𝑑 is the distance between the surface of the flame and the target (m) 
 
𝑃𝑤  is estimated as: 





𝑃𝑤𝑎 can be estimated by considering the atmospheric condition of 𝑇𝑎 = 289.15 𝐾 and 
𝑅𝐻 = 50% : 
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Where 𝑃𝑤𝑎 is in N·m
-2. 
 
An average value of the emissive power is calculated as: 
𝐸𝑝 =
𝜂𝑟𝑎𝑑 ∙ 𝑀 ∙ ∆𝐻𝑐
𝜋 ∙ 𝐷2 ∙ 𝑡
 (A.7) 
Where, 
 𝑡 is the duration of the fireball (s) 
∆𝐻𝑐 is the heat of combustion (lower value) of the fuel (kJ·kg
-1) 
𝜂𝑟𝑎𝑑  is the radiant heat fraction (-) 
 
The radiant heat fraction can be calculated as: 
𝜂𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 0.00325 ∙ 𝑃
0.32 (A.8) 
 
Where 𝑃 is the pressure in the vessel just before the explosion in N·m-2. The value of 
radiant heat fraction usually ranges from 0.2 and 0.4; however, its maximum value is 
limited to 0.4. The view factor, diameter of fireball, the time corresponding to the duration 
of the fireball, the height to the center of fireball and the distance between the fireball 







𝐷 = 5.8 ∙ 𝑀
1
3⁄  (A.10) 
𝑡 = 0.9 ∙ 𝑀0.25 (A.11) 
𝐻 = 0.75 ∙ 𝐷 (A.12) 
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The effects of thermal flux on human beings can be estimated with the Probit equations 
(Casal, 2008): 
First degree burns (FDB): 
𝑌 = −39.83 + 3.0186 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (𝑡 ∙ 𝐼
4
3⁄ ) (A.14) 
 
 
Second-degree burns (SDB) 
𝑌 = −43.14 + 3.0186 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (𝑡 ∙ 𝐼
4
3⁄ ) (A.15) 
 
Lethality (unprotected) (L) 
𝑌 = −36.38 + 2.56 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (𝑡 ∙ 𝐼
4
3⁄ ) (A.16) 
 
Lethality (protected) (LP): 
𝑌 = −37.23 + 2.56 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (𝑡 ∙ 𝐼
4
3⁄ ) (A.17) 
 
Where, 
𝐼 is the radiation intensity in W·m-2 
𝑡 is the exposure time in seconds  
 
 
